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INTRODUCTION

Successor liability is an exception to the general rule that when
one corporate or other juridical person sells assets to another entity, the
assets are transferred free and clear of all but valid liens and security
interests. When successor liability is imposed, a creditor or plaintiff with
a claim against the seller may assert that claim against and collect
payment from the purchaser.
Historically, successor liability was a flexible doctrine, designed to
eliminate the harsh results that could attend strict application of
corporate law. Over time, however, as successor liability doctrines
evolved, they became in many jurisdictions ossified and lacking in
flexibility. As this occurred, corporate lawyers and those who structure
transactions learned how to avoid application of successor liability
doctrines, rendering the unpaid creditors’ claims as externalities, 1 whose
cost is borne by the creditors or by society, but not by the transferee or
transferor. This article examines what has become of various species of
non-statutory successor liability with an eye to determining which of
these species have retained sufficient flexibility to serve the doctrines’
original purposes, as well as those which continue to incentivize the
parties to assess, allocate, and insure against the claims—those which
have become so ossified that they almost invite their own defeat by
attorneys of even moderate sophistication.
Successor liability does not consist of just one doctrine or
exception to the general corporate rule of non-liability for asset
purchasers, but of many. There are two broad groups of successor
liability doctrines, those that are judge-made (the “common law”
exceptions) and those that are creatures of statute. 2 Both represent a
Externality: An effect of one economic agent’s actions on another, such that
one agent’s decisions make another better or worse off by changing their utility
or cost. Beneficial effects are positive externalities; harmful ones are negative
externalities. www-personal.umich.edu/~alandear/glossary/e.html (last visited
July 5, 2013.)
1

The descriptive portions of this article present a fairly detailed taxonomy of
the species of successor liability that are applicable in United States
jurisdictions. This discussion does not discuss statutory successor liability,
which is beyond the scope of this article.

2

2017] A TAXONOMY AND EVALUATION OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY (REVISITED) 743

distinct public policy that in certain instances and for certain liabilities,
the general rule of non-liability of a successor for a predecessor’s debts
following an asset sale should not apply. With regard to the judge-made
doctrines, some commentators have asserted that they are basically a
species of liability based upon fraud. 3 Others have argued that they are
based upon an inherently equitable notion that, in certain instances, the
purchaser must take the bad (the liabilities) with the good (the assets). 4
Still others, embracing a type of result-oriented formalism, have found
that the liability arises out of an interest in the property sold that is akin
to an in rem interest that is said to “run with the land.” 5

See, e.g., Marie T. Reilly, Making Sense of Successor Liability, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV.
745 (2003). Professor Reilly’s article argues that basing successor liability on
fraud or fraud-like conduct is different from basing it on a form-over-substance
approach. Id. This author disagrees. While “fraud” is a strong word, the first
thing that comes to mind to an attorney structuring a transaction that might be
challenged as fraudulent or otherwise avoidable is whether or not there are any
rigid doctrines of law that can be employed to shelter the transaction from later
challenges, often by elevating form over substance. This article argues that the
evolution of successor liability toward a set of inflexible standards and the use
of anti-successor liability findings of fact and conclusions of law in 11 U.S.C. §
363(f) (2006) sale orders represent just this sort of transactional planning
though elevation of form (and forum) over substance. Form over substance
can be very alluring to those faced with difficult, otherwise fact-based
determinations and opinions. See also, e.g., Joseph H. King, Jr., Limiting the
Vicarious Liability of Franchisors for the Torts of their Franchisees, 62 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 417 (2005) (proposing that franchisors that take reasonable steps to
require franchisees to display a notice indicating the franchise is independently
owned and operated and to require franchisees to carry reasonable levels of
insurance should be insulated from liability for their franchisee’s torts,
seemingly without regard to whether or not such insurance is actually in force).
4 See, e.g., Jerry J. Phillips, Symposium: The Passage of Time: The Implications
for Product Liability, Product Line Continuity and Successor Corporation Liability, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 906 (1983).
3

David Gray Carlson, Successor Liability in Bankruptcy: Some Unifying Themes of
Intertemporal Creditor Priorities Created By Running Covenants, Product Liability, and
Toxic-Waste Clean Up, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119 (1987).

5
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6

This article examines judge-made successor liability and offers a
number of observations. First, our current judge-made successor liability
law is a product of the rise of corporate law in the last half of the 19th
century and early part of the 20th century. In fact, it appears to have
developed because of, and in reaction to, the rise of corporate law. It
may be better to characterize it as a part of that body of law, much like
the “alter ego” or “piercing the corporate veil” doctrines, 7 rather than as
a simple creature of tort law, despite it being used as a tool by plaintiffs
who are involuntary tort claimants.
Many sources and authorities list four to six basic types of
situations in which judge-made successor liability has sometimes been
recognized: (1) express or implied assumption, (2) fraud, (3) de facto
merger, (4) mere continuation, (5) continuity of enterprise, and (6)
product line. 8 In fact, the matter is more complicated than that. Each of
these species of successor liability has, within it, different sub-species
with different standards and variations in the jurisdictions that recognize
them. Some use a list of mandatory elements, while others are based on
a non-exclusive list of factors and considerations to be weighed and
balanced in a “totality of the circumstances” fashion. Some that began
as an approach consisting of a flexible list of factors have evolved into
This article does not address the independent duty to warn that a successor
may have when it learns that the predecessor placed defective goods in the
market or into the stream of commerce prior to the sale of assets from the
predecessor to the successor. This represents another, independent ground of
liability upon which to pursue a successor when the liability in question is one
caused by a defective product. This independent duty to warn is available as a
parallel cause of action to successor liability in the defective product context
and there is no need for a plaintiff to elect one theory or the other; both may be
pursued through to judgment.

6

See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Collapsing Corporate Structures: Resolving the
Tension Between Form and Substance, 60 BUS. LAW. 109 (2004).
7

See Savage Arms, Inc. v. W. Auto Supply Co., 18 P.3d 49, 53–54 (Alaska 2001)
(discussing varied approaches to determinations of whether successor liability
was a creature of contract and corporate law or tort law as part of its choice of
law analysis and concluding that successor liability is a tort law doctrine
designed to expand products liability law; collecting cases and other authorities
on both sides of the issue).

8
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one consisting of one or more mandatory elements. In any event, to
state that there are only four to six categories is to oversimplify the
matter. 9 Even so, this approach has been furthered by the Restatement
(Third) of Torts, Products Liability, which seems to have misstated,
rather than restated, the law in this area. 10
Even in those jurisdictions that appear to have expanded the
number of recognized categories of successor liability, there appears to
be a long-term trend to limit the applicability of the successor liability
doctrines by stating the applicable standard in the form of a bright-line
rule or set of rules. This trend toward bright-line rules threatens the
original purpose of successor liability, which was born to serve as a
counterbalance to corporate law’s limitation-of-liability protections
afforded to asset purchasers. Like the “alter ego” or “piercing the
corporate veil” doctrines, it was originally a set of extremely fact-specific
and context-sensitive standards based upon an examination of nonexclusive lists of flexible factors rather than rigid bright-lines rules.
To serve its original purpose as a safety valve ensuring just results
in the face of corporate law’s limitations on liability, successor liability
should remain more flexible and fluid so that its applications can be
adjusted as new forms of transactions are developed and pursued. It is
natural for capital to be deployed, harvested, and redeployed in a manner
that maximizes the externalities, the costs that society, not the invested
capital, must bear. It is natural to attempt to separate liabilities by
creating negative externalities for existing creditors and future claimants
whenever possible. Successor liability stands as a doctrine to regulate or
moderate this behavior and to prevent the dominance of corporate law
principles in situations where injustice would result. This, in turn, can
force the transferee and transferor to bargain and allocate the risk of
unpaid and future claims between themselves.
The variance in states’ approaches to successor liability and to the related
doctrines of alter ego or piercing the corporate veil is one of the reasons that
the federal courts have adopted a uniform federal common law of these
subjects under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2005); see
United States v. General Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 298–301 (3d Cir. 2005)
(collecting authorities).
10 See infra notes 138–146 and accompanying text.
9
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Development of a bright-line standard for successor liability sets
the stage for avoiding that liability when asset purchasers are represented
by competent counsel. Once a rigid standard or safe-harbor has
emerged, the transaction can be structured so that the standard is
avoided or the safe-harbor invoked. Successor liability emerged over
one hundred years ago in reaction to the rise of insulation of capital from
liability under corporate law. Since then there has been a trend toward
uniform statements of the successor liability doctrines and
transformation of flexible standards into rigid ones. This trend seems to
indicate that corporate law, in the long run, is winning the struggle
against these exceptions to the no-liability-for-asset-purchaser rule.
Especially in the case of the future tort claims, corporate law thus
encourages the externalization of these claims. As a result, it is future
claimants and society who are left to bear these claims, rather than the
parties who benefited from the act that gave rise to them.
Section one of this article examines the emergence of successor
liability at the time of the rise of corporate law. Section two details the
subspecies of the various judge-made doctrines that exist under the
current state of the law. Section three examines the gravitation of the
doctrine from a fluid model, which is difficult to draft around with
confidence, to a rigid one that makes this effort much easier. Section
three also examines the use of a federal court order to accomplish what
the mere agreements of the parties cannot: preemptive bars of successor
liability claims.
The article concludes that the purpose of the doctrine or
doctrines was to provide contract and tort creditors with an avenue for
recovery in appropriate cases against successor entities when the
predecessor that contracted with them or committed the tort, or the
action that later gave rise to the tort, had sold substantially all of its assets
and was no longer a viable source of recovery. 11 Its various species acted
Successor liability is not limited, as sometimes claimed, to the field of product
liability claims. Ordinary contract claims and other claims are amenable to
recovery through the doctrine. See Cab-Tek v. E.B.M., Inc., 571 A.2d 671, 673
(Vt. 1990) (rejecting notion of limit of successor liability to product liability
claims).
11
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as a pressure relief valve on the strict limitation of liability created by
corporate law and could force the parties to structure the transaction.
The doctrine is “equitable” in nature insofar as it is invoked when strict
application of corporate law would offend the conscience of the court.
In large part, the doctrine remains intact and still serves that
purpose. However, in those jurisdictions that have either adopted tests
that contain required elements or refused to accept the continuity
doctrines of successor liability, the doctrine has eroded. While failing to
adopt the continuity doctrines may be a laudable example of judicial
restraint and deference to the legislature’s role as the primary law-maker,
the courts’ conversion of flexible factors to rigid, required elements in
generally accepted judge-made doctrine does not appear to serve the
aims of equity or justice. 12 Rather, it promotes sharp lawyering based
upon an elevation of form over substance to protect asset purchasers.
By doing so, instead of incentivizing the parties to bargain and allocate
the risk of these claims between them (or insure against them), it
encourages them to structure the transaction to avoid them entirely,
leaving the creditors or society with the loss. This article concludes that
the species of successor liability that feature non-exclusive lists of factors
to be considered are superior to element-based forms of the doctrine in
terms of serving its initial goals.
For an amusing decision highlighting the error of employing factors as
elements, see Brandon v. Anesthesia & Pain Mgmt. Assocs. Ltd., 419 F.3d 594,
599–600 (7th Cir. 2005).
12

[T]he district judge may have been confused by the “badges of
fraud.” This archaic term, an unfortunate cliché that can have
a mesmerizing force on lawyers and judges, refers to a list of
11 symptoms of fraud . . . . The district judge found that five
of the “badges” were present in this case, short of a majority
and thus not enough, he thought, to prove fraud. But the
symptoms are not addictive. To treat them as such is the
equivalent of saying that if there are 11 common symptoms of
a serious disease, and a patient has only 5 (a low white
corpuscle count, internal bleeding, fever, shortness of breath,
and severe nausea), he is not seriously ill.
Id. at 600.
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Finally, the article presents a detailed appendix of the leading
recent successor liability cases in United States jurisdictions as a guide to
which sub-species of the doctrine can be found in which environments.
Rather than discussing the doctrine in terms of general and often
repeated statements, it makes sense to examine the specific species of
successor liability that are recognized in particular jurisdictions.
Generalities blur distinctions that individualized analyses reveals. It
bears keeping in mind that the state in which an involuntary tort victim
resides will often determine where suit can be brought against a
successor, what law will apply, and thus what species of successor
liability will be available to a plaintiff.
II.

WHAT SUCCESSOR LIABILITY WAS MEANT TO BE

A. The General Rule of No Successor Liability and a Traditional Statement of the
Successor Liability Exceptions
The general rule is that a purchaser of assets for fair
consideration does not become liable for the seller’s liabilities, even when
the purchaser purchases substantially all of the assets of the seller. 13
Absent fraudulent transfers, acquisition of all or substantially all of a
company’s assets is a necessary but, by itself, insufficient element for a
finding of successor liability. 14 Where exceptions to the general rule of
See Schwartz v. McGraw-Edison Co., 14 Cal. App. 3d 767, 780 (1971)
(opinion now flagged by Shepard’s as disapproved, which seems an overly
negative analysis designed to promote further searching and generation of
additional search fees since the California Supreme Court expanded California’s
recognized categories to include the “product line” exception in Ray v. Alad
Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 11 (Cal. 1977)); Husak v. Berkel, Inc., 341 A.2d 174, 176 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1975) (“Ordinarily when one company sells or transfers all its assets
to another company, the latter is not liable for the debts and liabilities of the
transferor simply by virtue of its succession to the transferor’s property.”);
Dana Corp. v. LTV Corp., 668 A.2d 752, 756 (Del. Ch. 1995) (“[A successor]
will be exposed to liability only if a court follows some exception to the
traditional rule that a transfer of assets does not pass liabilities unless the
transferee agrees to assume them.”), aff’d, 670 A.2d 1337 (Del. Super. Ct. 1995)
(unpublished table decision).
13

14 Acheson v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 523 F.2d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir. 1975)
(finding no successor liability as purchaser had not acquired accounts, customer
lists, trade names or goodwill); see also Schwartz, 14 Cal. App. 3d at 781
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no-successor-liability-for-asset-purchaser are accepted, they typically
require an additional element over mere acquisition of substantially all
the assets of an entity to justify imposition of successor liability. 15 The
findings that can constitute the additional element needed to justify
imposition of successor liability on an asset purchaser are commonly said
to include:
(a) An express or implied assumption of liabilities in the
purchase agreement; 16 or
(b) The transfer of assets to the purchaser that is for the
fraudulent purpose of escaping liability for the seller’s
debts; 17 or

(purchaser who did not acquire substantially all of a business and who paid
valuable and adequate consideration was not liable in tort for defective
products manufactured by a seller that continued to exist as a separate
corporate entity with substantial assets to meet its debts).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12 (1998)
(collecting and discussing authorities).

15

See, e.g., Schwartz v. Pillsbury, Inc., 969 F.2d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 1992) (asset
purchaser that acquired franchiser did not expressly or impliedly assume seller’s
tort liability when acquisition agreement expressly limited obligations assumed
to certain specified contracts and agreements of seller); Kessinger v. Grefco,
Inc., 875 F.2d 153, 154 (7th Cir. 1989) (asset purchaser impliedly assumed a
seller’s unforeseen liability for certain tort claims where the purchaser agreed
“to pay, perform and discharge all debts, obligations, contracts and liabilities”
of the seller); Carlos R. Leffler, Inc. v. Hutter, 696 A.2d 157 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1997) (asset purchaser impliedly assumed a liability where other liabilities were
expressly assumed).
16

See, e.g., Schmoll v. ACandS, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 868, 873 (D. Or. 1988)
(finding corporate restructuring was undertaken to avoid liabilities from
asbestos claimants and imposing liability on transferee), aff’d, 977 F.2d 499 (9th
Cir. 1992); Reddy v. Gonzalez, 8 Cal. App. 4th 118, 122 (1992) (under Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act actual intent and inadequate consideration are
alternative requirements for successor liability based upon fraudulent transfer);
see also Husak v. Berkel, Inc., 341 A.2d 174, 176 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975) (using
inadequate consideration paid as alternative factor implying fraudulent purpose,
much like construction fraudulent conveyance theories of recovery).
17
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(c) A transaction amounting to a consolidation or a de facto
merger; 18 or
(d) A purchasing corporation that is merely a continuation of the
seller (in some jurisdictions this has been expanded to
include continuity of enterprise); 19 or
(e) Application of the product line exception, imposing liability
on an asset purchaser that continued production of the
transferor’s product line with the assets purchased. 20
See, e.g., Marks v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1429, 1435–36
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (de facto merger found where one corporation takers all of
another’s assets without providing any consideration to meet the claims of the
seller’s creditors; five factor test for de facto merger: (i) consideration paid for the
assets solely belonging to the purchaser or its parent; (ii) continues the same
enterprise after the sale; (iii) shareholders of the seller corporation become
shareholders of the purchaser; (iv) the seller liquidates; and (v) the buyer
assumes the liabilities of the seller necessary to carry on the business); Drug,
Inc. v. Hunt, 168 A. 87, 96 (Del. 1933) (where consideration for transfer of
assets was stock in transferee and transferee assumed all debts and liabilities of
the transferor, there was a de facto merger); Sweatland v. Park Corp., 587 N.Y.S.
2d 54, 56 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (de facto merger factors include continuity of
ownership, liquidation of predecessor, assumption of liabilities needed to carry
on the business, and continuity of management, personnel, physical location,
assets and general operations).

18

See, e.g., Stanford Hotel Co. v. M. Schwind Co., 181 P. 780 (Cal. 1919) (“mere
continuation successor liability may lie when: (1) no adequate consideration
was given for the acquired assets, and (2) where one or more persons were
officers, directors, or stockholders of both corporations); Turner v. Bituminous
Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 882 (Mich. 1976) (“Continuity is the purpose,
continuity is the watch word, continuity is the fact.”); Bostick v. Schall’s Brakes
& Repairs, Inc., 725 A.2d 1232, 1239 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (reversing summary
judgment and remanding for determination of whether successor was
established to merely continue the former corporation’s operations).

19

In the seminal (or ovular) case of Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977),
California’s courts introduced the product line exception. Since 1977, courts in
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Washington, Mississippi, and New Mexico have
adopted the product line exception, and those of Ohio, Virginia, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Maine, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Iowa, Texas, Georgia,
Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Wisconsin, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Vermont, Florida, Colorado, Illinois, Oregon, and the District of
Columbia have rejected it. See Harris v. T.I., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 605 (Va. 1992);
20
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The first exception, express or implied assumption of liabilities,
is fairly straight-forward. It is based, at least in theory, upon the
voluntary acts and conduct of the purchaser. Similarly, the second
category, fraudulent transfer, is fairly straightforward and the expected
result when a court is faced with what amounts to a corporate shell game
to escape liability. The balance of the exceptions seem to hover around a
common core: They are tests that to one degree or another focus on
one or both of (i) some indicia of a fraudulent-transaction-like scenario
or (ii) the successor’s enjoyment of the benefits of continuing to operate
the business essentially as it was before the transfer. These are two
distinct justifications for successor liability, although the courts do not
always clearly distinguish between them when discussing the doctrines.
B. The Origins of Successor Liability in Railroad Failures and Reorganizations
Although the doctrine is older, or at least has its roots in a much
earlier time, 21 the failure of many railroads around the turn of the century
and their reorganization through asset sales and equity receiverships
Huff v. Shopsmith, Inc., 786 So. 2d 383, 388 (Miss. 2001) (recognizing product
line theory as a viable basis for recovery); Garcia v. Coe Mfg., Co., 933 P.2d
243, 248 (N.M. 1997) (adopting product line theory from Ray v. Alad Corp.);
accord Jordan v. Hawker Dayton Corp., 62 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 1995); Pesce v.
Overhead Door Corp., No. 2-91CV0435 JCH, 1998 WL 34347661 (D. Conn.
Aug. 21, 1998); Bullington v. Union Tool Corp., 328 S.E.2d 726 (Ga. 1985);
Stratton v. Garvey Int’l, Inc., 676 P.2d 1290 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984); Pelc. v.
Bendix Mach. Tool Corp., 314 N.W.2d 614 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Young v.
Fulton Iron Works Co., 709 S.W.2d 927 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Jones v. Johnson
Mach. & Press. Co. of Elkart, Ind., 320 N.W.2d 481 (Neb. 1982); Goucher v.
Parmac, Inc., 694 P.2d 953 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984); Dawejko v. Jorgenson Steel
Co., 434 A.2d 106 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981); Griggs v. Capitol Mach. Works, Inc.,
690 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. App. 1985); Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach., Inc., 387
N.W.2d 515 (S.D. 1986); see also Jeffrey Davis, Cramming Down Future Claims in
Bankruptcy: Fairness, Bankruptcy Policy, Due Process, and the Lessons of the Piper
Reorganization, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 329 (1996) (collecting cases). New York also
rejected the “product line” exception in Semenetz v. Sherling & Walden, Inc.,
851 N.E.2d 1170 (N.Y. 2006), see RICHARD E. KAYE, AM. L. PROD. LIAB. 3d §
7:27 (updated February 2013) and 15 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL.,
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7123.30
(rev. perm. ed. 1983) (updated September 2012) for a list of states that have
accepted or rejected this exception.
21

See, e.g., Gibson v. Stevens, 49 U.S. 384 (1850).
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provides a context in which to see the first real discussion of successor
liability. It also provides examples of when the courts found it prudent
to limit the exceptions to the no-liability-assumption-through-purchaseof-assets rule. Claims of successor liability were fact-driven. Indeed,
depending on the record developed at trial, they might either be
sustained or reversed on appeal. For example, in limiting successor
liability to cases of intentional assumption of liabilities or fraud, a
Colorado court, in reversing the trial court’s perhaps-too-liberal
instruction on successor liability to the jury, explained:
The seventh instruction, to the effect that,
in case the jury should find from the
evidence that the Colorado Springs and
Interurban Railway Company [the
successor]
was
organized
and
incorporated for the purpose and with the
intention, among other things, of
acquiring the property, and thereafter to
carry on the business and affairs, of the
Colorado Springs Rapid Transit Railway
Company [the predecessor], in its place
and stead, the verdict should be against
both defendants, in case it was in favor of
plaintiff, is assigned as effort.
The
interurban company was not charged with
the negligence complained of.
The
complaint alleged that said company was
organized and incorporated in succession
to its co-defendant, and, among other
things, for the purpose of acquiring its
property and to assume its liabilities and
obligations; that thereafter it did purchase
and take over all the property of its codefendant, and that, “by reason thereof, it did
assume all obligations and liabilities then
existing” against said codefendant. The
cause was tried upon the theory that
because all the property of the selling
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company was transferred to the
purchasing company, therefore, and
thereby, the latter company actually or
impliedly assumed all the obligations and
liabilities of the other . . . .
The
allegations of the complaint and the
evidence in support thereof were not
sufficient to sustain a judgment against
the Colorado Springs & Interurban
Railway Company . . . .
There is no
allegation or proof that the purchasing
company expressly agreed to pay or
assume the obligations, nor evidence of
intention to pay the claim sued upon, but
any such intention was expressly denied;
nor that the new corporation was merely
the old one under a new name. It was
alleged and shown that the new company
was incorporated for the purpose of not
only taking over the property of its
codefendant, but for other purposes,
among which was the purchase of the
property of another and similar railway
company, which it did purchase and take
over. There was no consolidation under
the statute imposing liability. The rule
is . . . that, in order that a promise may be
implied on the part of a corporation to
pay the debts of another corporation, to
the property and franchises of which it
has succeeded by valid purchase, the
conduct relied upon must show such an
intention . . . . If any ground of liability is
alleged or disclosed, it is that of fraud,
actual or constructive, by which in respect
to the property, the purchasing company
may be held liable in equity to creditors of

754
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the old corporation, if fraud is shown in
the transfer . . . . 22
Thus, this court made it clear that corporate law anti-successor-liability
principles were dominant absent intentional assumption of liability or
fraud. The court also intimated that, even with fraud, the action against
the successor might be limited to the property that had been transferred,
what we would today call a fraudulent conveyance action. 23
Railroad reorganizations could give rise to successor liability in
the right circumstances, however. A South Carolina Supreme Court case
from the 1920s reflects a pro-successor-liability attitude when the court
was faced with a successor that had, perhaps, issued loose statements
that the predecessor’s debts would be “taken care of” and then failed to
document the transaction so as to achieve that result. 24 When the
successor/appellant later stood on its claim of being a newly organized
corporation that was not responsible for the predecessor’s pre-sale debts,
the court rejected this position stating:
The appellant’s position does not appeal
to us; it is an attempt to dodge the
damages that respondent has sustained by
a quirk and technical question of law, and
smacks too much of a skin game, and
hand stacked and dealt to dealer from the
bottom of the deck.
….
The appellant cannot now at this stage of
the case repudiate its liability. By its
action it has allowed the Southern
Express Company to go out of existence
Colorado Springs Rapid Transit Ry. Co. v. Albrecht, 22 Colo. App. 201, 206–
08 (1912) (emphasis added).

22

23

Id. (in respect to the “property” in the last quarter of the block quote).

24

Brabham v. So. Express Co., 117 S.E. 368 (S.C. 1922).
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and now proposes to let the respondent
whistle for his money, and by its
technicality, which would besmirch the
character of any honest man, smacks its
lips and licks its chops and congratulates
itself on its shrewdness in avoiding its
payment of a just claim. 25
The Third Circuit, in 1986, drawing on Blackstone’s analogy of a
corporation to the River Thames which remains the same river although
its water and other constituent parts are constantly changing,
summarized the law of no-liability-for-asset-purchasers and its four
“traditional exceptions”—intentional assumption, consolidation or
merger, fraud, and mere continuation—as follows:
Describing the characteristics of the
corporate body, Blackstone wrote that
“all the individual members that have
existed from the foundation to the
present time, or that shall ever hereafter
exist, are but one person in law, a person
that never dies; in like manner as the river
Thames is still the same river, though the
parts which compose it are changing ever
instant.” . . . A corporation whose stock
is actively traded on an exchange has a
constantly changing ownership; however,
that fluctuation does not affect the
corporation’s liability for its past actions.
The same concepts of continuing life and
accountability underlie the law governing
corporate merger through the purchase of
stock. Liability continues because the
25 Id. The most recent articulation of successor liability in South Carolina is
found in Walton v. Mazda of Rock Hill, 657 S.E.2d 67 (S.C. 2008) (citing
Simmons v. Mark Lift Indus., 622 S.E.2d 213 (S.C. 2005); Brown v. Am. Ry.
Express Co., 123 S.E. 97 (S.C. 1924), which in turn, cites to Brabham)).
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corporate body itself survives.
A
different rule applies when one
corporation purchases the assets of
another. Under the well-settled rule of
corporate law, where one company sells
or transfers all of its assets to another, the
second entity does not become liable for
the debts and liabilities, including torts, of
the transferor . . . .
Four generally recognized exceptions
qualify this principle of successor
nonliability. The purchaser may be liable
where: (1) it assumes liability; (2) the
transaction amounts to a consolidation or
merger; (3) the transaction is fraudulent
and intended to provide an escape from
liability; or (4) the purchasing corporation
is a mere continuation of the selling
company . . . .
The successor rule was designed for the
corporate contractual world where it
functions well. It protects creditors and
dissenting shareholders, and facilitates
determination of tax responsibilities,
while promoting free alienability of
business assets . . . . The doctrine reflects
the general policy that liabilities adhere to
and follow the corporate entity.
However, when the form of the transfer
does not accurately portray substance, the
courts will not refrain from deciding that
the new organization is simply the older
one in another guise. In that instance, the

[Vol. 18
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continuation approach articulated by
Blackstone remains applicable. 26
The tension is easy to see. On the one hand, purchasing corporations
desire some certainty when acquiring a business through an asset sale
that they will not be liable for pre-closing unsecured debt unless it is
specifically assumed. This is the whole point of acquisition by asset sale
rather than merger. 27 This limitation of liability benefits sellers and their
known creditors, too, by driving up the purchase price rather than
subjecting the buyer to risks of unknown and, perhaps, unknowable
claims that would justify a discount in the purchase price or other
transactional adjustment to allocate the risk. On the other hand, the
main group negatively affected by the no-liability rule consists of unpaid
unsecured creditors and, within that group, the subset of involuntary tort
creditors, some of whom may not even know of their claim at the time
of the sale and are thus unable to assert it when assets may be available
for distribution. 28 For them, it creates negative externalities. A pro26 Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 77–78 (3d Cir. 1986); see infra notes
156–61 and accompanying text discussing how bright-line rules allow careful
contract drafting and transactional structuring to elevate form over substance
by drafting into a safe harbor or around standards.

See MODEL ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT xiv–xv (ABA 2001) (an asset
purchase “may be the only structure that can be used where a buyer is
interested in purchasing only a portion of the company’s assets or assuming
only some of its liabilities.”).
27

28 This pro-limitation-of-liability inclination is perhaps at its strongest in the
nation’s bankruptcy courts, where the chant of “benefit to the estate and its
creditors” and the need not to “chill the bidding” is used to justify fast track
asset sale transactions that feature the additional protective wrapper of a final
federal court order that declares the purchaser free of the claims of the
predecessor’s claims. See George W. Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 19 (2005) (describing combinations of statutory changes in the
1979 Bankruptcy Code that have led to the development of a federal unified
foreclosure system in the bankruptcy courts); George W. Kuney, Let’s Make It
Official: Adding an Explicit Pre-Plan Sale Process as an Alternative Exit from Chapter
11, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1265 (2004) (discussing shortfalls of section 363 sale
process as currently required by the Bankruptcy Code and suggesting statutory
and rule amendments to address the perceived shortfalls); Selling a Business in
Bankruptcy Court Without a Plan of Reorganization, 18 CEB CAL. BUS. L. PRACT. 57
(2003) (a brief “how to” guide); George W. Kuney, Misinterpreting Bankruptcy
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limitation-of-liability inclination continues in corporate law generally
today.
Against this background, the next section of this article examines
the specific non-statutory species and sub-species of successor liability
currently populating American jurisdictions. In each case, the particular
theory is described and then critiqued in terms of whether it serves the
original purposed of successor liability in ameliorating the otherwise
harsh results mandated by strict adherence to corporate law principles.
III.

WHAT SUCCESSOR LIABILITY HAS BECOME

When examined in detail, for purposes of this article, the types of
successor liability can be classified into five species, each of which is
made up of separate sub-species, some of which are particular to only a
single jurisdiction, some of which are found in many, and some of which
have been alluded to but not specifically identified in others. 29 The five
categories of successor liability species addressed in this article are: (1)
Intentional Assumptions of Liabilities, (2) Fraudulent Schemes to Escape
Liability, (3) De Facto Mergers, (4) The Continuity Exceptions: Mere
Continuation and Continuity of Enterprise, and (5) The Product Line
Exception. This taxonomy and the sub-species of successor liability
Code § 363(f) and Undermining the Chapter 11 Process, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235
(2002) (discussing the evolution and doctrinal basis for current section 363 sale
practice). See generally Yair Listokin & Kenneth Ayotte, Protecting Future Claimants
in Mass Tort Bankruptcies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1435 (2004).
29 Authorities differ on how many categories of successor liability there are.
Most seem content with four or five, but at least one identifies nine different
theories, including statutory successor liability. See MODEL ASSET PURCHASE
AGREEMENT WITH COMMENTARY, EXHIBITS, ANCILLARY DOCUMENTS AND
APPENDICIES at 144 (ABA 2002) (listing the categories as express or implied
agreement to assume, de facto merger, mere continuation, fraud, continuity of
enterprise, product line, duty to warn, inadequate consideration coupled with
failure to make provision for predecessor’s creditors, and statutory liability). See
generally 2 DAVID G. OWEN & M. STUART MADDEN, MADDEN & OWEN ON
PRODUCT LIABILITY § 19:6 (3d ed. 2000). The point of the taxonomy that
follows is to demonstrate that, actually, there are many different sub-groups
even within the seven of the ABA’s nine categories discussed in this article. The
independent duty to warn and statutory successor liability are beyond the scope
of its piece.
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recognized in various jurisdictions are summarized in the appendix by
jurisdiction.
When examining successor liability, one should keep in mind that
there is variance and overlap between the species and their standards in
particular jurisdictions, and the label a court uses for its test is not
necessarily one with a standardized meaning applicable across
jurisdictions. Accordingly, it is dangerous to place too much reliance on
a name; substance should always be examined.
A. Intentional (Express or Implied) Assumption of Liabilities
Intentional assumption of liabilities, express or implied, is
probably the simplest of the successor liability species. Imposing liability
on a successor that, by its actions, is shown to have assumed liabilities is
essentially an exercise in the realm of contract law, drawing on doctrines
of construction and the objective theory of contract. 30
Because it focuses on the language of the contract and the
conduct and communications of the successor, express or implied
assumption should be the form of successor liability that is the easiest to
avoid by careful transaction structuring and document drafting. That
said, creating a record that will not support a finding of assumption of
liabilities may be harder to accomplish than it should be given that client
representatives often do not refrain from volunteering information or
taking actions inconsistent with the client’s intent not to assume liability.
Further, the tangled web of cross-references and definitions in an asset
purchase agreement can trip up lawyers documenting the deal. 31

Michael J. Zaino, Bielagus v. EMRE: New Hampshire Rejects Traditional Test for
Corporate Successor Liability Following an Asset Purchase, 45 N.H. B.J. 26 (2004).
30

See In re Eagle-Pitcher Indus., Inc., 255 B.R. 700, 704 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
2000) (intent of the parties as expressed in the terms of an asset purchase
agreement are controlling); see also Isaacs v. Westchester Wood Works, Inc., 278
A.D. 2d 184, 185 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (applying ejusdem generis rule of contract
interpretation to construe broad term maturity and confined to items similar to
those specifically enumerated).
31

760

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 18

1. Type 1: The Language of the Contract
The first sub-species of intentional assumption is based on the
language of the contract. Courts look to the language of the asset
agreement to determine whether the purchaser expressly or impliedly
agreed to assume liabilities of the successor. 32 This express plainlanguage approach is a fairly straightforward form of successor liability
with the most potential for uncertainty in the area of implied terms of
the contract and application of the canons of construction such as
ejusdem generis to construe potentially conflicting sections of the
doctrine. 33
2. Type 2: Liability Based on Conduct or Representations
Under a second sub-species of intentional assumption of
liabilities, the courts look beyond the language of the contract itself and
examine extrinsic factors to determine if the purchaser impliedly
assumed the liabilities of the seller. 34 For example, Maryland imposes
successor liability where “the conduct or representations relied upon by
the party asserting liability . . . indicate an intention of the buyer to pay
Matrix-Churchill v. Springsteen, 461 So. 2d 782, 788 (Ala. 1984); Peglar &
Assocs., Inc. v. Prof’l Indem. Underwriters Corp., No. X05CV970160824S,
2002 WL 1610037, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 19, 2002); Gwinnett Hosp.
Sys., Inc. v. Massey, 469 S.E.2d 729, 731 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Myers v.
Putzmeister, Inc., 596 N.E.2d 754, 756 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Winkler v. V.G.
Reed & Sons, Inc., 638 N.E.2d 1228, 1233 (Ind. 1994); Pearson ex rel. Trent v.
Nat’l Feeding Sys., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46, 50 (Ky. 2002); Scott v. NG U.S. 1, Inc.,
No. 023898BLS, 2003 WL 22133177, at *9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 2003);
McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 264 A.2d 98, 102 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1970); Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., Inc. v. Canron, Inc., 373 N.E.2d 364, 364–
65 (N.Y. 1977); Welco Indus., Inc. v. Applied Companies, 617 N.E.2d 1129,
1134 (Ohio 1993); Erickson v. Grande Ronde Lumber Co., 92 P.2d 170, 174
(Or. 1939).
32

See Folger Adam Sec., Inc. v. DeMatteis/MacGregor, J.V., 209 F.3d 252, 258
(3d Cir. 2000).

33

34 See Baltimore Luggage v. Holtzman, 562 A.2d 1286, 1292 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1989); Safeco Ins. Co. v. Pontiac Plastics & Supply Co., No. 214079, 2000
WL 33538535, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2000); States Roofing Corp. v.
Bush Constr. Corp., 426 S.E.2d 124, 127 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).
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the debts of the seller.” 35 This is reminiscent of the holding in the
Brabham case from South Carolina quoted in the previous section. 36
3. Type 3: Undefined
A substantial number of courts—representing almost thirty
jurisdictions—have adopted or recited the existence of the express or
implied assumption of liabilities doctrine, but appear not to have defined
a test or elaborated further in a reported decision. 37 Often this adoption
35

Baltimore Luggage, 562 A.2d at 1292.

36

See Brabham v. So. Express Co., 117 S.E. 368 (S.C. 1922).

Winsor v. Glasswerks, PHX, LLC, 63 P.3d 1040, 1044–50 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2003); Ford Motor Co. v. Nuckolls, 894 S.W.2d 897, 903 (Ark. 1995); Henkel
Corp. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 62 P.3d 69, 73 (Cal. 2003); Johnston v.
Amstead Indus., Inc., 830 P.2d 1141, 1142–43 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); In re
Asbestos Litig., No. 92C-10-100, 1994 WL 89643, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 4,
1994); Bingham v. Goldberg.Marchesano.Kohlman. Inc., 637 A.2d 81, 89–90
(D.C. Ct. App. 1994); Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047, 1049 (Fla.
1982); Evanston Ins. Co. v. Luko, 783 P.2d 293, 296–97 (Haw. Ct. App. 1989);
Grundmeyer v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 649 N.W.2d 744, 751–52 (Iowa 2002);
Gillespie v. Seymour, 876 P.2d 193, 200 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994); Dir. Bureau of
Labor Standards v. Diamond Brand, Inc., 588 A.2d 734, 736 (Me. 1991);
Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96, 98 (Minn. 1989); Paradise Corp.
v. Amerihost Dev., Inc., 848 So. 2d 177, 179 (Miss. 2003); Chem. Design, Inc.
v. Am. Standard, Inc., 847 S.W.2d 488, 491 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Jones v.
Johnson Mach. & Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481, 483 (Neb. 1982); Lamb v. Leroy
Corp., 454 P.2d 24, 27–28 (Nev. 1969); Bielagus v. EMRE of New Hampshire
Corp., 826 A.2d 559, 564 (N.H. 2003); Pankey v. Hot Springs Nat. Bank, 119
P.2d 636, 640 (N.M. 1941); G.P. Publ’ns., Inc. v. Quebecor Printing—St. Paul,
Inc., 481 S.E.2d 674, 679 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997); Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal
Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118, 121 (N.D. 1984); Pulis v. U.S. Elec. Tool Co.,
561 P.2d 68, 69 (Okla. 1977); In re Thorotrast Cases, 26 Phila. Co. Reptr. 479,
488–89 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1994); Brown v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 123 S.E. 97, 98
(S.C. 1924); Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach., Inc., 387 N.W.2d 515, 518
(S.D. 1986); Hopewell Baptist Church v. Se. Window Mfg. Co., No. E200002699-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 708850, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2001);
Decius v. Action Collection Serv., Inc., 105 P.3d 956, 958-59 (Utah Ct. App.
2004); Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 479 A.2d 126, 127 (Vt. 1984); Mill &
Logging Supply Co. v. W. Tenino Lumber Co., 265 P.2d 807, 812 (Wash. 1954);
In re State Pub. Bldg. Asbestos Litig., 454 S.E.2d 413, 424–25 (W.Va. 1994);
Columbia Propane, L.P. v. Wisconsin Gas Co., 661 N.W.2d 776, 785 (Wis.
2003).
37
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takes the form of reciting, arguably as dicta, a version of the “typical” or
“traditional” rule of no successor liability and its exceptions, including
express or implied assumption, and then moving on to discuss whether
liability will lie under a species of the doctrine other than express or
implied assumption. For example, in Winsor v. Glasswerks PHX, LLC, 38
the Arizona Court of Appeal stated the four traditional exceptions,
including express or implied assumption, and cited to A.R. Teeters &
Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 39 which itself had taken the recitation of
four traditional exceptions from two California cases, another Arizona
case that had cited a Kentucky case, and cases from Hawaii and
Washington State. None of these cases actually concerned liability of a
successor based upon express or implied assumption. The Winsor court
also found support in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability § 12 (1998), which announced substantially the same general
rule and exceptions. 40
B. Fraudulent Schemes to Escape Liability
Fraudulent schemes to escape liability by using corporate law
limitation-of-liability principles to defeat the legitimate interests of
creditors illustrate an example of the need for successor liability to
prevent injustice. If a corporation’s equity holders, for example, arrange
for the company’s assets to be sold to a new company in which they also
hold an equity or other stake for less value than would be produced if
the assets were deployed by the original company in the ordinary course
of business, then the legitimate interest and expectations of the
company’s creditors have been frustrated. 41 By allowing liability to

38

63 P.3d 1040, 1044 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).

39

836 P.2d 1034, 1039 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).

40

Winsor, 63 P.3d at 1045; Id.

“Causation is a required element of all species of the fraud exception.”
George Kuney, SUCCESSOR LIABILITY IN ILLINOIS: When Can Creditors
and Tort Victims Sue the Buyer of a Business for the Debts and Torts of the Seller?, 96
ILL. B.J. 148 n.11 (2008) (citing Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles, LLC, 887
N.E.2d 244 (Mass. 2008) (discussing need for causation, but also that judgment
creditors could look to company’s long term prospects, not just immediate
41
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attach to the successor corporation in such instances, the creditors’
interests and expectations are respected. The challenge, of course, is
defining the standard that separates the fraudulent scheme from the
legitimate one.
1. Type 1: Common Law Fraud or Lack of Good Faith
Some courts review the record for evidence of common law
fraud. For example, in Eagle Pacific Insurance Co. v. Christensen Motor
Yacht Corp. 43 the court held that the successor corporation was created
solely to hinder the predecessor’s creditors, and a fraudulent purpose
was established sufficient to impose liability on the successor. The
fraudulent purpose doctrine is closely related to the mere continuation
doctrine in that the fraudulent scheme is the mere continuation of the
business with only a superficial change in legal form to defeat the valid
claims of the predecessor’s creditors. Both doctrines have similar origins
and were, perhaps, originally flexible standards addressing similar
situations featuring differently structured transactions. 44
42

insolvency, saying “[the creditor] was deprived of the opportunity to wait and
see whether [predecessor]'s business, now being conducted by [the successor],
turned around financially to where it was able to repay its debt obligations.”)).
42 Ingram v. Prairie Block Coal Co., 5 S.W.2d 413, 416–17 (Mo. 1928); McKee
v. Harris-Seybold Co., Div. of Harris-Intertype Corp., 264 A.2d 98, 107 (N.J.
Law Div. 1970); Eagle Pac. Ins. Co. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 934
P.2d 715, 721 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
Eagle Pac. Ins. Co. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 934 P.2d 715, 721
(Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting trial court’s finding of mere continuation
successor liability but sustaining successor liability on grounds of actual fraud).
43

44

See, e.g., Ingram, 5 S.W.2d at 417.
The conclusion is irresistible that the Elmira Coal Company
was incorporated for the purpose of complying with the
requirements of the Missouri law, and it was in fact either a
continuation of the Prairie Block Company or a subsidiary
corporation. The rule is, that, where one corporation
purchases the stock and assets . . . of a mere continuance of
the selling corporation . . . [it is] ipso facto liable for the debts
and liabilities of the selling corporation.

Id. at 416.
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Other courts review the facts to determine whether “some of the
elements of a purchase in good faith were lacking, as where the transfer
was without consideration and the creditors of the transferor were not
provided for . . . [.]” 45 Either formulation of the standard appears
flexible enough to prevent artful dodging through skillful structuring and
drafting, although the record and facts may be manipulated to make
proving the case difficult and expensive, as is the case with almost every
form of fraud.
2. Type 2: Statutory Fraud
Maryland determines successor liability for fraud by
incorporating the standards of its Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act. 46 This inclusion would seem to expand fraudulent conveyance
liability, which is normally limited to avoidance of the transfer and, thus,
recovery of the value of the assets transferred. Successor liability can
subject all of the purchaser’s assets and insurance to the claims of the
predecessor’s creditors.

Foster v. Cone-Blanchard Mach. Co., 597 N.W.2d 506, 510-11 (Mich. 1999)
(quoting 19 Am Jur 2d, Corporations, § 1546, pp. 922-924; Malone v. Red Top
Cab Co., 16 Cal.App.2d 268, 273, 60 P.2d 543 (1936)) (also citing Turner v.
Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 878 n. 3 (Mich. 1976) (quoting Schwartz
v. McGraw-Edison Co., 14 Cal.App.3d 767, 92 Cal.Rptr. 776 (1971))) (other
citations omitted); Dir. of Bureau of Labor Standards v. Diamond Brands, Inc.,
588 A.2d 734, 736 n.5 (Me. 1991) (citing Brennan v. Saco Constr., Inc., 381
A.2d 656, 662 (Me. 1978) for proposition that “absent fraud, misrepresentation,
or intent to circumvent overriding public policy, court[s] [are] reluctant to
disregard corporation form.”); see Huray v. Fournier MC Programming, Inc.,
No. C9-02-1852, 2003 WL 21151772, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. May 20, 2003);
Lamb v. Leroy Corp., 454 P.2d 24, 27-28 (Nev. 1969); McKee v. HarrisSeybold Co., 264 A.2d 98, 107 (N.J. Law Div. 1970); Welco Indus., Inc. v.
Applied Cos., 617 N.E.2d 1129, 1134 (Ohio 1993); In re Thorotrast Cases, 26
Phila. Co. Reptr. 479, 488–89, No. 1135, 1994 WL 1251120 (Pa. Com. Pl. Jan.
13, 1994) (limiting the exception to inadequacy of consideration or where
provision was not made for creditors of the transferor); Ostrowski v. HydraTool Corp., 479 A.2d 126, 127 (Vt. 1984).
45

46

Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564, 574 (Md. 1991).
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3. Type 3: Undefined
As is the case with intentional assumption, 47 many courts have
adopted or recited the existence of the exception but appear not to have
defined a test. 48 It is not entirely clear if their comments should be
47

See supra notes 30–40 and accompanying text.

48 Winsor v. Glasswerks PHX, L.L.C., 63 P.3d 1040, 1044–50 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2003); Ford Motor Co. v. Nuckolls, 894 S.W.2d 897, 903 (Ark. 1995); Henkel
Corp. v. Hardford Acc. & Indem. Co., 62 P.3d 69, 73 (Cal. 2003); Johnston v.
Amstead Indus., Inc., 830 P.2d 1141, 1142–43 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); Peglar &
Assocs., Inc. v. Prof’l Indem. Underwriters Corp., No. X05CV970160824S,
2002 WL 1610037, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 19, 2002); In re Asbestos Litig.,
No. 92C-10-100, 1994 WL 89643, at *3 (Del. Super Ct. Feb. 4, 1994); Bingham
v. Goldberg. Marchesano. Kohlman. Inc., 637 A.2d 81, 89–90 (D.C. Ct. App.
1994); Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. 1982); Farmex Inc.
v. Wainwright, 501 S.E.2d 802, 804 (Ga. 1998); Evanston Ins. Co. v. Luko, 783
P.2d 293, 296–97 (Haw. Ct. App. 1989); Myers v. Putzmeiser, Inc., 596 N.E.2d
754, 756 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Winkler v. V.G. Reed & Sons, Inc., 638 N.E.2d
1228, 1233 (Ind. 1994); Grundmeyer v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 649 N.W.2d 744,
751–52 (Iowa 2002); Comstock v. Great Lakes Distrib. Co., 496 P.2d 1308,
1312 (Kan. 1972); Pearson ex rel. Trent v. Nat’l Feeding Sys., 90 S.W.3d 46, 51
(Ky. 2002); Wolfe v. Shreveport Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 70 So. 789, 794
(La. 1916); Guzman v. MRM/Elgin, 567 N.E.2d 929, 931 (Mass. 1991); Turner
v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 886–87 (Mich. 1976) (noting that
fraud might be indicated by inadequate consideration and/or lack of good faith
in the transaction; the court did not address other possible indications of fraud);
Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96, 98 (Minn. 1989); Paradise Corp.
v. Amrihost Dev., Inc., 848 So. 2d 177, 179 (Miss. 2003); Jones v. Johnson
Mach. & Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481, 483 (Neb. 1982); Bielagus v. EMRE of
New Hampshire Corp, 826 A.2d 559, 564 (N.H. 2003); Schumacher v. Richards
Shear Co., Inc., 451 N.E.2d 195, 198 (N.Y. 1983); Pankey v. Hot Springs Nat’l
Bank, 119 P.2d 636, 640 (N.M. 1941); G.P. Publ’ns. v. Quebecor Printing-St.
Paul, Inc., 481 S.E.2d 674, 679 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997); Downtowner, Inc. v.
Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118, 121 (N.D. 1984); Welco Indus., Inc.
v. Applied Cos., 617 N.E.2d 1129, 1134 (Ohio 1993); Pulis v. U.S. Elec. Tool
Co., P.2d 68, 69 (Okla. 1977); Erickson v. Grande Ronde Lumber Co., 92 P.2d
170, 174 (Or. 1939); In re Thorotrast Cases, 26 Phila. Co. Reptr. 479, 488–89
(Pa. Com. Pl. 1994); Brown v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 123 S.E. 97, 98 (S.C.
1924); Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach. Inc., 387 N.W.2d 515, 518 (S.D.
1986); Hopewell Baptist Church v. Se. Window Mfg. Co., No. E2000-02699COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 708850, (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2001); Ostrowski v.
Hydra-Tool Corp., 479 A.2d 126, 127 (Vt. 1984); Harris v. T.I., Inc., 413 S.E.2d
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considered dicta. Nor is it clear if these jurisdictions would apply a
common law fraud, lack of good faith, statutory fraud, or some other
standard to apply to this species of successor liability.
C. De Facto Merger
In a statutory merger, the successor corporation becomes liable
for the predecessor’s debts. 49 The de facto merger species of successor
liability creates the same result in the asset sale context to avoid allowing
form to overcome substance. A de facto merger, then, allows liability to
attach when an asset sale has mimicked the results of a statutory merger
except for the continuity of liability. The main difference between the
sub-species of de facto merger in various jurisdictions is how rigid or
flexible the test is. In other words, how many required elements must be
shown to establish applicability of the doctrine? On one end of the
spectrum is the lengthy, mandatory checklist of required elements. On
the other, the non-exclusive list of factors to be weighed in a totality of
the circumstances fashion.
1. Type 1: Element-Based Test
Courts applying an element-based de facto merger test require a
showing of certain required elements. Generally, “[t]o find a de facto
merger there must be a continuity of the selling corporation evidenced
by the same management, personnel, assets and physical location; a
continuity of the stockholders, accomplished by paying for the acquired
corporation with shares of stock; a dissolution of the selling corporation;
and assumption of the liabilities.” 50 This is a rigid test that allows
605, 609 (Va. 1992); In re State Pub. Bldg. Asbestos Litig., 454 S.E.2d 413, 424–
25 (W. Va. 1994); Fish v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820, 823 (Wis.
1985).
G. William Joyner, III, Beyond Budd Tire: Examining Successor Liability in North
Carolina, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 889, 894 (1995).
49

Serchay v. NTS Fort Lauderdale Office Joint Venture, 707 So. 2d 958, 960
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Amjad Munim, M.D., P.A. v. Azar, 648 So.
2d 145, 153–54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); see Perimeter Realty v. GAPI, Inc.,
533 S.E.2d 136, 145–46 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); Myers v. Putzmeister, Inc., 596
N.E.2d 754, 756 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244
N.W.2d 873, 891 (Mich. 1976); Howell v. Atlantic-Meeco, Inc., No. 01CA0084,
50

2017] A TAXONOMY AND EVALUATION OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY (REVISITED) 767

transactions to be structured so as to avoid exposure to liability. For
example, counsel that is aware of the applicability of this sub-species of
successor liability is likely to disfavor 100% stock payments in
acquisitions of substantially all the assets of a business. Counsel can
require that the seller continue to exist and not dissolve post-sale and
arrange for the seller to fund payments to its voluntary, ordinary course
of business creditors out of the purchase price to avoid assuming any
pre-sale unsecured liabilities. This sort of lawyering, encouraged by the
rigid “required elements” approach to de facto merger, elevates form over
substance and undermines successor liability’s usefulness as a tool to
soften the harsh results that may obtain from strict application of
corporate law principles.
2. Type 2: Threshold Requirement Plus Non-Dispositive Factors
Other courts require a threshold finding of continuity of
ownership and then consider other not-necessarily dispositive factors,
including dissolution of the predecessor necessary to operate the
business. 51
2002 WL 857685, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2002). Vermont only requires
evidence of three elements. CAB-TEK, Inc. v. E.B.M., Inc., 571 A.2d 671,
672–73 (Vt. 1990) (stating de facto merger occurs where a corporation (1) takes
control of all of the assets of another corporation, (2) without consideration,
and (3) the predecessor ceases to function).
Wolff v. Shreveport Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 70 So. 789, 794 (La.
1916) (Louisiana has not adopted the de facto merger exception per se, but its
“continuation doctrine” appears to be the traditional de facto merger exception
with a requirement of continuity of ownership); Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson
Mach., Inc. 387 N.W.2d 515, 518 (S.D. 1986) (“When the seller corporation
retains its existence while parting with its assets, a ‘de facto merger’ may be found
if the consideration given by the purchaser corporation is shares of its own
stock.”) (citations omitted); Decius v. Action Collection Serv., Inc., 105 P.3d
956, 958–59 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (requiring “that the buyer paid for the asset
purchase with its own stock”); Schawk, Inc. v. City Brewing Co., No. 02-1833,
2003 WL 1563767, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2003) (requiring that
consideration for the assets be stock in the purchasing corporation and
examining the following four non-dispositive factors: (1) the assets of the seller
corporation are acquired with shares of the stock in the buyer corporation,
resulting in a continuity of shareholders; (2) the seller ceases operations and
dissolves soon after the sale; (3) the buyer continues the enterprise of the seller
51
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Although more flexible than the pure required element-based
approach to de facto merger, this hybrid approach suffers from some
rigidity because it rests on the touchstone of “ownership,” itself a largely
illusory concept in the modern corporate world. Under the classical
model, the “owners” of the corporation are the common shareholders
who are said to “control” the corporation through their power to elect
directors and, thus, indirectly, control management. The first criticism
of the classical model is that, outside of the small, closely held
corporation, most, or at least many, shareholders have no meaningful
control or power to elect even one director. More importantly, though,
corporate and lending lawyers in the real work have sliced and diced
corporate securities and debt interests and instruments with precision
and the result has been to increase the control over directors,
management, and operations held by debt and preferred stock holders. 52
Further, as modern corporate law recognizes, the real “owners” of a
corporation are the lowest priority debt or interest holders that are
supported by value in the corporation. Even directors’ duties are aimed
corporation so that there is a continuity of management, employees, business
location, assets and general business operations; and (4) the buyer assumes
those liabilities of the seller necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of
normal business operations).
Douglas G. Caird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of
Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1211 (2006).
52

Id.

In our Essay, we explore this missing lever of corporate
governance: the control that creditors exercise through
elaborate loan covenants. Bondholders typically can do little
until a corporation defaults on a loan payment. Even then,
their remedies are limited. Not so with bank debt or debt
issued by nonfinancial institutions. These loans—and their
volume now exceeds half a trillion dollars per year—come
with elaborate covenants covering everything from minimum
cash receipts to timely delivery of audited financial statements.
When a business trips one of the wires in a large loan, the
lender is able to exercise de facto control rights—such as
replacing the CEO of a company—that shareholders of a
public company simply do not have.
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at this last residual value class, whether or not it is named “common
stock.” 53
Faced with a required element of de facto merger like
“commonality of ownership,” the transactional gambit is to avoid it by
providing old equity with something entirely different in the purchasing
company. Contingent promissory notes, convertible debt, or, if
appropriate, continued employment with salary and preferred stock
options would also serve to leave old equity with some skin in the game.
And these are the easy, almost transparent solutions. The use of
derivative securities and coordinated debt, equity, and workout swaps all
achieve the same end. The hybrid approach to de facto merger that
requires commonality of ownership is fairly easy to address, and avoid,
by competent counsel structuring the acquisition.
3. Type 3: Non-Dispositive Factor Test
Other courts essentially use a completely non-dispositive factor
from of the test for de facto merger and weigh these factors in light of the
totality of the circumstances. 54 This is the most flexible form of de facto
See generally Gregory Scott Crespi, Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary Duties, The
Inefficiency of the Shareholder Primacy Norm, 55 SMU L. REV. 141 (2002). The duty
shifting from stockholders to other corporate constituents is largely based on
the seminal case of Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns.
Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).

53

Marks v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 594, 598 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986) (adding an additional factor to the general test: “was the
consideration paid for the assets solely stock of the purchaser or its parent”);
Peglar & Assocs., Inc. v. Prof’l Indem. Underwriters Corp., No.
X05CV970160824S., 2002 WL 1610037, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 19, 2002);
Sorenson v. Allied Prods. Corp, 706 N.E.2d 1097, 1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)
(Indiana courts acknowledge the four traditional factors but have not clearly
expressed whether their de facto merger test requires a threshold finding of
continuity of shareholders); Cargill, Inc. v. Beaver Coal & Oil Co., 676 N.E.2d
815, 818–19 (Mass. 1997) (noting that although continuity of ownership is not a
threshold requirement, “in determining whether a de facto merger has occurred,
courts pay particular attention to the continuation of management, officers,
directors and shareholders”); Harache v. Flinkote Co., 848 S.W.2d 506, 509
(Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (listing the four traditional elements but noting, “[i]t is not
necessary to find all the elements to find a de facto merger”); Woodrick v. Jack J.
Burke Real Estate, Inc., 703 A.2d 306, 312 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); In
54
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merger and is not as susceptible to the “draft around.” The result is that
corporate attorneys and their clients will lack the certainty of a bright-line
rule or elements that they can work around to create a safe haven for
their transaction.
4. Type 4: Undefined
Finally, still other courts have adopted or recited the existence of
the exception but do not appear to have illustrated its application in their
jurisdiction or defined a test. 55
re Seventh Judicial Dist. Asbestos Litig., 788 N.Y.S.2d 579, 583 (N.Y. App. Div.
2005); Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Schneider, Inc., 810 A.2d 127, 135 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2002); Richmond Ready-Mix v. Atl. Concrete Forms, Inc., No. Civ. A. 92-0960,
2004 WL 877595, at *10 (R.I. Apr. 21, 2004).
Matrix-Churchill v. Springsteen, 461 So. 2d 782, 786–88 (Ala. 1984); Winsor
v. Glasswerks PHX, L.L.C. 63 P.3d 1040, 1044–50 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); Ford
Motor Co. v. Nuckolls, 894 S.W.2d 897, 903 (Ark. 1995); Johnston v. Amsted
Indus., Inc., 830 P.2d 1141, 1142–43 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); In re Asbestos
Litig., No. 92C-10-100, 1994 WL 89643, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 1994);
Bingham v. Goldberg. Marchesano. Kohlman. Inc., 637 A.2d 81, 89-90 (D.C.
1994); Evanston Ins. Co. v. Luko, 783 P.2d 293, 296–97 (Haw. Ct. App. 1989);
Grundmeyer v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 649 N.W.2d 744, 751–52 (Iowa 2002);
Gillespie v. Seymour, 876 P.2d 193, 200 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994); Pearson ex rel
Trent v. Nat’l Feeding Sys., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46, 51 (Ky. 2002) (indicating that
continuity of shareholders, management, or other indicia of merger or
consolidation is necessary before the de facto merger exception will apply);
Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564, 571–72 (Md. 1991); Niccum v. Hydra
Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96, 98 (Minn. 1989); Paradise Corp. v. Amerihost
Dev., Inc., 848 So. 2d 177, 179 (Miss. 2003); Jones v. Johnson Mach. & Press
Co., 320 N.W.2d 481, 483 (Neb. 1982); Lamb v. Leroy Corp., 454 P.2d 24, 27–
28 (Nev. 1969); Bielagus v. EMRE of New Hampshire Corp., 826 A.2d 559,
564 (N.H. 2003); Pankey v. Hot Springs Nat’l Bank, 119 P.2d 636, 640 (N.M.
1941); G.P. Publ’ns, Inc. v. Quebecor Printing—St. Paul, Inc., 481 S.E.2d 674,
679 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997); Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347
N.W.2d 118, 121 (N.D. 1984); Pulis v. U.S. Elec. Tool Co., 561 P.2d 68, 71
(Okla. 1977); Tyree Oil, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 7 P.3d 571, 573 (Or.
Ct. App. 2000); Brown v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 123 S.E. 97, 98 (S.C. 1924);
Hopewell Baptist Church v. Se. Window Mfg. Co., No. E2000-02699-COA-R3CV, 2001 WL 708850, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2001); Harris v. T.I., Inc.,
413 S.E.2d 605, 609 (Va. 1992); Hall v. Armstrong Cork, Inc., 692 P.2d 787,
789–90 (Wash. 1984); In re State Pub. Bldg. Asbestos Litig., 454 S.E.2d 413,
424–25 (W. Va. 1994).
55
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D. Continuation of the Business: The Continuity Exceptions
An exception with two distinct subcategories permits successor
liability when the successor continues the business of the seller: mere
continuation and continuity of enterprise. Each has sub-species
particular to specific jurisdictions within it. The two share roughly the
same indications, but continuity of enterprise does not require continuity
of shareholders or directors or officers between the predecessor and the
successor—a requirement said to be one of the mere continuation
exception’s dispositive elements or factors. 56 Courts are not altogether
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12 cmt. g. (AM.
LAW INST. (1998)); AM. TRAVERS ET AL., AMERICAN LAW PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 7:20 (3d ed. 2004); see, e.g., Holloway v. John E. Smith’s Sons Co.,
432 F. Supp. 454, 456 (D. S.C. 1977) (relying on Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501
F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974) and denying summary judgment to the defendant
successor in a products liability suit because (1) the business continued at its
same address with virtually all of the previous employees; (2) the successor was
responsible for maintenance and repairs on the products sold by the
predecessor prior to its sale of assets; (3) the successor continued
manufacturing the same or similar products as the predecessor; and (4) the
successor held itself out to the public as a business entity under a virtually
identical name as its predecessor; not requiring continuity of ownership and
control but calling the doctrine applied “mere continuation” anyway.); see also
Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 175 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying
Mississippi law and citing Holloway and Cyr as cases following the continuity of
enterprise theory); TRAVERS ET AL., AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
3d § 7:22 (2004) (noting that the court in Holloway denied summary judgment to
a successor despite a lack of continuity of ownership even though the court
treated its ruling as an application of the mere continuation theory); 2 MADDEN
& OWEN ON PRODUCT LIABILITY § 19:6, n.25 (3d. ed. 2000) (noting an
increasing number of courts have adopted the continuity of enterprise
exception including the Holloway court and the Ohio Supreme Court in Flaugher
v. Cone Automatic Mach. Co., 507 N.E.2d 331 (Ohio 1987)); Richard L. Cupp, Jr.,
Redesigning Successor Liability, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 845, 854–55, n.44 (1999)
(noting that states following the continuity of enterprise approach include
South Carolina (citing Holloway), Ohio (citing Flaugher), Alabama, Michigan,
Mississippi, and New Hampshire (citing Cyr)); Phillip I. Blumberg, The
Continuity of the Enterprise Doctrine: Corporate Successorship in United States Law, 10
FLA. J. INT’L L. 365, 375–76 (1996) (collecting cases applying the continuity of
enterprise theory, including Holloway and Flaugher); 30 S.C. JUR. PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 12 (stating the court in Holloway denied the successor’s motion for
summary judgment “where the evidence indicated that the [successor] was a
mere continuation of the predecessor corporation”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
56
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careful or uniform in labeling which exception they are applying. There
appear to be four general sub-species of mere continuation and three of
continuity of enterprise. The similarity of these doctrines to those of de
facto merger is striking. 57
1. The Four Species of Mere Continuation
a. Type 1: Element-Based Mere Continuation
For some courts, mere continuation is a conclusion derived from
a showing of a set of required elements. For example, “[t]he primary
elements of the ‘mere continuation’ exception include use by the buyer
of the seller’s name, location, and employees, and a common identity of
stockholders and directors.” 58 Much as with the first type of de facto
merger where a test comprised of required elements is used, this subspecies of mere continuation is user friendly for corporate lawyers. It
provides the bright-line certainty needed to have confidence that one has
insulated a transaction from this form of successor liability by arranging
for potential relocation, change of employees, and a new group of
directors and shareholders. Presumably, in most cases, the successor
would wish to use the predecessor’s trade name and goodwill, but if not,
that too could be dropped—or not even acquired—to further insulate
the transaction from successful attack.
b. Type 2: Threshold Finding Plus Non-Dispositive Factors Mere
Continuation
Another set of jurisdictions approach the mere continuation
doctrine by requiring continuity of ownership as a threshold matter.
OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12 cmt. c. (AM. LAW INST. (1998)) (citing
only Alabama, Michigan, and New Hampshire as jurisdictions that have
adopted the continuity of enterprise theory).

Gladstone v. Stuart Cinemas, Inc., 878 A.2d 214, 221–22 (Vt. 2005). Cases
from the beginning of the last century in Idaho preserve another term that
seems to capture all or part of the de facto merger, mere continuation, and
continuity of enterprise exceptions: “reorganization.” See infra notes 274–76
and accompanying text.

57

58

Savage Arms, Inc. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 18 P.3d 49, 55 (Alaska 2001).
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Then they consider other relevant factors on an ad hoc basis. 59 As with
the de facto merger sub-species that employs a requirement of continuity
Alcan Aluminum Corp., Met. Goods Div. v. Elec. Metal Prods., 837 P.2d
282, 283 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (requiring “continuation of directors and
management, shareholder interest, and, in some cases, inadequate
consideration”); In re Asbestos Litig., No. 92C-10-100, 1994 WL 89643, at *4
(Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 1994) (“[I]t must be established that the
transaction . . . was an arms’ length transaction and not simply a corporate
name and that [the successor] has different owners than [the predecessor]”);
Amjad Minim, M.D., P.A. v. Avar, M.D., 648 So. 2d 145, 154 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1994) (“The key element of a continuation is a common identity of the
officers, directors and stockholders in the selling and purchasing corporation”);
Bullington v. Union Tool Corp., 328 S.E.2d 726, 727 (Ga. 1985); NeyCopeland & Assocs., Inc. v. Tag Poly Bags, Inc., 267 S.E.2d 862, 862–63 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1980); Vernon v. Schuster, 688 N.E.2d 1172, 1176 (Ill. 1997)
(requiring continuity of ownership without listing other non-dispositive
factors); Pancratz v. Monsanto Co., 547 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa 1996); Pearson
ex rel Trent, v. Nat’l Feeding Sys., 90 S.W.3d 46, 51 (Ky. 2002) (The court noted
that there must be continuity of “shareholders [or] management” before
liability would be imposed, but it did not define the test further); Wolff v.
Shreveport Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 70 So. 789, 794 (La. 1916) (Louisiana
has not adopted the mere continuation exception, but its “continuation
doctrine” appears to take cognizance of the mere continuation exception that
requires continuity of ownership); Garcia v. Coe Mfg. Co., 933 P.2d 243, 247
(N.M. 1997) (noting that the “key element of a ‘continuation’ is a common
identity of officers, directors and stockholders in the selling and purchasing
corporations”); G.P. Publ’ns., Inc. v. Quebecor Printing—St. Paul, Inc., 481
S.E.2d 674, 680 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (indicating that continuity of ownership
may not be necessary under corporate successorship, but did not clarify to
which exception this analysis would apply); Welco Indus., Inc. v. Applied Cos.,
617 N.E.2d 1129, 1133 (Ohio 1993) (stating continuity of ownership is as a
threshold requirement but the court expressly limited its holding to contract
related actions); Decius v. Action Collection Serv., Inc., 105 P.3d 956, 958–59
(Utah Ct. App. 2004) (“A continuation demands ‘a common identity of stock,
directors, and stockholders and the existence of only one corporation at the
completion of the transfer’”); Harris v. T.I., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 605, 609 (Va.
1992) (requiring continuity of ownership, then adding that an additional inquiry
is whether “the purchase of all the assets of a corporation is a bona fide, arm’slength transaction.”); Tift v. Forage King Indus., Inc., 322 N.W.2d 14, 17–18
(Wis. 1982) (noting common identity of officers, directors, and stockholders is
a key element for continuation); California courts require, as a threshold matter,
inadequacy of consideration; continuity of ownership is a crucial factor.
Beatrice Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 863 P.2d 683, 690 (Cal. 1993)
(requiring a showing of no adequate consideration and some commonality of
officers, directors, or stockholders and then considering other factors).
59
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of ownership as its touchstone (de facto merger type 2 ), lack of this
single dispositive element can be understood to provide the key to
structuring the transaction to avoid the doctrine. Faced with the threat
of this type of mere continuation liability, a change in ownership is
critical. If prior owners are to have any interest in the successor entity,
such interest should be as employees or creditors, perhaps with notes
that are payable based upon contingencies (such as requiring the
successor to meet revenue targets, among other things).
60

c. Type 3: Non-Dispositive-Factors Mere Continuation
A number of courts have examined a non-exclusive list of nondispositive factors in a totality of the circumstances analysis. Typically,
these factors include commonality of directors, officers, or shareholders;
continuation of business practices; dissolution of the predecessor;
sufficiency of consideration, and the like. As with the de facto merger, this
flexible approach is probably superior in terms of allowing the doctrine
to operate flexibility as a safety valve to avoid unduly harsh results from
the strict application of corporate law. For precisely the same reason, it
is the least acceptable approach for those who structure and finance
corporate transactions and desire bright-line rule and safe harbors.
d. Type 4: Undefined mere Continuation
Finally, a number of courts have adopted or recited the existence of
the exception but appear not to have specifically defined a test. 61
Arizona courts require proof of both insufficient consideration and continuity
of ownership as a threshold matter. See A.R. Teeters & Assocs., Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 836 P.2d 1034, 1039-40 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (requiring
proof of insufficient consideration and looking at certain other non-dispositive
factors; a crucial (though non-dispositive) factor is “substantial similarity in the
ownership and control of the two corporation”).
60

See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.

61 Ford Motor Co. v. Nuckolls, 894 S.W.2d 897, 903 (Ark. 1995); Evanston Ins.
Co. v. Luko, 783 P.2d 293, 296–97 (Haw. Ct. App. 1989); Sorenson v. Allied
Products Co., 706 N.E.2d 1097, 1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (“An indication that
the corporate entity has been continued is a common identity of stock,
directors, and stockholders and the existence of only one corporation at the
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2. The Three Species of Continuity of Enterprise
Unlike the more traditional and long standing mere continuation
exception, the continuity of enterprise theory does not require strict
continuity of shareholders or owners (and possibly directors and
officers) between the predecessor and the successor, although the degree
or extent of continuity of owners, directors and officers is a factor. 62
Further, continuity of enterprise generally does not require dissolution of
the predecessor upon or soon after the sale, which is often a factor, and
sometimes a requirement, in jurisdictions applying the mere continuation
doctrine. 63
A detailed examination of continuity of enterprise in the
jurisdictions that have adopted it discloses three sub-species at work. All
completion of the transfer.”) (emphasis added); Scott v. NG U.S. 1, Inc. No.
023898BLS, 2003 WL 22133177, at *10 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 2003) (“[T]he
de facto merger exception subsumes the continuation exception.”); Paradise Co.
v. Amerihost Dev., Inc., 848 So. 2d 177, 179 (Miss. 2003); Bielagus v. EMRE of
New Hampshire Corp., 826 A.2d 559, 564 (N.H. 2003); Schumacher v.
Richards Shear Co., Inc., 451 N.E.2d 195, 198 (N.Y. 1983); Downtowner, Inc.
v. Acromental Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118, 121 (N.D. 1984); Davis v. Loopco
Indus., Inc., 609 N.E.2d 144, 145 (Ohio 1993) (expressly declining to adopt a
test for the mere continuation exception for product liability cases); Pulis v.
U.S. Elec. Tool Co., 561 P.2d 68, 71 (Okla. 1977); Erickson v. Grande Ronde
Lumber Co., 92 P.2d 170, 174 (Or. 1939); Brown v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 123
S.E. 97, 98 (S.C. 1924); Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach., Inc., 387 N.W.2d
515, 518 (S.D. 1986); Hopewell Baptist Church v. Se. Window Mfg. Co., No.
E2000-02699-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 708850, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25,
2001); Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Co., 479 A.2d 126, 127 (Vt. 1984); In re State
Pub. Bldg. Asbestos Litig., 454 S.E.2d 413, 424–25 (W. Va. 1994); Polius v.
Clark Equip. Co., 608 F. Supp. 1541, 1545 (D.V.I. 1985).
Mozingo v. Correct Mfg., 752 F.2d 168, 174–75 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that
the traditional mere continuation exception requires identity of stockholders,
directors and officers); see also Savage Arms Inc. v. W. Auto Supply, Co., 18
P.3d 49, 55 (Alaska 2001) (mere continuation theory requires “the existence of
identical shareholders”).
62

See, e.g., Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 879 (Mich. 1976)
(dissolution of the seller soon after the sale one of four enumerated factors
indicating continuity of enterprise).

63
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the variations of the continuity of enterprise exception derive from
Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co. 64 Variations in the application of the Turner
factors create the three sub-species.
In Turner, the Michigan Supreme Court expanded the four
traditional categories of successor liability and, in so doing, developed a
continuity of enterprise theory of successor liability. 65 The court adopted
the rule that, in the sale of corporate assets for cash, three criteria would
be the threshold guidelines to establish whether there is continuity of
enterprise between the transferee and the transferor corporations: (1)
“There is a continuation of the enterprise of the seller corporation, so
that there is a continuity of management, personnel, physical location,
assets, and general business operations;” (2) “[t]he seller corporation
ceases its ordinary business operations, liquidates, and dissolves as soon
as legally and practically possible;” and (3) “[t]he purchasing corporation
assumes those liabilities and obligations of the seller ordinarily necessary
for the interrupted continuation of normal business operations of the
seller corporation.” 66
The Turner court went on to state that:
Because this is a products liability case,
however, there is a second aspect on
continuity which must also be considered.
Where the successor corporation
represents itself either affirmatively or, by
64

244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976).

65

Id. at 878–79.

Id. at 879 (citing McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., Div. of Harris-Intertype
Corp., 264 A.2d 98, 103–05 (N.J. 1970), aff’d, 288 A.2d 585 (1972)). These are
three of the four factors from McKee used to determine whether liability will
arise under the de facto merger form of successor liability. The court in Turner
decided that the absence of the factor omitted in this article—that “[t]here is a
continuity of shareholders which results from the Purchasing corporation
paying for the acquired assets with shares of its own stock, this stock ultimately
coming to be held by the shareholders of the seller corporation so that they
become a constituent part of the purchasing corporation.”—should not be
conclusive. Id. at 880.
66
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omitting to do otherwise, as in effect a
continuation
of
the
original
manufacturing enterprise, a strong
indication of continuity is established. 67
If continuity is established, “then the transferee must accept the
liabilit[ies] with the benefits.” 68 Thus, when applying its rule, the Turner
court stated that the plaintiff had made a prima facie showing of
“continuation of corporate responsibility for products liability” by
proving:
(1) There was basic continuity of the
enterprise of the seller corporation,
including, apparently, a retention of key
personnel, assets, general business
operations, and even the [corporate]
name. (2) The seller corporation ceased
ordinary business operations, liquidated,
and dissolved soon after distribution of
consideration received from the buying
corporation.
(3) The purchasing
corporation assumed those liabilities and
obligations of the seller ordinarily
necessary for the continuation of the
normal business operations of the seller
corporations, (4) The purchasing
corporation held itself out to the world as
the effective continuation of the seller
corporation. 69
In Turner the showings are presented as “guidelines,” making it
somewhat ambiguous as to whether they were required elements, nonexclusive factors, or if they were to be weighed and balanced.
67

Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 882.

68

Id. at 883.

69

Id. at 883–84.
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The Michigan Supreme Court did not address the limits of the
continuity of enterprise exception again until 1999 in Foster v. ConeBlanchard Mach. Co. 70 In Foster, a plaintiff, injured while operating a feed
screw machine, sued the corporate successor after receiving a $500,000
settlement from the predecessor corporation. 71 The court held that
“because [the] predecessor was available for recourse as witnessed by
plaintiff’s negotiated settlement with the predecessor for $500,000, the
continuity of enterprise theory of successor liability is inapplicable.” 72
The Foster court thus resolved two issues left open in Turner.
First, the Michigan appellate decisions prior to Foster cited Turner for the
proposition that the continuity of enterprise test was comprised of four
elements or factors, following the four items enumerated in the Turner

597 N.W.2d 506 (Mich. 1999). In the interim, the court cited Turner in three
decisions, none of which clarified the key Turner holding. Jeffrey v. Rapid Am.
Corp., 529 N.W.2d 644, 656 (Mich. 1995) (citing Turner for the proposition that
corporate law principles should not be rigidly applied in products liability
cases); Stevens v. McLough Steel Prods. Corp., 446 N.W.2d 95, 98 (Mich. 1989)
(citing Turner as a case where the Michigan Supreme Court discussed the
doctrine of successor liability in the context of a products liability suit); Langley
v. Harris Corp., 321 N.W.2d 662, 664–65 (Mich. 1982) (citing Turner for the
proposition that an acquiring corporation maybe held liable for products
liability claims arising from activities of its predecessor corporation under a
continuity of enterprise theory but then holding that the Turner rationale will
not allow a corporation to seek indemnity from the plaintiff’s employer in a
products liability suit). One appellate court decision between Turner and Foster
concluded that satisfying the fourth consideration in Turner (the purchasing
corporation’s holding itself out as a continuation of the selling corporation) was
not sufficient for a finding of successor liability where the first three
considerations were not met. The court noted that to impose successor liability
in such circumstances would effectively be an adoption of the broader “product
line exception.” Pelc v. Bendix Mach. Tool Corp., 314 N.W.2d 614, 620 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1981) (finding where a successor bought only 8% of the assets of
another corporation in a bankruptcy sale and did not meet the first three
criteria of Turner but held itself out as a continuation of the liquidating
corporation, the mere continuation test was not satisfied).
70

71

Foster v. Cone-Blanchard Mach. Co., 597 N.W.2d 506, 508 (Mich. 1999).

72

Id.
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court’s holding and not the three listed in its announcement of the rule. 73
The Foster court clarified that, in fact, only three items are involved in the
Turner rule, and they are required elements:
Turner held that a prima facie case of
continuity of enterprise exists where the
plaintiff establishes the following facts:
(1) there is continuation of the seller
corporation, so that there is a continuity
of management, personnel, physical
location, assets, and general business
operations
of
the
predecessor
corporation;
(2)
the
predecessor
corporation ceases its ordinary business
operations, liquidates, and dissolves as
soon as legally and practically possible;
and (3) the purchasing corporation
assumes those liabilities and obligations
of the seller ordinarily necessary for the
uninterrupted continuation of normal
business operations of the selling
corporation.
Turner identified as an
additional
principle
relevant
to
determining successor liability, whether
the purchasing corporation holds itself
out to the world as the effective
continuation of the seller corporation. 74
In a footnote, the Foster court recognized the relationship between the
three necessary elements for continuity of enterprise and the fourth
Fenton Area Pub. Sch. v. Sorensen-Gross Constr. Co., 335 N.W.2d 221,
225–26 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); Lemire v. Garrard Drugs, 291 N.W.2d 103, 105
(Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Powers v. Baker-Perkins, Inc. 285 N.W.2d 402, 406
(Mich. Ct. App. 1979); Pelc, 314 N.W.2d at 618; State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co.
v. Pitney Bowes Mgmt Ser., Inc., No. 205164, 1999 WL 33451719, at *1 (Mich.
Ct. App. Apr. 2, 1999).
73

74

Foster, 597 N.W.2d at 510 (emphasis added).
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“separate and relevant inquiry”—whether the purchasing corporation
holds itself out to the world as the effective continuation of the seller
corporation:
This principle has been called the fourth
guideline of the Turner continuity of
enterprise analysis. However, we note
that a truer reading of Turner suggests that
the first three guidelines were intended to
complete the continuity of enterprise
inquiry where there is a sale of corporate
assets. Turner went on to identify as a
separate and relevant inquiry whether a
purchasing corporation holds itself out as
the effective continuation of the seller. 75
It is not readily apparent what this “separate and relevant inquiry” is to
be used for under Foster. Thus, after Foster, a plaintiff alleging successor
liability under the continuity of enterprise exception must only establish
the three articulated elements. 76
Second, the Foster court held that the “‘continuity of enterprise’
doctrine applies only when the transferor is no longer viable and capable
of being sued.” 77 The court’s interpretation of the underlying rationale
of Turner was “to provide a source of recovery for injured plaintiffs.” 78
According to Justice Brickley, the Turner court expanded liability based
on the successor’s continued enjoyment of “certain continuing benefits”:
“[T]he test in Turner is designed to determine whether the company (or
‘enterprise’) involved in the lawsuit is essentially the same company that
was allegedly negligent in designing or manufacturing the offending
75

Id. at 510 n.6

Meram v. Clark Refining & Mktg., Inc., No. 221342, 2001 WL 1606883, at *2
(Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2001) (quoting Foster, 597 N.W.2d).
76

77

Foster, 597 N.W.2d at 511.

Id. Justice Brickley, in dissent, disagreed with the majority as to the underlying
rationale of Turner.

78
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product.” 79 Furthermore, the dissent stated that the Turner court had
explained that the policy basis for the continuity of the enterprise
requirement was that “the enterprise, the going concern, ought to bear
the liability for the damages done by its defective products.” 80 The court
reasoned that, because “[the] enterprise enjoys certain continuing
benefits, such as goodwill and expertise, [it must] also accept continuing
responsibility for the costs that the enterprise has imposed on society
through its negligence.” 81 Therefore, the majority relies upon the policy
of providing plaintiff with a recovery as the fundamental basis for
extending successor liability under Turner whereas the minority would
impose successor liability where the successor enjoys the continuing
benefits of the enterprise. 82
The dissent notwithstanding, the Foster decision appears to return
Michigan law to its state immediately after Turner was decided:
continuity of enterprise is a recognized doctrine of successor liability and
the doctrine has three required elements. To the extent that intervening
decisions had narrowed Turner with the addition of a fourth factor—
whether the purchasing corporation holds itself out to the world as the
effective continuation of the seller corporation—that revision of the
doctrine appears to have been reversed. Further, to the extent that
Turner’s “guidelines” had been considered factors by other courts
adopting the continuity of enterprise, the Foster court made it clear that
the rule was to be comprised of elements.
a. Type 1: Element-based Continuity of Enterprise
Some courts apply the Turner factors as elements. 83 As with
other rigid, element-based forms of successor liability, this renders the
Id. at 513; Foster v. Cone-Blanchard Mach. Co., 597 N.W.2d 506, 513 (Mich.
1976).

79

80

Id. at 513–14 (citing Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 876).

81

Id. at 514.

82

See id.

Asher v. KCS Int’l, Inc., 659 So. 2d 598, 599–600 (Ala. 1995); Foster, 597
N.W.2d at 510 (Michigan courts also consider, to the extent discussed above,
83
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doctrine susceptible to the “draft around.” Structuring the transaction to
avoid continuities of the seller business with the same management,
personnel, assets and location, will defeat the first element. That,
however, is probably an acceptable result. It is this continuity that
suggests successor liability is appropriate in some sense; if the
constituent parts are at fault in some way and they continue to operate,
then subjecting the new whole of which they are part to liability has
some legitimacy. For requirements two and three, predecessor cessation
of operations and liquidation and successor assumption of ordinary
course of business debts of the predecessor, both of these required
elements can be structured around by requiring the predecessor to
remain in existence and to operate some business with the proceeds of
the sale, perhaps even as a passive investor, and forcing the predecessor
to pay claims against it out of sale proceeds rather than having the
successor entity assume them. To allow a successor to escape liability
because of a structure that adopts these features is to elevate form over
substance.
b. Type 2: Factor-based Continuity of Enterprise
When continuity of enterprise is defined by a factor-based test
lacking required elements, it bears a striking resemblance to factor-based
de facto merger and factor-based mere continuation. Courts using this
test look for evidence of the following key factors: (1) continuity of key
personnel, assets, and business operations; (2) speedy dissolution of the
predecessor corporation; (3) assumption by the successor of those
predecessor liabilities and obligations necessary for continuation of
normal business operations; and (4) continuation of corporate identity. 84

an additional factor identified in Turner: “whether the purchasing corporation
holds itself out to the world as ‘the effective continuation of the seller
corporation.”); Salvati v. Blaw-Knox Food & Chem. Equip., Inc., 497 N.Y.S.2d
242, 247 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1985) (neglecting to cite the fourth
“consideration” of Turner and relaxing Turner’s requirement of prompt
dissolution).
84 Savage Arms, Inc. v. W. Auto Supply Co., 18 P.3d 49, 55; see also Paradise
Corp. v. Amerihost Dev., Inc., 848 So. 2d 177, 180 (Miss. 2003).
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It is likely that, although sporting different names in different
jurisdictions, factor-based de facto merger, mere continuation, and
continuity of enterprise are, really, the same species of successor liability.
E. The Product Line Exception of Ray v. Alad
In Ray v. Alad, 85 the California Supreme Court recognized the
product line exception to the general rule of successor non-liability. It is
a species of liability that is very similar to continuity of enterprise. The
court articulated the following “justifications” for imposing liability on a
successor corporation:
(1) the virtual destruction of the plaintiff’s
remedies
against
the
original
manufacturer caused by the successor’s
acquisition of the business, (2) the
successor’s ability to assume the original
manufacturer’s risk-spreading role, and
(3) the fairness of requiring the successor
to assume a responsibility for defective
products that was a burden necessarily
attached to the original manufacturer’s
goodwill being enjoyed by the successor
in the continued operation of the
business. 86

[Continuity of enterprise] considers the traditional [mere
continuation] factors as well as other factors such as: (1)
retention of the same employees; (2) retention of the same
supervisory personnel; (3) retention of the same production
facilities in the same physical location; (4) production of the
same product; (5) retention of the same name; (6) successor
holds itself out as the continuation of the previous enterprise.
85

560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977).

86

Id. at 9.
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The term “justifications” is somewhat ambiguous as to whether
it connotes the balancing of required elements or non-exclusive factors,
much like the Turner guidelines.
Like the Michigan Supreme Court in Foster, which revisited Turner some
years after the original opinion was issued, the California Supreme Court
referred to these three justifications as conditions, thus suggesting that
they were essential elements under the product line exception. Despite
its name, the product line theory of successor liability appears only rarely,
if at all, to have been applied in a reported decision to a successor that
had acquired merely one of many product lines from the predecessor; in
nearly all reported cases, it appears to have been applied to sales of
substantially all of a predecessor’s assets. 87 In fact, one court has
emphasized that the “policy justifications for our adopting the product
line rule require the transfer of substantially all of the predecessor’s
assets to the successor corporation.” 88
The product line doctrine, where accepted, breaks into three
distinct sub-species. The first two differ only as to whether Ray’s “virtual
destruction of the plaintiff’s [other] remedies” 89 condition is strictly
required in order to permit recovery. The third type is too ambiguously
defined to analyze.
1. Type 1: Causation By Destruction of Other Remedies Requirement
Some courts include in the conditions in Ray, a requirement that
“the virtual destruction of the plaintiff’s remedies against the original
manufacturer have been caused by the successor’s acquisition of the
business.” 90 This requirement is said to limit the product line doctrine to

George W. Kuney & Donna C. Looper, Successor Liability in California, 20 CEB
CAL. BUS. L. PRACT. 50 (2005).
87

Hall, 692 P.2d at 791 n.1 (refusing to apply product line test to successor that
purchased but one of many asbestos product lines).
88

89

Ray, 560 P.2d at 9.

Id.; see also Sullivan v. A.W. Flint Co., No. CV 920339263, 1996 WL 469716,
at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 1996); Garcia, 933 P.2d at 249; In re Seventh
90
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situations where two sets of facts are present that justify application of
the doctrine and imposition of successor liability. First, the product line
rule is said to be one of necessity and should only be applied when the
successor is the only source of relief for the plaintiff. 91 “Second,
elemental fairness demands that there be a causal connection between
the successor’s acquisition and the unavailability of the predecessor.” 92
A sale of substantially all the assets of a business satisfies these twin
requirements; sale of a single product line of many may not. 93 This
approach to the product line doctrine renders it virtually identical to type
1 element-based continuity of enterprise. 94
2. Type 2: No Causation By Destruction of Other Remedies
Requirement
Other courts apply the conditions in Ray without requiring that
the purchasing corporation cause the destruction of the plaintiff’s
remedy. 95 These courts focus on the necessity of providing recovery for
imposing liability on the successor because of its “‘enjoyment of [the
original manufacturer’s] trade name, good will, and the continuation of
an established . . . enterprise.’” 96 A Pennsylvania court, after examining
Judicial Dist. Asbestos Litig., 788 N.Y.S.2d 579, 583 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005);
Garcia v. Coe Mfg. Co., 933 P.2d 243, 249 (N.M. 1997); Hall, 692 P.2d at 790.
91

Hall, 692 P.2d at 792.

92

Id at 791.

93 See Garcia, 933 P.2d at 249 (adopting Ray v. Alad and discussing justifications
for product line and continuing enterprise liability).
94

See Ray, 560 P.2d at 9.

LeFever v. K.P. Hovnanian Enter., Inc., 734 A.2d 290, 298–99 (N.J. 1999);
Dewejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106, 111 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981)
(Pennsylvania courts consider the three Ray conditions as well as additional
factors).
95

LeFever, 734 A.2d at 299 (quoting Mettinger v. Globe Slicing Machine Co.,
709 A.2d 779, 785 (153 N.J. 371, 384 (N.J. 1988) (Pollock, J., dissenting) (other
citations omitted)).

96
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whether it was better to expand the mere continuation doctrine or adopt
the product line doctrine, decided upon the latter course and deliberately
chose to cast off any remnants of corporate formalism that would attend
a required element based test:
We also believe it better not to phrase the
new exception too tightly. Given its
philosophical origin, it should be phrased
in general terms, so that in any particular
case the court may consider whether it is
just to impose liability on the successor
corporation.
The various factors
identified in the several cases discussed
above will always be pertinent – for
example,
whether
the
successor
corporation advertised itself as an
ongoing enterprise, Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.;
or whether it maintained the same
product, name, personnel, property, and
clients, Turner v. Bituminous casualty Co.; or
whether it acquired the predecessor
corporation’s name and good will, and
required the predecessor to dissolve,
Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp..
Also, it will always be useful to consider
whether the three-part test stated in Ray v.
Alad Corp. has been met. The exception
will more likely realize its reason for
being, however, if such details are not
made part of its formulation. 97

3. Type 3: Ambiguous

97

Dawejko, 434 A.2d at 106.
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Georgia and Indiana have both commented upon the product
line exception, arguably favorably, without expressly adopting it. 98
F. Commentary: The Status of the Continuity Doctrines
The continuity doctrines—continuity of enterprise, product line,
and the expansive form of mere continuation—have much in common
and some critical differences that are discussed below.
1. Continuity of Enterprise Liability: Must the Predecessor be
Defunct?
One of the main points of difference amount courts adopting
continuity of enterprise is whether the predecessor must have become
defunct, in some sense. Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 99 is the ovular
case for the continuity of enterprise theory and it includes dissolution of
the predecessor as a factor, noting that if the predecessor “legally and/or
practically becomes defunct. [The injured person] has no place to turn
for relief except to the second corporation.” 100 The court set forth the
following as “guidelines” 101 in determining whether there is sufficient
continuity between the predecessor and the successor:
(1) There is a continuation of the
enterprise of the seller corporation, so
that there is a continuity of management,
personnel, physical location, assets, and
general business operations[;]
98 See Farmex v. Wainwright, 501 S.E.2d 802, 804 (Ga. 1998) (holding that the
product-line exception was not applicable because the purchaser did not
continue to manufacture the product that injured the plaintiff after the asset
purchase); Guerrero v. Allison Engine Co., 725 N.E.2d 479, 483–87 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2000) (declining to adopt the product line exception because it would not
aid the plaintiff in that case because the predecessor corporation continued to
exist).
99

244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976).

100

Id. at 878.

101

Id. at 883.
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(2) The seller corporation ceases its ordinary
business operations, liquidates, and dissolves as
soon as legally and practically possible[;]
(3) The purchasing corporation assumes
those liabilities and obligations of the
seller ordinarily necessary for the
uninterrupted continuation of the normal
business operations of the seller
corporation[; and]
(4) The purchasing corporation [holds]
itself out to the world as the effective
continuation of the seller corporation. 102
There is variation within the continuity of enterprise species of
successor liability on the point of whether the predecessor entity must
actually be dissolved for liability to attach and recovery against the
predecessor to occur. Some courts allow recovery against the successor
without addressing whether or not the predecessor dissolved. 103
At the other end of the spectrum, some courts have held there
can be no successor liability unless the predecessor is completely

Id. at 883–84 (emphasis added). This presentation makes the continuity of
enterprise exception appear extremely similar to the doctrines of de facto merger
and the product line exception. At least as originally conceived, the three
species of successor liability, especially when one considers their local
subspecies in various jurisdictions, may actually represent one broadly defined
category of successor liability. See supra note 94–96 and accompanying text
regarding similarity of product line liability to the continuation of the business
doctrines.
102

See Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 173, 175–76 (5th Cir.
1985) (products liability action allowed to proceed against successor under
continuity of enterprise theory where the successor “splitoff” from an extant
predecessor; applying Mississippi law). See generally Holloway v. John E. Smith’s
Sons, 432 F. Supp. 454, 454–56 (D.S.C. 1977) (unclear whether the predecessor
ceased operations, liquidated or dissolved).
103
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dissolved (regardless of whether or not it has merely ceased ordinary
business operations and exists only as a legal, not a practical, matter). 104
Other courts consider whether the predecessor remains a viable
entity capable of providing relief—if it is, then there can be no recovery
against the successor; if not, then successor liability will lie. 105 While
failure of the predecessor to dissolve may not be fatal in every action for
continuity of enterprise successor liability, especially where the
predecessor remains a viable source for recourse, this is generally fatal to
the successor’s liability. 106 This appears to be the most rational approach
in terms of the policies underlying successor liability. 107
Notably, some opinions that make strong statements regarding
the requirement that the predecessor be dissolved—or that are cited by
courts and commentators for that proposition—are based on cases in
which the predecessor has not only failed to dissolve, but remained
operating and viable. 108 This being so, it is hard to conclude that
104 See Asher v. KCS Int’l Inc., 659 So. 2d 598, 600 (Ala. 1995) (citing MatrixChurchill v. Springsteen, 461 So. 2d 782 (Ala. 1984) for the rule that “the
corporation must cease ordinary business operations, liquidate, and dissolve.”).
If this approach is taken, it is fairly easy for the asset sale transaction to be
structured to avoid liability: Simply require that the predecessor remain in
existence, even as a corporate shell for some period of time such as ten or more
years to provide protection for the successor and avoid application of the
continuity of enterprise doctrine. This would seem to elevate form over
substance by providing a convenient bright-line rule.

See Foster v. Cone-Blanchard Mach. Co., 597 N.W.2d 506, 511 (Mich. 1999)
(stating the thrust of Turner was “to provide a remedy to an injured plaintiff in
those cases in which the first corporation ‘legally and/or practically becomes
defunct.’”).

105

106

See Knapp v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 369 (3d Cir. 1974).

Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 878 (Mich. 1976); Foster,
597 N.W.2d at 511.

107

See Santa Maria v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 808 F.2d 848, 859, 862 (1st Cir. 1986)
(applying New York law, the court stated that under Turner “the injured
plaintiff must have been deprived by the asset transaction of an effective remedy
against the predecessor corporation that actively manufactured the product
causing the injury” (emphasis in original)—in that case, the predecessor
108
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109

dissolution of the predecessor is, or should be, required.
Rather, the
focus should be upon whether the predecessor represents a meaningful
or substantial source of payment or recovery.
2. Continuity of Enterprise Does Liability Only Lie If There is No
Available Remedy Against the Predecessory Entity?
In a similar vein to whether dissolution of the predecessor is
required for liability to attach to the successor, the availability of a
remedy against the predecessor has also been held relevant to the
continuity of enterprise species of successor liability—but it is not a
required element. It is the quality of the remedy available from the
predecessor that should be evaluated and taken into consideration.
Availability of relief against the predecessor is considered relevant
because one of the rationales underlying the continuity of enterprise
exception is that successor liability should lie where the predecessor
becomes defunct, and the injured party “has no place to turn for relief
except to the second corporation.” 110 Moreover, federal courts, in
continued to operate and “maintain[] a substantial ongoing sales and
manufacturing presence . . . .”); Diaz v. South Bend Lathe Inc., 707 F. Supp. 97,
102–03 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (court notes that continuity of enterprise exception
applies, inter alia, where the “original entity ceased its ordinary business
operation by dissolving promptly after the transaction” and holds the doctrine
not available because the predecessor “remains in existence”—there, the
predecessor sold its subsidiary and the subsidiary’s assets, and the court noted
the plaintiff was not without a remedy against the predecessor); McCarthy v.
Litton Indus., Inc., 570 N.E.2d 1008, 1013 (Mass. 1991) (stating that even if the
broader continuing enterprise exception were applied, there would be no
successor liability because “dissolution of the predecessor [was] required” and
not met—there, in that case the predecessor continued to operate and
manufacture electrical components); Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Mach. Co.,
507 N.E.2d 331, 340 (Ohio 1987) (citing Turner and stating that cases applying
the continuity of enterprise doctrine require the predecessor to be dissolved or
liquidated soon after the transfer of assets—there, the predecessor continued
after the sale “as an active, viable operation”).
Judge Posner notes as much in Brandon v. Anesthesia & Pain Mgmt.
Assocs., 419 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 2005), in which the predecessor was being
maintained as a “shell in good standing” by the successor precisely to attempt
to afford protection from continuity liability. Brandon, 419 F.3d at 600.

109

110

Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 878.
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dealing with labor and CERCLA cases, apply the similar “substantial
continuity” theory of successor liability and also hold that the ability of a
creditor or plaintiff to recover against the predecessor is an important
factor. 111
Finally, the Third Circuit and Pennsylvania district courts have
held that under Pennsylvania’s product line continuation exception, there
can be no successor liability remedy afforded by filing a claim in
bankruptcy proceedings. 112 There appear to be no cases outside of
Pennsylvania or applying other than Pennsylvania law that hold the
existence of any “potential” remedy, even if not actual or realized as a
practical matter, is required for successor liability. Moreover, it appears
that the Third Circuit and Pennsylvania district courts are misconstruing
Pennsylvania law. This draconian rule is derived from Conway, a case in
which the plaintiff had an effective remedy in the bankruptcy proceedings
due to available insurance coverage and the existence of a special fund,
but did not attempt to file even a late claim when he learned of the
bankruptcy proceedings. The Conway court held that “Pennsylvania law
would preclude successor liability where the plaintiff failed to make any
effort to assert his potentially available remedies in bankruptcy or in a

See Chicago Truck Drivers v. Tasemkin, Inc., 59 F.3d 48, 49 (7th Cir. 1995)
(successor liability for delinquent pension fund payments and withdrawal
liability); see also Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 749 (5th Cir.
1996) (sexual harassment under Title VII); Central States, Se. and Sw. Areas
Pension Fund v. Wiseway Motor Freight, No. 99 C 4202, 2000 WL 1409825, at
*5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2000) (pension withdrawal liability); Anderson v. J.A.
Interior Applications, Inc., No. 97 C 4552, 1998 WL 708851, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 28, 1998) (successor liability for delinquent employee benefit
contributions); Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Allis-Chalmers, 195 B.R. 716,
724, 726–27, 730–31 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (court held that the successor is not
liable where the predecessor is a viable company capable of providing relief,
and under section 363, the successor, whether viable or not, is not liable for any
claim that could have been brought during the bankruptcy proceeding).
111

112 Zerand-Bernal Group v. Cox, 23 F.3d 159, 163 (7th Cir. 1994); LaFountain
v. Webb Indus. Corp., 951 F.2d 544, 547–48 (3d Cir. 1991); Forrest v. Beloit
Corp., 278 F. Supp. 2d 471, 478 (E.D. Pa. 2003); Shaffer v. South State Mach.,
Inc., 995 F. Supp. 584, 585–86 (W.D. Pa. 1998).
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pending lawsuit against the original manufacturer.”
However, in
114
LaFountain v. Webb Industries Corporation, the court interpreted Conway to
mean that the existence of the right to file a claim against the
predecessor in bankruptcy precluded successor liability under
Pennsylvania law, 115 and subsequent courts have followed this seemingly
erroneous interpretation. 116
The availability of a remedy against a successor has two disparate
and competing components. On the one hand, courts state that
successor liability is available only where the predecessor cannot provide
a remedy. 117 On the other hand, courts have cautioned against
“[i]mposing liability on a successor when a predecessor could have
provided no relief whatsoever”. 118
In terms of required elements or factors for consideration, the
better approach appears to be to look at the availability of relief against
the predecessor as simply a factor, to be considered along with all the
other factors and facts of the case. 119 Courts frown on plaintiffs who
pursue successor liability claims without attempting to pursue potential
113

Conway v. White Trucks, 885 F.2d 90, 97 (3d Cir. 1989) (emphasis added).

114

951 F.2d 544. (3d Cir. 1991).

115

Id. at 547.

116 See, e.g., Keselyak v. Reach All, Inc., 660 A.2d 1350, 1353-54 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1995) (citing Conway and LaFountain in affirming trial court holding that, “the
continued existence of a viable cause of action against [the predecessors]
precluded application of the product line exception so as to permit suit against
[the successor].”); Kradel v. Fox River Tractor Co., 308 F.3d 328, 332 (3d Cir.
2002) (citing Keselyak, which cited LaFountain, for the proposition that “[clearly
the] inability to recover from an original manufacturer is a prerequisite in
Pennsylvannia to the use of the product line exception.”).
117

See, e.g., Foster v. Cone-Blanchard, 597 N.W.2d 506, 511. (Mich. 1999).

Musikiwamba v. ESSI, Inc., 760 F.2d 740, 750–51 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Unless
extraordinary circumstances exist, an injured [party] should not be made worse
off by a change in the business. But neither should [he] be made better off.”).
118

119

Chicago Truck Drivers v. Tasemkin, Inc., 59 F.3d 48, 51 (7th Cir. 1995).
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remedies against the predecessor and are likely not to apply the
“equitable” successor liability doctrine in these circumstances. 120 This is
consistent with the origins of the doctrine as an escape valve for
satisfaction of liability that would otherwise be suppressed by the general
no-liability-for-asset-purchasers rule.
Similarly, in rejecting the Products Liability Restatement’s
restrictive approach to successor liability and adopting the continuity of
enterprise species of successor liability, the Supreme Court of Alaska
noted:
[T]he Restatement analysis defeats the
assumptions behind tort law. We assume
that meritorious claims will be paid; that
they are sometimes not paid due to
insolvency does not change that
underlying assumption. To characterize
as a ‘windfall’ full recovery for losses
caused by product defects unjustly
challenges the legitimacy of the injuries
suffered. 121
Thus, the majority—and probably the better—approach is that courts
should treat the ability to recover against the predecessor as a factor, 122
not a bar to successor liability. For example, in Anderson v. J.A. Interior
Applications, 123 a case in which the predecessor was a debtor in an
ongoing Chapter 7 action, the court rejected the successor’s arguments
See, e.g., Conway v. White Trucks, 885 F.2d 90, 97 (3d Cir. 1989); Callahan &
Sons v. Dykeman Elec. Co., 266 F. Supp. 2d 208, 226 (D. Mass. 2003) (failure
to file a claim in a receivership); see also Central States, Se. & Sw. Pension Fund
v. Wiseway Motor Freight, Inc., No. 99 C 4202, 2000 WL 1409825, at *8 (N.D.
Ill. Sept 26, 2000).
120

121

Savage Arms, Inc. v. W. Auto Supply, 18 P.3d 49, 57 (Alaska 2001).

122

See Chicago Truck Drivers, 59 F.3d at 51.

123 Anderson v. J.A. Interior Applications, No. 97 C 4552, 1998 WL 708851
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 1998).
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that the successor liability doctrine did not apply because (1) the
plaintiffs might still recover a portion of their claims in the bankruptcy
proceedings, and (2) if plaintiffs could not recover anything in the
bankruptcy proceedings, then allowing them to proceed against the
successor would amount to a windfall. 124 The court noted that the
“‘continuity’ factors” were overwhelming, and, in light of the important
“federal interest in ensuring that employers maintain properly funded
pension plans[,]” successor liability was mandated. 125 In other words,
looking at the totality of the circumstances, including a number of factual
findings and factors, and weighing the public policy concerns that were
implicated, the court imposed liability. This is the essence of the
successor liability doctrine as originally conceived: a safety valve that
prevents an unjust result caused by the strict application of normal
corporate law rules.
3. Broad Contraction, Narrow Expansion of the Continuity Doctrines
The continuity doctrines—continuity of enterprise, product line,
and the expansive form of mere continuation—are under attack in a
number of jurisdictions. Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 126 a case that had
supported continuity of enterprise’s validity in New Hampshire, is no
longer good law. 127 In Simoneau v. South Bend Lathe, Inc., 128 the court
Id. at *6–7 (citing Chicago Truck Drivers v. Tasemkin, 59 F.3d 48, 50–51
(7th Cir. 1995)).

124

125

Id. at *5, 7.

126

501 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 1974).

Conway v. White Trucks, 885 F.2d 90, 93 n.2 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Cyr is no
longer good law in light of the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s express
rejection of its reasoning.”); see also Zerand-Bernal Group, Inc. v. Cox, 23 F.3d
159, 163 (7th Cir. 1994) (under Pennsylvania law there is no successor liability
where the plaintiff had any remedy against the predecessor, even the limited
remedy of filing a claim in bankruptcy).
127

Solely relating to 363(f) claims. See In re Portrait Corp. of Am., Inc., 406 B.R.
637, 641 n.4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Courts in this circuit clearly view section
363(f) to have a broader reach than Zerand did.”); see, e.g., In re Chrysler, 405
B.R. at 98; In re Lawrence United Corp., 221 B.R. 661, 668 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.
1998) (“interests” under section 363(f) are not limited to in rem interests).
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rejected the product line theory of successor liability 129 because riskspreading was a primary justification for that theory. 130 The court had
denounced risk-spreading as a justification for imposing strict liability in
an earlier decision, maintaining that “strict liability is not a no-fault
system of compensation.” 131 The court also stated “to the extent Cyr
does suggest that we embrace risk-spreading, it is no longer a valid
interpretation of New Hampshire law.” 132 Then, in Bielagus v. EMRE, 133
the New Hampshire Supreme Court continued in this direction and also
rejected the continuity of enterprise theory of successor liability based
upon its earlier rejection of risk spreading as a basis for imposing strict
liability. 134 This position is noteworthy not just because it states the law
of New Hampshire, but also because Cyr was an important case and
courts in twenty-seven other states either accepted it, considered it with
ambivalence, or disapproved of it. 135

128

543 A.2d 407 (N.H. 1988).

129

See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text.

130

Simoneau, 543 A.2d at 408–09.

Id. at 409 (quoting Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 845–46
(N.H. 1978)).

131

132

Id. at 409.

133

826 A.2d 559 (N.H. 2003).

Id. at 569. In rejecting this position, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
denounced Cyr and Kleen Laundry and Dry Cleaning Servs. v. Total Waste
Mgmt. I (817 F. Supp. 225 (D.N.H. 1993)) & II (867 F. Supp. 1136 (D.N.H.
1994)) to the extent they are cited for the proposition that New Hampshire has
adopted the continuing enterprise or substantial continuity theory of successor
liability.

134

Courts in twelve states have cited Cyr favorably, generally adopting either the
product line or continuity of enterprise exceptions to successor liability.
Alabama: Matrix-Churchill v. Springsteen, 461 So. 2d 782, 786–87 (Ala. 1984)
(noting that the Alabama Supreme Court adopted the continuity of enterprise
doctrine in Andrews v. John E. Smith’s Sons Co., 369 So. 2d 781 (Ala. 1979)).
California: Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 8 (Cal. 1977) (creating the product

135
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line exception); Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, Inc., 159 Cal. Rptr. 119, 123–24 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1979); Connecticut: A.G. Assocs. v. Parafati, No. CVN0041808 NE,
2002 WL 1162890, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 11, 2002) (applying the
continuity of enterprise exception). Delaware: Sheppard v. A.C. & S. Co., 484
A.2d 521, 525 (Del. Super. Ct. 1984). Georgia: Farmex, Inc. v. Wainwright, 501
S.E.2d 802, 804 (Ga. 1998) (implicitly adopting the product line exception).
Kansas: Stratton v. Garvey Int’l, Inc., 676 P.2d 1290, 1298–99 (Kan. Ct. App.
1984) (citing Cyr and performing a continuity of enterprise analysis).
Massachusetts: Cargill, Inc. v. Beaver Coal & Oil Co., 676 N.E.2d 815, 819
(Mass. 1997) (citing Cyr for the proposition that “there is no requirement that
there be complete shareholder identity between the seller and a buyer before
corporate successor liability will attach”). Michigan: Turner, v. Bitiminous Cas.
Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 878 (Mich. 1976) (creating the continuity of enterprise
exception). New Jersey: Ramirez, v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811, 816
(N.J. 1981) (adopting the product line exception). New Mexico: Garcia v. Coe
Mfg. Co., 933 P.2d 243, 247 (N.M. 1997) (discussing the underlying policies
examined in Cyr before adopting the product line exception). Pennsylvania:
Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106, 108–10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981)
(citing Cyr with approval and then adopting the product line exception).
Washington: Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 385–87 (Wash. 1984) (citing
Cyr and adopting the product line exception).
Courts in six states have cited Cyr with ambivalence. Indiana: Lucas v.
Dorsey Corp., 609 N.E.2d 1191, 1201 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Cyr for the
proposition that express rejection of a predecessor’s liability is not dispositive
of successor liability issue). New York: Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 59
N.Y.2d 239, 245 (N.Y. 1983) (citing Cyr for the proposition that predecessor
corporation must “be extinguished” before liability will be imposed on a
successor). NOTE: Other New York decisions not citing Cyr have adopted
both the product line and continuity of enterprise exceptions. North Carolina:
Budd Tire Corp. v. Pierce Tire Co., 370 S.E.2d 267, 269 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988)
(citing Cyr for the proposition that “inadequate consideration for the purchase,
or a lack of some of the elements of a good faith purchaser for value” is a
separate exception to the general rule of successor non-liability, but not
expressly rejecting or adopting this position). South Dakota: Groseth Int’l, Inc.
v. Tenneco, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 159, 175 (S.D. 1987) (citing Cyr for the traditional
exceptions). Texas: Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 556
(Tex. 1981) (citing Cyr for the mere continuation exception without explaining
the test.). Wisconsin: Tift v. Forage King Indus., Inc., 322 N.W.2d 14, 27 (Wis.
1982) (Callow, J. dissenting) (critiquing the Cyr rationale after the majority
imposes liability under the traditional exceptions).
Courts in nine states, generally those adhering strictly to the traditional
rule of successor non-liability, treat Cyr with disfavor. Arizona: Winsor v.
Glasswerks PHX, L.L.C., 63 P.3d 1040, 1047 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (deferring
to the legislature on successor liability). Colorado: Johnston v. Amsted Indus.,
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In opposition to this contracting trend in the spread of
continuity of enterprise, Alaska fairly recently accepted and strongly
endorsed the continuity of enterprise theory in the Savage Arms case:
Thus, whereas the traditional “mere
continuation” exception depends on the
existence of identical shareholders, the
“continuity of enterprise” looks beyond
that formal requirement and considers the
substance of the underlying transaction.
The key factors under the “continuity of
enterprise: exception, first articulated in
Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., are: (1)
continuity of key personnel, assets, and
business
operations;
(2)
speedy
dissolution
of
the
predecessor
corporation; (3) assumption by the
Inc., 830 P.2d 1141, 1146 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting both the product line
and continuity of enterprise exceptions). Florida: Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409
So. 2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. 1982) (refusing to adopt the continuity of enterprise
exception). Illinois: Green v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 460 N.E.2d 895,
899 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (holding that plaintiff’s reliance on Cyr was unfounded
because continuation in Illinois requires continuity of stock ownership); State ex
rel. Donahue v. Perkins & Will Architects, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 29, 33 (Ill. App. Ct.
1980). Iowa: Pancratz v. Monsanto Co., 547 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa 1996)
(citing Cyr and then holding that Iowa is a “traditional” state). Maryland:
Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564, 571–72 (Md. 1991) (expressly rejecting
any extension of the traditional rule). New Hampshire: Bielagus v. EMRE of
New Hampshire Corp., 826 A.2d 559, 569 (N.H. 2003); Simoneau v. South
Bend Lathe, Inc., 543 A.2d 407, 409 (N.H. 1988) (stating that, to the extent Cyr
adopts risk spreading, it is not a valid interpretation of New Hampshire law).
North Dakota: Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118,
124 (N.D. 1984) (citing Cyr for the proposition that costs from products
liability should be “borne by those best able to gauge the risks of those costs,
protect against them, and pass the costs on the consumer,” but holding that any
extension of the traditional doctrine of successor liability should be undertaken
by the legislature). Ohio: Welco Indus., Inc. v. Applied Cos., 617 N.E.2d 1129,
1133 (Ohio 1993) (recognizing that Ohio courts do not expand the traditional
exceptions in tort or contract cases). Virginia: Harris v. T.I, Inc., 413 S.E.2d
605, 609–10 (Va. 1992) (expressly rejecting the “product line exception” and
the “expanded mere continuation exception”).
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successor of those predecessor liabilities
and
obligations
necessary
for
continuation
of
normal
business
operations; and (4) continuation of
corporate identity. This is a limited
exception that looks past the identity of
shareholders and directors, and focuses
on whether the business itself has been
transferred as an ongoing concern.
….
We also note that permitting successor
liability under the “continuity of
enterprise” exception will not discourage
large-scale transfers so long as anticipated
successor liabilities do not exceed the
value of the corporation’s accumulated
goodwill. Presumably, many corporations
will continue to engage in efficient and
productive transfers, with the purchasing
firm merely factoring into the purchase
price the cost of those successor
liabilities. When firms contract for an
asset transfer where the basic enterprise is
to be continued, they negotiate to a price
that reflects the fair market value of the
transfer, taking heed of the risk of future
claims. The purchasing firm will value
any potential successor liability claims at
least at the incremental cost of obtaining
insurance coverage against successor
liability for them. Where that insurance is
too expensive or is unavailable,
negotiations could collapse, and the firm
will either continue to exist (and be
subject to liability claims) or liquidate (and
future victims will receive no recovery).
But in many cases, we would expect
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selling and purchasing firms simply to
negotiate to a rational price that takes
account of these potential claims. The
posited negative effects on the overall
economy are too indeterminate and
speculative to outweigh the policy of
compensating persons injured by product
defects. 136
Commentators have noted that growth of the product line and
continuity of enterprise theories began to wane in the 1980s. 137
Although some are optimistic that the expanded exceptions have
recently received favorable treatment by some courts, 138 others recognize
that “a number of courts have recently refused to extend the traditional
principles of successor liability in order to compensate plaintiffs.” 139
Regardless of the current state of the law, commentators routinely
caution businesses to carefully structure asset sales because the law is not
settled in many jurisdictions. 140
4. The Restatement as Misstatement
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability rejected
the continuity of enterprise theory of successor liability. 141 The Products
Savage Arms, Inc. v. W. Auto Supply Co., 18 P.3d 49, 55, 56–57 (Alaska
2001).
136

Richard L. Cupp, Jr. Redesigning Successor Liability, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 845,
850 (1999).

137

138

Id.

David W. Pollack, Successor Liability in Asset Acquisitions, 1376 PLI/CORP.
255, 274 (2003).

139

Id. at 288–89; see also Jo Ann J. Brighton, How Free is “Free and Clear”? A
Practical Guide to Protection against Successor Liability when Purchasing Assets Out of a
Bankruptcy Estate, 21 SEP. AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 42–43 (Sept. 2002).

140

141 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12, cmts. b, g
(1998).
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Liability Restatement’s rejection of the theory—and the product line
theory—appears premised on the ground that:
[a] successor is not within the basic
liability rule in § 1 of this Restatement:
‘one who sells or distributes a defective
product is subject to liability for harm . . .
caused by the defective product.’ . . .
When the alleged successor receives value
in the form of the transferor’s goodwill
and continues to manufacture products of
the same sort as manufactured earlier by
the predecessor, and thus to some extent
constitutes a continuation of the
predecessor, the general rule of
nonliability derives primarily from the law
governing corporations, which favors the
free alienability of corporate assets and
limits shareholders’ exposures to liability
in order to facilitate the formation and
investment of capital. 142
Professor Owen has stated, “the Products Liability Restatement will play
a significant role in helping shape the law of products liability for the
twenty-first century” and that restatements “tend to influence
significantly the development of the law, especially in states where the
law is less developed.” 143 However, in his treatise on products liability,
Owen has also noted that “an increasing number of other courts [in
addition to the Michigan Supreme Court in Turner . . .] have adopted the
continuity of enterprise exception.” 144 Moreover, Professor Cupp has
pointed out that the Products Liability Restatement “overstates courts’
fondness for the traditional approach” to successor liability and
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12 cmt. a
(1998).

142

143

David Owen, Products Liability Law Restated, 49 S.C. L. REV. 273, 292 (1998).

144

2 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 19:6, n. 25.
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understates the number of courts applying the broader continuity of
enterprise theory (omitting Ohio and Mississippi). 145 Indeed, the less
restrictive continuity of enterprise theory and product line theories are
applied in almost as many jurisdictions, and probably more actual
lawsuits, than the traditional approach advocated by the Products
Liability Restatement. 146
The Products Liability Restatement appears to run counter to the
approaches of many states at the time of its issuance. Rather than
“restating” the law, at least in this area, the Products Liability
Restatement appears to have gone ahead of state courts and announced a
position that was not reflective of the state of the law at the time it was
adopted. It overstated the “trends” in applying the traditional approach
over the less restrictive continuity exceptions of enterprise and product
line theories, and it relied on corporate principles to the exclusion of
principles underlying tort law. 147 It was, however, cited and relied upon
heavily in Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Gordon, 148 in which the court states
“Texas strongly embraces the non-liability rule.” 149 On the other hand,
Cupp, supra note 135 at 857; see also Savage Arms, Inc. v. W. Auto Supply
Co., 18 P.3d 49, 56–58 (Alaska 2001). Since then, South Carolina has rejected
continuity of enterprise even while finding that Bankruptcy Code § 363(f) sales
do not preempt state successor liability laws. Simmons v. Mark-Lift Indus., 622
S.E.2d 213, 223 (S.C. 2005).
145

See Cupp, supra note 135, at 856–57, 894 (suggesting that the predictions of
“serious future consequences” of the less restrictive approaches broadly applied
are outdated).
146

See, e.g., Savage Arms, Inc. v. W. Auto Supply Co., 18 P.3d 49, 56–58 (Alaska
2001); Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 880 (Mich. 1976)
(stating that successor liability cases should be “decided on products liability
principles rather than simply by reexamining and adjusting corporate law
principles”); Cupp, supra note 135, at 856–57, 894.

147

Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Gordon, 16 S.W.3d 127, 139 (Tex. Ct. App.
2000).
148

149 Id. at 139; cf. Holland v. Williams Mountain Coal Co., 256 F.3d 819, 825
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that the “majority” of courts follow the traditional
mere continuation rule and citing the Restatement section 12 and Pearson v.
Nat’l Feeding Sys., 90 S.W.3d 46, 51 (Ky. 2002) (referring to “Restatement
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the Alaska Supreme Court rejected the Restatement (Third) approach in
Savage Arms. 150
G. Statutory Abolishment – One Last Approach
Texas has adopted a statute that limits successor liability to
express assumption and statutory mergers. 151 The statute was passed
expressly to legislatively overrule common law successor liability
doctrine. 152 While this standard is probably the most efficient to
administer in terms of cost—“just say no”—it is inflexible and invites
sharp drafting, thereby providing little or no recourse to involuntary
creditors who have no place at the table when the transactional
documents are being prepared.
H. So What is Successor Liability, Really?
1. Is it a Type of Fraudulent Conveyance Liability?
In her article Making Sense of Successor Liability, 153 Professor Reilly
suggests that, except for express assumption, the basis of common law
forms of the successor liability is to serve the same purpose as fraudulent
transfer law: protecting a predecessor’s creditors from the effect of a
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 12 (1998) for a general review of
successor-in-interest liability”)); New York v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 260 A.D.2d
174, 176 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (citing “Restatement 3d § 12 comment b and
note thereto” and stating “[w]ere the question open, we would decline to adopt
the “product line” approach as a radical change from existing law implicating
complex economic considerations better left to be addressed by the
legislature”).
Savage Arms, Inc., 18 P.3d at 56–58; see Lefever v. K.P. Hovnanian Enter.
Inc., 734 A.2d 290, 294–95 (N.J. 1999); Saez v. S & S Corrugated Paper Mach.
Co., 695 A.2d 740, 746–47 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).
150

151

TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 10.254(b) (West 2007).

See C.M. Asfahl Agency v. Tensor, Inc., 135 S.W.3d 768, 791–92 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2004).

152

Marie T. Reilly, Making Sense of Successor Liability, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 745,
748–49 (2003).

153
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transfer that, in some sense, defrauds them. In this, she tends toward
general agreement with the premises of this article: all forms of
successor liability stem from circumstances when the corporate rule of
no-liability-for-asset purchasers should not be honored because it is
somehow wrong, unjust, or inequitable in a particular case; 154 each
individualized doctrine should thus, be comprised of a set of flexible
factors that help to define the appropriate case for imposition of liability
and prevent sharp lawyering and the draft around from defeating this
purpose. Her focus on fraud as the touchstone for liability, however,
appears to be too limiting of a threshold. Fraud is often alleged but is
difficult to prove. It is not the courts that must look for fraud, but for
litigants to prove it. This presents a higher costly barrier to recovery,
especially for the class of creditors most in need of the protection of the
doctrine: involuntary tort creditors in general—specifically, future
claimants who can take no action to protect themselves from the effects
of the transfer. 155
Further, if actual or constructive fraud is used as the criterion for
imposing successor liability, haven’t we, in a roundabout way, merely
changed the remedy for fraudulent transfers from avoidance of the
transfer or recovery of the value transferred to open-ended liability
limited only by the successor’s (and, importantly, its insurers’) ability to

To be fair, Professor Reilly would probably not characterize herself as being
in agreement with this premise, which is here stated more broadly than her
position. The author has corresponded about the matter with her. In her
article, she explains her view of why certain transfers under certain
circumstances are “unfair” to the transferor’s creditors by reference to the
traditional exceptions to protections for good faith purchasers based upon
fraud. She describes “fraud” as including the many ways that a transferee and
transferor can collaborate to manipulate an asset transfer to deny creditors’
access to assets to satisfy their claims. Her point is that unless the courts first
determine the purpose of successor liability, they will not be able to articulate a
test or tests that screens for the appropriate circumstances for imposition of
liability. In this, she and the author agree.
154

Frank Fagan, From Policy Confusion to Doctrinal Clarity: Successor Liability from the
Perspective of Big Data, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 391, 433 (2015).

155
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156

pay? If the remedy for fraudulent transfer liability is to be changed, it
would be more appropriate to accomplish this directly by modification
of the statutes of various jurisdictions (generally based upon the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act). Further, fraudulent transfer liability is
susceptible to evaluation and elimination through careful structuring and
documentation. The use of solvency opinions, expert valuations, the
business judgment rule, and, at least in the bankruptcy context, “creative
findings of fact and conclusions of law” are enough to plan or draft
around successor liability in many cases. 157
If the goal is to promote economically efficient allocation of risk
of loss between the transferee and transferor, then adopting a bright-line
rule that allows both to structure the transaction and to avoid liability
seems to fail the test. Such a solution allows the parties to render unpaid
claims against the predecessor—including the involuntary tort claims of
future claimants—as externalities, to be born by society or the claimants.
Absent some form of social insurance mechanism, which is likely to be
politically infeasible, a better rule is a flexible standard that is resistant to
the “draft around.” 158 Such a standard leaves the risk where it belongs,
on the transferee and transferor, and forces them to address and allocate
it between them by contract, through the due diligence process, by
obtaining private insurance or other credit support (guaranties, letters of
credit, escrowed funds, etc.), and by adjusting the purchase price.

156 Conversely, Professor Epstein has suggested capping successor liability by
limiting it “to the extent of the liquidated firm’s assets (including, of course, any
insurance)” that have been transferred. He suggests that the value of these
assets could be subjected to a multiplier or projected rate of return to determine
the cap of liability in the future, and admits that “the entire matter is shrouded
in difficulty.” Richard A. Epstein, Imperfect Liability Regimes: Individual and
Corporate Issues, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1153, 1166–67 (2002).

George W. Kuney, A Taxonomy and Evaluation of Successor Liability, 6 FL. ST.
U. BUS. L. REV. 9, 53 (2007).
157

158

Id.
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2. Is it an In Rem Interest in Property?
Successor liability may appear at first blush to be an interest in
property. Thus, it may appear to be solely and wholly derivative of the
predecessor’s liability because the liability appears to merely follow the
property to the purchaser, similar to the way in which servitudes running
with the land will be enforceable against a successor because of the grant
of servitude by the predecessor. In the case of a traditional in rem
interest that runs with the land, like a servitude, the successor is bound
merely because it takes the property from the predecessor and is on
actual or constructive notice of the interest. 159 This view has been
advanced to support the creation of a trust with the proceeds of the sale
that is impressed with the successor claims that would otherwise follow
the assets to the successor. 160 It appears, however, that this is a minority
position and an example of result-oriented jurisprudence based upon a
legal fiction.
A review of the species of successor liability that act as
exceptions to the general rule of no-liability-for-asset-purchasers reveals
that an in rem characterization is incorrect. Successor liability arises out
of the liability of the predecessor—and is thus “derivative”—but at the
same time requires certain actions on the part of the purchaser, not merely
the purchaser’s acquisition of the property itself—thus it is not “solely
derivative.” For this reason, it is different from an in rem interest that
passes automatically with the property.
For example, the successor liability doctrine of express or
implied assumption of liability is rooted in the actions of the purchaser
159

Conway v. White Trucks, 692 F. Supp. 422 (M. D. Penn. 1988).

David Grey Carlson, Successor Liability in Bankruptcy: Some Unifying Themes of
Intertemporal Creditor Priorities Created by Running Covenants, Products Liability, and
Toxic Waste Cleanup, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 121 (1987); see also In re
Grumman Olson Indus., Inc., 467 B.R. 694, 702 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Conway v.
White Trucks, 692 F. Supp. 442, 455 n.9 (M.D. Penn. 1988) (barring non-future
claimant successor liability suit for failure to file a claim and summarizing the
Carlson’s position as arguing “Section 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(5) of the Bankruptcy
Code should be read to permit the foreclosure of future claimants from
proceeding against successor corporations where a fund is created to which the
future Plaintiffs’ ratable share of a cash proceeds would be paid.”).
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agreeing or appearing to agree to assume liability. That is the additional
element required from the successor in order to establish liability.
Similarly, when a de facto merger is found, or when mere continuation of
an enterprise justifies imposing successor liability, it is the purchaser’s
post-sale conduct (in continuing the business in substantially the same
form and manner) that is the necessary final element that gives rise to
liability. 161 The same is true for successor liability founded upon
fraudulent transfer or continued manufacture of a product line. All these
successor liability doctrines are grounded upon a combination of the
liability of the predecessor plus the acts or implications from acts of the
purchaser.
Further revealing the in personam and not-solely-and-whollyderivative nature of successor liability, if the assets are not sold as a unit
but are nonfraudulently sold to a variety of uses, successor liability will
not lie. 162 The necessary elements of continued operation of the business
by the successor is missing. In fact, those purchasers are not
“successors” at all, they are merely purchasers.
An alternative that is consistent with the continuity of enterprise
and product line species of successor liability as well as the more
traditional de facto merger and mere continuation species is to view
successor liability as arising out of the business that is conducted with the
assets involved. 163 Still, this is conduct of the purchaser. The focus of
the inquiry is, again, not solely on the assets themselves, but on what is
being done with them and by whom. This is the “take the good with the
bad” argument, also phrased in terms of the successor bearing the
burden of liability as a quid pro quo to enjoying the goodwill it acquired
from the predecessor. 164 Once the purchaser’s conduct or the use of the
assets to operate a business matches one of the applicable species of
161

See Kuney, supra note 155, at 55.

162

Carlson, supra note 158, at 121.

163

See Kuney, supra note 155, at 55.

See Jerry J. Phillips, Product Line Continuity and Successor Corporation Liability, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 906, 908 (1983).

164
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successor liability, that liability is not capped at the value of the assets as
they are in the case of an in rem interest like a lien securing a note or in
the case of a fraudulent conveyable. Rather, a successful plaintiff can
pursue collection as to all of the successor’s non-exempt assets and
insurance coverage.
3. Successor Liability Evolved from the Collision of Corporate Law and
Contracts and Tort Liability
What, then, is the nature of successor liability? If one steps back
and looks at all the common-law doctrines from a bit of a distance, one
common thread remains: Each of the enunciated standards seeks to
determine if the circumstances warrant overriding the normal, default
rule of successor non-liability. If the contract says the successor will be
liable, it is fair to enforce the contract. Likewise, if the successor’s
conduct implies an assumption of the liability, it is fair to enforce the
obligation. If the successor was part of a fraudulent scheme to avoid
liability, it is fair to allow recovery by the defrauded party by stripping it
of the normal protections of corporate law. And when there is a de facto
merger, a consolidation, or a continuation of a business or when the
product line exception’s requirements are met, it may be that the
successor has to bear the bad with the good in order to enjoy the fruits
of the business acquired. 165
Courts that embrace plaintiff’s entreaties to do substantial justice
and engage in wide-ranging factual analysis as a test for whether to
impose successor liability threaten to deprive the commercial world of
the certainty it desires. This is true especially with regard to the
continuity doctrines (de facto merger, mere continuation, continuity of
enterprise, and product line). But, examining precedent for guidance,
attempting to ferret out all claims that may exist in the due diligence
process, and providing a contractual mechanism for their payment (a
hold back or adjustment of the purchase price, an escrow, or insurance)
seems a small price to pay to afford otherwise injured but

George W. Kuney, Jerry Phillips’ Product Line Continuity and Successor Corporation
Liability: Where are We Twenty Years Later?, 72 TENN. L. REV. 777 (2005).
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166

uncompensated parties a means of recovery. This is especially so if a
jurisdiction were to adopt a rule limiting or eliminating punitive damages
or ensuring that the question of successor liability is a matter for the
court, not the jury. 167 As the old saying goes, “you pay your money and
166

In a recent article, a commentator on successor liability notes:
If the transferor is still around with sufficient assets to satisfy
the claims, then the successor liability doctrine is unnecessary.
Some courts and commentators contend that favoring
successor liability claimants over general unsecured creditors
in the bankruptcy sale context violates the priority scheme of
the federal bankruptcy statute. Yet, outside of bankruptcy,
claimants seeking to impose successor liability frequently, if
not usually, will be among the disfavored class of creditors of the
transferor. If a court is considering whether an asset
purchaser expressly or impliedly agreed to assume certain
debts, or whether there was a de facto consolidation or merger,
or whether the purchaser is a mere continuation of the seller
or whether the assets were transferred fraudulently to escape
liability, more likely than not certain favored creditors, such as
trade creditors and others holding debts incurred in the
ordinary course of business, will have been paid to preserve
the good will of the going concern. Indeed, one of the four
factors upon which the courts typically rely to determine that
the transferee is “a continuation of the enterprise” of the
transferor is the “assumption of the ordinary business
obligations and liabilities by the successor.”

Michael H. Reed, Successor Liability and Bankruptcy Sales Revisited—New Paradigms,
61 BUS. LAW. 179, 188 (2005) (emphasis in original) (internal footnotes and
citations omitted).
Although it may seem odd to assess punitive damages against a successor for
the wrongs of the predecessor, courts have assessed such damages against
successors, holding that if the successor is liable at all, it is liable for all types of
damages. See, e.g., Richmond v. Madison Mgmt. Group, 918 F.2d 438, 455–56
(4th Cir. 1990) (collecting authorities); Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v.
M.B. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64, 106–07 (D.S.C. 1979) (holding that
the purpose of punitive damages is to deter defendants and others from similar
conduct in the future). A more moderate approach is not to impose punitive
damages on a successor absent a finding of mere continuation, de facto merger,
or, presumably, continuity of enterprise. See Lloyds of London v. Pac. Sw.
Airlines, 786 F. Supp. 867, 869 (C.D. Cal. 1992). This subject, however, is
beyond the scope of this article.
167
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you take your chances.” 168 Why change that rule to benefit capital to the
detriment of future claimants who, by their very nature, can do nothing
to protect themselves?
IV.

LOSS OF FLEXIBILITY PROMOTES THE “DRAFT AROUND”

Successor liability began as a narrow set of exceptions to the
corporate rule of no-liability-in-asset-sale-transactions. The exceptions
were extremely fact-specific and generally the result of a flexible, multifactor analysis. Even when the modern continuity doctrines (continuity
of enterprise and product line) were developed, their initial phrasing was
in terms of a flexible multi-factor analysis or a set of considerations of
principles.
In those jurisdictions that have, by intent or chance, restated or
interpreted the doctrines in terms of one or more required elements,
competent counsel can often avoid a later finding of successor liability
by structuring the transaction so that one or more of the elements is
missing. On the mundane level, to avoid a finding that any liabilities
have been expressly or impliedly assumed, the purchase documentation
would specify exactly what liabilities were being assumed and expressly
disclaim assumption of every other liability. Additionally, all purchaser
conduct and communications would be screened and, if needed, a
boilerplate disclaimer added to make sure that they could not be used to
prove an intent to assume liabilities.
But on a more sophisticated level, if the predecessor must be
dissolved in order for the mere continuation form of successor liability
to lie, then the well-advised purchaser has an incentive to bargain for the

Gardener v. Zulu Soc. Aid & Pleasure Club, Inc., 729 So. 2d 675 (La. Ct.
App. 1999) (The court affirmed a judgment granting defendant’s exception of
no cause of action in plaintiffs’ suit seeking damages for breach of a contract to
ride on a float in a Mardi Gras parade. The float became disabled, and
plaintiffs took shelter in a church as unruly spectators surrounded the float in
search of “throw” (prizes).
The court sympathized with plaintiffs’
disappointment, but, under the Mardi Gras Parade immunity statute, when it
came to Mardi Gras parading, plaintiffs paid their money and they took their
chances. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.).

168
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seller to remain in existence for some predetermined time period. The
purchasers should also provide the proper or other consideration to
assure that it will. 169 If necessary, the successor could require the
predecessor to remain in some sort of active business using the proceeds
of sale rather than distributing the proceeds to equity after paying
existing creditors. Similarly, if a jurisdiction adheres to the continuity
doctrine, then the well-advised purchaser has an incentive to characterize
equity’s share in the new entity as debt, perhaps even convertible debt,
and to make appropriate changes in management structure. This model
can be followed for almost any of the facts that must be shown in
jurisdictions that have adopted a required elements approach for
successor liability doctrines. 170
Erecting barriers to a flexible examination of the totality of the
circumstances within a multi-factor framework when a claim is later
asserted invites structuring transactions in form, rather than substance,

This appears to be exactly what had occurred in Brandon v. Anesthesia &
Pain Mgmt. Assocs., Ltd., 419 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2005).

169

In fact, merger and acquisition professionals have gone farther than this by
developing the section 363(f) sale practice in bankruptcy courts. Briefly, the
selling company is placed in bankruptcy and an offer to purchase, usually in the
form of a fully negotiated purchase agreement, is presented to the debtor and
then to creditors, parties in interest, and the court. Notice and an opportunity
for another party (which is generally far behind on the learning curve and facing
high transaction costs to get up to speed) to overbid is provided. When the
sale is approved, counsel for the purchaser (with the cooperation of other
represented parties) presents the court with a proposed sale order and a set of
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Those documents are signed,
with or without modification, by the court. Generally, the proposed
conclusions of law state that the purchaser is not a successor to the debtor for
purposes of successor liability doctrines. This order, if entered without
modification, becomes final after a 10-day-notice-of-appeal period and is
binding on all parties in interest nationwide due to the supremacy clause of the
federal Constitution. At least one bankruptcy attorney called it “putting the
business through the shower” to wash off the undisputed so that it can emerge
clean on the other side. See George W. Kuney, Misinterpreting Bankruptcy Code
Section 363(f) and Undermining the Chapter 11 Process, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235
(2002) (describing the process and practice).
170
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to avoid successor liability. 171 These structural barriers, then, in turn,
foreclose recovery by some deserving plaintiffs that would have
benefited from the use of a flexible, totality-of-the-circumstances
analysis. It also hampers reasoned development of the law as the
structure of transactions changes. In essence, it allows the transferee and
transferor to avoid the liability, rendering it an externality to be borne by
the creditor or society.
Consider, for example, the commonality of control element of
the mere continuation species of successor liability. It is generally
expressed in terms of a requirement that some or all of the successor’s
Yet arms-length 11 U.S.C. § 363 sales should not bring with them the
specter of successor liability at all.
In an article currently being prepared for publication,
Professor George Kuney will contend that if a bankruptcy sale
is at arms-length and properly conducted, the purchaser
should not be subject to successor liability under nonbankruptcy law. With regard to certain categories of successor
liability, that is undoubtedly the case. If (1) a bankruptcy sale
to an independent purchaser is adequately documented from
the purchaser’s perspective (i.e., the asset purchase agreement
contains language expressly excluding any assumption of
liability and the bankruptcy court order expressly determines
that the sale shall be free and clear of successor liability), (2) an
appropriate evidentiary record is made and (3) the sale is
otherwise proper under the Code and the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, there would appear to be little risk that
(a) the purchaser would be found to have assumed successor
liability, (b) the transaction would be deemed a de facto
consolidation or merger, or (c) the transaction would be found
to have been entered into fraudulently to escape liability.
Thus, in most cases, the primary risk of common law successor
liability (as distinguished from successor liability predicated
upon a statute) would appear to be instances where,
notwithstanding the bankruptcy proceedings, the purchaser
later is found to be a “mere continuation” of the seller or the
purchaser is found to have “continued the product line” of the
seller.

171

Michael H. Reed, Successor Liability Revisited – New Paridigms, 61 BUS.
LAW. 179, 188 (2005) (emphasis added, internal footnotes and citations
omitted).
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officers, directors, or shareholders have been officers, directors, or
shareholders to predecessor. 172 If this requirement is applied rigidly, it
will foreclose liability when, for instance, an insolvent business’ secured
creditors arrange a sale to a captive acquisition subsidiary in which they
hold an ownership interest, directly or indirectly, because, although they
controlled the business and the sale, they were “debt holders” of the
predecessor and “shareholders” of the successor. 173 But, as the last
priority of claimants that were “in the money” in terms of the going
concern value of the predecessor, their relationship to the business was
more like that of shareholders rather than debt holders, and a wellreasoned argument can be made that they should be treated as such. 174
Further, what if, as part of a relationship with others in their industry,
they arrange to trade off the opportunity to acquire and harvest the value
from businesses in this situation, by arranging for the sale to take place
to an acquisition subsidiary owned and controlled by a colleague, in
exchange for the right to acquire one of the colleague’s distressed
business/borrowers in the future subject to some “netting” of revenues
in the future? Is this the sort of indirect retention of the benefits of a
business that could, arguably, provide the basis for imposing successor
liability? Under a rigid element-based text, or under Professor Reilly’s
actual fraud standard, no one will bring cases like this. The transaction
can be structured to avoid the appearance of a qualifying transaction
under either rule.

172 Generally, continuity of enterprise only treats this fact as one of many
factors to be considered. See supra notes 63–85 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., In re The Colad Group, Inc., 324 B.R. 208 (W.D.N.Y. 2005)
(purchaser of secured debt controlled the debtor and caused it to commence a
Chapter 11 case and move for approval of a chief reorganization officer and a
usurious DIP financing package that would all but ensure it of successful bidder
status at planned § 363(f) sale of all assets).

173

See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twighlight,
56 STAN. L. REV. 673, 696 (2003); David A. Skeel, Jr., The Natural and Effect of
Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461 (1992).
But see Lynn M. LoPucki, The Myth of the Residual Owner: An Empirical Study, 82
WASH. U. L. Q. 1341 (2004).
174
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Adoption of rigid standards or preemptive litigation practices like
those discussed in the bankruptcy court context has a powerful
narrowing and hampering effect upon the development of successor
liability and its evolution to confront new and different transactions and
transactional structures. It paves the way for dismissal with prejudice
under a defendant’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion
before there can be development of the facts—facts that might indicate
successor liability should lie if a flexible, totality of the circumstances
analysis were performed. Whether this is good or bad depends on your
attitude toward successor liability plaintiffs’ relative rights vis-à-vis
successor entities, and reasonable minds can differ. Sunlight, however,
“is the best disinfectant; electric light the most efficient policeman.” 175
Developments that foreclose examination are likely to be breeding
grounds for fraud and other inequitable conduct. The apparent
narrowing of successor liability applicability even as the number of
successor liability species expands should not pass unnoticed, however.
V.

CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to detail some of the history and the
current condition of successor liability law in the United States. It
concludes that the purpose of the doctrines was to provide contract and
tort creditors with an avenue of recovery against a successor entity in
appropriate cases, such as when the predecessor that contracted with
them or committed the tort or the action that later gave rise to the tort
had sold substantially all of its assets and was no longer a viable source
of recovery. Its various species acted as a pressure relief valve on the
strict limitation of liability created by corporate law. The doctrine is in
the nature of an “equitable” doctrine insofar as it is invoked when strict
application of corporate law would offend the conscience of the court.
In large part, the doctrine remains intact and still serves that purpose.
The doctrine has eroded, however, in jurisdictions that have
adopted tests containing required elements or that have rejected the
“continuity” doctrines of successor liability. While failing to adopt the
“continuity” doctrines may be a laudable example of judicial restraint and
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS
USE IT 62 (Harper Torchbooks 1967).
175

814

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 18

deference to the legislature’s role as the primary law maker, the courts’
conversion of flexible factors to rigid, required elements in generally
accepted judge-made doctrine does not appear to serve the aims of
equity or justice. Rather, it promotes sharp lawyering based upon an
elevation of form over substance to protect asset purchasers.
Pacific Gaming Technologies (PGT)
places VendaTel vending machines in bus
stations, truck stops, and other places
where people are likely to buy prepaid
telephone calling cards. Unlike ordinary
vending machines, the VendaTel has a
“sweepstakes” feature that pays out
money. The VendaTel looks like a slot
machine. It acts like a slot machine. It
sounds like a slot machine. The trial
court nevertheless said that it is not a slot
machine. In our view, if it looks like a
duck, walked like a duck, and sounds like
a duck, it is a duck. And so it is with this
duck. We reverse. 176
Better, it would appear, is a test that recognizes a duck in whatever
disguise its keepers dress it.
People v. Pac. Gaming Techs., 82 Cal. App. 4th 699, 700 (2004); see also
Provost v. Unger, 752 F. Supp. 716, 721 (E.D. La. 1990) (“if it looks like a
duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it is a duck”); In re North, 128
B.R. 592, 594 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1991) (“if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck,
and quacks like a duck, it must be a duck.”); Strength v. Alabama Dept. of
Finance, 622 So. 2d 1283, 1289 (Ala. 1993) (“if it looks like a duck, walks like a
duck, and quacks like a duck, it must be a duck.”); Pieper v. Commercial
Underwrites Ins. Co., 59 Cal. App. 4th 1008, 1014 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (“‘if it
looks like a duck, walked like a duck and quacks like a duck, it’s a duck’ – not a
platypus”); cf. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Humboldt Loaders, Inc., 249 Cal.
Rptr. 175, 180 n.5 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (“respondents advanced . . . the
argument that, ‘if it looks like a duck, if it walks like a duck and if it quacks like
a duck, it should be treated as a duck.’ [In the context of pleadings,] the
Legislature has quite clearly stated that no such ‘ducks’ are permitted . . .”);
Perry v. Robertson, 247 Cal. Rptr. 74, 75 n.1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (“the tortcontract action” could be seen as “either as a duck or as a rabbit, . . . depending
on the will of the viewer.”)
176
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APPENDIX
Appendix to George W. Kuney, A Taxonomy and Evaluation of
Successor Liability , 6 FLA. ST. BUS. L. REV. 9 (2007), last update
completed June 31, 2013.
This appendix represents the author’s attempt to explain the
characteristics of each of the judge-made forms of successor liability in
the 50 states and other jurisdictions listed. These presentations should
be thought of as a set of “field notes” as they are often based on sketchy,
brief observations of the doctrines in jurisdictions where the reported
case law is thin or where the state supreme court has not spoken. As the
story of Cyr v. Offen in New Hampshire shows, at times, long standing
assumptions about the doctrine can be quickly reversed or undermined.
This appendix is updated regularly to track the state of the law in
this field. Please note that while the author and editors are cognizant of
the formalities of the blue-book form, we have chosen to abandon the
use of “Id.” in this appendix in order to avoid confusion between
multiple layers of citation.
Comments are welcome and will be incorporated into future
editions of this document, which can also be found at
http://www.law.utk.edu/people/george-w-kuney/, under “publications”
following the article listing for the original article.
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Alabama
Alabama recognizes the four traditional exceptions and the
continuity of enterprise exception to the general rule of successor nonliability in asset purchases. 177 The general rule and traditional exceptions
are described as follows:
As a general rule, where one company
sells or otherwise transfers all its assets to
another company, the transferee is not
liable for the debts and liabilities of the
transferor unless (1) there is an express
agreement to assume the obligations of
the transferor, (2) the transaction
amounts to a de facto merger or
consolidation of the two companies, (3)
the transaction is a fraudulent attempt to
escape liability, or (4) the transferee
corporation is a mere continuation of the
transferor. 178
In MPI Acquisitions, the Supreme Court of Alabama ruled that the
state’s successor liability laws were preempted by an order from the
United States Bankruptcy Court declaring a successor's purchase of the
Prattville Mem’l Chapel & Memory Gardens, Inc. v. Parker, 10 So. 3d 546,
555–56 (Ala. 2008) (quoting Andrews v. John E. Smith’s Sons Co., 369 So. 2d
781, 785 (Ala. 1979)). But see Daake v. 331 Partners, LLC (In re 331 Partners,
LLC), No. 11-00049-CG-C, 2011 WL 3440099, at *5 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 8, 2011)
(“Liability will be imposed on a successor only where: (1) the successor
expressly or impliedly assumes obligations of the predecessor, (2) the
transaction is a de facto facto merger, (3) the successor is a mere continuation of
the predecessor, or (4) the transaction is a fraudulent effort to avoid the
liabilities of the predecessor.”) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted)
(citing Amjad Munim, M.D., P.A. v. Azar M.D., 648 So. 2d 145, 153–54 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1994)). The 331 Partners case reinforces Alabama’s recognition
of the four traditional exceptions to the general rule of non-liability as stated in
the Prattville case.
177

178

Prattville Mem’l Chapel, 10 So. 3d at 555 (quoting Andrews, 369 So. 2d at 785).
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predecessor's assets to be free and clear of liability for any claims
involving products manufactured and sold by the predecessor. 179
Alabama: The Express Assumption Exception
Unlike many states which include implied assumption in the
traditional exceptions, Alabama requires “an express agreement to assume
the obligations of the transferor.” 180 In Watts v. TI, Inc., for example, the
plaintiff argued that a paragraph of the asset purchase agreement entitled
“Indemnification” constituted an express agreement to assume. 171.1 The
court rejected this argument, stating:
“After reviewing the
indemnification portion of the asset purchase agreement, we conclude
that that document, while indicating an agreement to assume some
existing contractual obligations, does not amount to an express
agreement to assume future claims in tort.” 181 Alabama courts have also
rejected an implied assumption exception to the extent that a successor
could be held liable for the predecessor’s liabilities where “the
purchasing corporation purchased unfilled customer orders, purchase
orders, and vendor commitments from the selling corporation.” 182
Of note is that courts appear to have confused the application of
the mere continuation or continuity of enterprise exception with the
express assumption exception, treating express assumption as merely a

MPI Acquisition, LLC v. Northcutt, 14 So. 3d 126, 128–30 (Ala. 2009)
(overturning Glenn v. Steelox Bldg. Systems, Inc. 698 So. 2d 142 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1997)).

179

180 Prattville Mem’l Chapel, 10 So. 3d at 555 (emphasis added) (quoting Andrews,
369 So. 2d at 785).
171.1
181

Watts v. TI, Inc., 561 So. 2d 1057, 1060 (Ala. 1990).

Watts, 561 So. 2d at 1060.

Asher v. KCS Int’l, 659 So. 2d 598, 600–01 (Ala. 1994) (citing Brown v.
Econ. Baler Co., 599 So. 2d 1, 3 (Ala. 1992); Turner v. Wean United, Inc., 531
So. 2d 827, 831 (Ala. 1988).
182
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factor in analyzing the continuation or continuity of enterprise
exceptions. 183
Alabama: The Fraud Exception
Alabama courts will review the record for evidence of fraud,
without applying any specific test. 184
Alabama: The De Facto Merger Exception
Alabama has not developed a specific test for the de facto merger
exception, and its courts have somewhat combined the de facto merger
exception with the continuity of enterprise exception. 185 In MatrixChurchill v. Springsteen, for example, the court stated in finding that an
asset purchase was a de facto merger that “the trial court doubtless was
Turner v. Wean United, 531 So. 2d at 831(stating in applying the continuity
of enterprise exception: “The third factor to be considered is whether [the
successor] expressly assumed the liabilities of [the predecessor] . . . . The
motives behind the sale of assets in 1961 are not relevant to the question of
whether there was an express assumption of liability for damages in products
liability actions. An assumption of liability would be a strong indicator of
continuity of enterprise, and its absence here tends to indicate the contrary.”);
Matrix–Churchill v. Springsteen, 461 So. 2d 782, 788 (Ala. 1984) (noting in
applying the mere continuation exception that “the record does not disclose
any express agreement between [the successor and predecessor] whereby the
former was to assume the obligations of [the latter] . . .”); Rivers v. Stihl, Inc.,
434 So. 2d 766, 772 (Ala. 1983) (applying the continuity of enterprise exception,
the court stated: “Another factor . . . militates in favor of the imposition of
liability on Stihl, Inc. [the successor]. Here, Stihl, Inc. expressly assumed
liability for damages in products liability actions arising out of sales of Stihl
products by [the predecessor].”); see also Prattville Mem’l Chapel, 10 So. 3d at 556
(“This Court [in Rivers v. Stihl, Inc.] never stated the four factors of the
continuation [sic] exception, but based its finding on several ‘factors’ from
Andrews and Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., including an express assumption of
liabilities.”) (emphasis added).
183

See Matrix–Churchill, 461 So. 2d at 788 (“[T]he record does not disclose . . .
any facts justifying the conclusion that [the successor’s] purchase of [the
predecessor’s] stock was ‘a fraudulent attempt to escape liability.’”).

184

185 See, e.g., Matrix–Churchill, 461 So. 2d at 786–88 (applying guidelines for
determining continuity of enterprise to resolve whether there was a de facto
merger between a predecessor and a successor).
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applying the ‘basic continuity of enterprise’ test adopted by the Court in
Andrews v. John E. Smith’s Sons Co., 369 So.2d 781, 785 (Ala. 1979),
derived from Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244
N.W.2d 873 ([Mich.] 1976) . . . .” 186 The court then cited Turner’s three
“guidelines” for continuity of enterprise in resolving whether the “trial
court’s finding of a de facto merger between [the predecessor] and [the
successorwas] supported by the facts[.]” 187 After applying the three
Turner guidelines, the court further blurred the distinction between the
exceptions:
Accordingly, there was no "continuity of
enterprise" by [the successor] in its
purchase of [the predecessor] in 1969,
under Andrews, supra, and Rivers, supra.
What is shown by the record is that [the
successor] purchased 99.7% of [the
predecessor’s] stock in 1969 and
continued to operate it as a separate
company. By purchasing substantially all
of that stock, [the successor] did not
effect a consolidation or merger which
could be construed as an implied
assumption of [the predecessor’s]
obligations. 188
In Daake v. 331 Partners, LLC (In re 331 Partners, LLC), the federal district
court recited its restatement of Alabama law on de facto merger:
“To find a de facto merger there must be
continuity of the selling corporation
evidenced by the same management,
personnel, assets and physical location; a
continuity
of
the
stockholders,
186

Matrix–Churchill, 461 So. 2d at 786.

187

Matrix–Churchill, 461 So. 2d at 787.

188

Matrix–Churchill, 461 So. 2d at 787–88.

2017] A TAXONOMY AND EVALUATION OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY (REVISITED) 821

accomplished by paying for the acquired
corporation with shares of stock; a
dissolution of the selling corporation; and
assumption of the liabilities. 189 The
bottom line question is whether each
entity has run its own race, or whether
there has been a relay-style passing of the
baton from one to another.” 190
This summary is, of course, from a federal court and should not be
dispositive as to Alabama state law.
Alabama: The Continuity of Enterprise Exception
The Alabama Supreme court explicitly adopted the continuity of
enterprise exception in Andrews v. John E. Smith’s Sons Co. 191 Later,
however, Alabama adopted the Turner v. Bituminous Casualty factors as a
set of required elements holding that there must be “substantial
evidence” of each in order to impose successor liability:
1) There was a basic continuity of the
enterprise of the seller corporation,
including, apparently, a retention of key
personnel, assets, general business
operations and even the [seller’s] name.
2) The seller corporation ceased ordinary
business operations, liquidated, and
dissolved soon after distribution of

Daake v. 331 Partners, LLC (In re 331 Partners, LLC), No. 11-00049-CG-C,
2011 WL 3440099, at *5 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 8, 2011) (citations omitted) (quoting
Amjad Munim, M.D., P.A. v. Azar M.D., 648 So. 2d 145, 153–54 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1994) (citing Matrix–Churchill, 461 So. 2d at 787).
189

In re 331 Partners, LLC, 2011 WL 3440099, at *5 (quoting 300 Pine Island
Assocs., LTD v. Steven L. Cohen & Assocs., P.A., 547 So. 2d 255, 256 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (citations omitted)).

190

191

Andrews v. John E. Smith’s Sons Co., 369 So. 2d 781, 785 (Ala. 1979).
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consideration received from the buying
corporation.
3) The purchasing corporation assumed
those liabilities and obligations of the
seller ordinarily necessary for the
continuation of the normal business of
the seller corporation.
4) The purchasing corporation held itself
out to the world as the effective
continuation of the seller corporation. 192
Alabama: The Mere Continuation Exception
Alabama courts have blurred the distinction between the mere
continuation exception and continuity of enterprise exception, using the
terms interchangeably and applying the same test for both. In order to
show that a successor is a mere continuation of its predecessor, the
plaintiff must prove that there is substantial evidence of each of the
continuity of enterprise factors. 193
As the Supreme Court of Alabama explained in Brown v. Economy
Baler Co.:
In Turner v. Wean United, Inc., 531 So.2d
827, 830–31 (Ala.1988) . . . this Court
addressed [whether] “the transferee
corporation is a mere continuation of the
Prattville Mem’l Chapel & Memory Gardens, Inc. v. Parker, 10 So. 3d 546,
555–57 (Ala. 2008) (quoting Asher v. KCS Int’l, Inc., 659 So. 2d 598, 599–600
(Ala. 1995) ((quoting Brown v. Econ. Baler Co., 599 So. 2d 1, 3 (Ala. 1992)
(quoting Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 883–84 (Mich.
1976)) (citing Pietz v. Orthopedic Equipment Co., 562 So.2d 152 (Ala. 1989))
(rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that Alabama cases supported a totality of the
circumstances test for mere continuation and requiring substantial evidence
supporting each Turner criterion).

192

Parrett Trucking, Inc. v. Telecom Solutions, Inc., 989 So. 2d 513, 519–20
(Ala. 2008) (citing Brown, 599 So. 2d at 3); Asher v. KCS Int’l, Inc., 659 So. 2d
598, 599–600 (Ala. 1995) (citing Brown, 599 So. 2d at 3).

193
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transferor”[;] there we referred to it as the
“continuity of the enterprise test.” Under
that test, [transferee] would be a mere
continuation of [the transferor] if there is
substantial evidence of each of the
following factors:
“1) There was basic continuity of the
enterprise of the seller corporation,
including, apparently, a retention of key
personnel, assets, general business
operations and even the [seller's] name.
“2) The seller corporation ceased ordinary
business operations, liquidated, and
dissolved soon after distribution of
consideration received from the buying
corporation.
“3) The purchasing corporation assumed
those liabilities and obligations of the
seller ordinarily necessary for the
continuation of the normal business
operations of the seller corporation.
“4) The purchasing corporation held itself
out to the world as the effective
continuation of the seller corporation.” 194
In subsequent cases the Supreme Court has introduced its test by
stating: “This court has adopted a four-factor test for determining
whether a purchasing corporation is a mere continuation of the selling
corporation. If there is substantial evidence of each of the four factors,

Brown, 599 So. 2d at 3 (quoting Turner v. Wean United, Inc., 531 So. 2d 827,
830 (Ala. 1988) (quoting Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406,
244 N.W.2d 873, 883–84 (Mich. 1976) (citations omitted) and citing Pietz v.
Orthopedic Equipment Co., 562 So.2d 152 (Ala. 1989)).

194
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then [the purchasing corporation] may be held liable as a successor
corporation.” 195
In a 2010 bankruptcy case in the Southern District of Alabama,
the court stated that “[t]he indices of a continuation are, at a minimum,
continuity of directors, officers, and stockholders, and the continued
existence of only one corporation after the sale of assets” 196 and ruled
“[i]n this case, the minimum indices of continuation are not met.” 197
In Parrett Trucking, Inc. v. Telecom Solutions, Inc., the Alabama
Supreme Court elucidated the prong of the mere continuation exception
which requires that the predecessor corporation be dissolved, holding
the predecessor must be absolutely dissolved in order to satisfy this
requirement of the test. 198 Previously, the trial court had held that where
a predecessor corporation had no remaining assets, did not pay any
taxes, and was in the process of dissolution but still made filings with the
Alabama secretary of state as required by law, the predecessor had
“effectively dissolved.” 199 The Supreme Court reversed, stating “[t]hat
[though the predecessor] is ‘for all practical purposes dissolved,’ as
[plaintiff] states in its brief, or ‘effectively dissolved,’ as the trial court
found in its order, [this] is insufficient. There must be evidence of
dissolution.” 200
Parrett Trucking, Inc., 989 So. 2d at 519–20 (quoting Asher, 659 So. 2d at 599)
(citing Brown, 599 So. 2d at 1).
195

In re 331 Partners, LLC, No. 10-00846-MAM, 2010 WL 4676621, at *6
(Bankr. S.D. Ala. Nov. 9, 2010) (citing Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles, LLC,
887 N.E.2d 244 (Mass. 2008)).
196

197

In re 331 Partners, LLC, 2010 WL 4676621, at *6.

Parrett Trucking, Inc., 989 So. 2d at 520–21 (finding that testimony that the
predecessor may have been dissolved to be insufficient and holding instead that
“[t]here must be evidence of dissolution”).

198

199

Parrett Trucking, Inc., 989 So. 2d at 520–21.

200 Parrett Trucking, Inc., 989 So. 2d at 521; see also Prattville Mem’l Chapel &
Memory Gardens, Inc. v. Parker, 10 So. 3d 546, 557–58 (Ala. 2008) (“Although
the evidence clearly shows that PMG no longer operated the cemetery after it
was purchased by Jefferson and that Jefferson no longer operated the cemetery
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Alaska
In the 2001 Savage Arms case, the Supreme Court of Alaska
adopted two species of successor liability: mere continuation and
continuity of enterprise. 201
In 2002 the Alaska legislature passed a bill (CSHB 499(JUD))
that would have expressly overturned the portion of Savage Arms that
adopted the continuity of enterprise exception; the bill, however, was
vetoed by the governor. 202 Alaska’s attorney general recommended that
the bill be vetoed, stating, inter alia, “while this bill may be legally
defensible, we anticipate lengthy and costly litigation to challenge the bill.
Additionally, we believe that the Alaska Supreme Court properly decided
the case.” 203
Alaska: The Mere Continuation Exception
In Savage Arms, the court adopted the “traditional” mere
continuation exception. 204 The court stated, “[t]he primary elements of
the ‘mere continuation’ exception include use by the buyer of the seller’s
name, location, and employees, and a common identity of stockholders
and directors.” 205

after it was purchased by Memorial Chapel, no evidence shows whether
Jefferson and PMG dissolved soon after those sales.”).
201

Savage Arms, Inc. v. W. Auto Supply Co., 18 P.3d 49, 55–58 (Alaska 2001).

H.B. 499, 22ND LEG., 3RD SPEC. SESS. (Alaska 2002) (vetoed by the
Governor).
202

Office of the Attorney Gen., Re: CSHB 499(JUD)—declaring legislative
intent to reject the continuity of enterprise exception to the doctrine of
successor liability adopted in Savage Arms, Inc. v. W. Auto Supply, 18 P.3d 49
(Alaska 2001), as it relates to products liability, 2002 WL 32388334, Alaska
Att’y Gen. (Jun. 11, 2002).
203

204

Savage Arms, 18 P.3d at 55.

205

Savage Arms, 18 P.3d at 55.
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Alaska: The Continuity of Enterprise Exception
The Savage Arms court listed the “key factors” under the
continuity of enterprise exception: “(1) continuity of key personnel,
assets, and business operations; (2) speedy dissolution of the predecessor
corporation; (3) assumption by the successor of those predecessor
liabilities and obligations necessary for continuation of normal business
operations; and (4) continuation of corporate identity.” 206 The court
then stated: “[t]his is a limited exception that looks past the identity of
shareholders and directors, and focuses on whether the business itself
has been transferred as an ongoing concern.” 207
Before expressly adopting the continuity of the enterprise
exception, the court reviewed multiple policy considerations that
weighed against the exception, ultimately discounting each. 208 The court
then stated, “this new rule will also have the effect of encouraging
existing corporations to produce safer products, in keeping with the
public policy goals that underlie product liability law generally.” 209 The
court was also concerned that the traditional exceptions did not
encourage the shareholders of the predecessor firm to manufacture safe
products:
Without successor liability, the original
shareholders
can
receive
full
compensation for the current value of the
firm, without sharing the burden caused
by any defective products manufactured
before the sale. The rule we announce
today
will
give
manufacturing
corporations additional incentives to
market non-defective products, in order
Savage Arms, 18 P.3d at 55–56 (citing Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244
N.W.2d 873, 883–84 (Mich. 1976)); David W. Pollak, Successor Liability in Asset
Acquisitions, 1126 PLI/CORP. 85, 103 (1999); 63 AM. JUR. 2d Prod. Liab. § 132).

206

207

Savage Arms, 18 P.3d at 56.

208

Id. at 56–58.

209

Id. at 58.
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to maximize the corporations’ market
value in event of sale. 210

Arizona
In Winsor v. Glasswerks PHX, L.L.C., the Arizona appellate court
expressly recognized the four traditional exceptions to the general rule of
successor non-liability and expressly rejected the continuity of enterprise
and product line exceptions. 211 Thus, the Arizona courts impose liability
on a successor corporation for the predecessor’s defective product
where:
(1) there is an express or implied
agreement of assumption,
(2) the transaction amounts to a
consolidation or merger of the two
corporations,
(3) the purchasing corporation is a mere
continuation [or reincarnation] of the
seller, or
(4) the transfer of assets to the purchaser
is for the fraudulent purpose of escaping
liability for the seller’s debts. 212
After the court listed the various policy considerations in favor
of and in opposition to the continuity of enterprise and product line
exceptions, it deferred to the legislature to address and enact either
exception:

210

Id. at 58 (citations omitted).

Winsor v. Glasswerks PHX, L.L.C., 63 P.3d 1040, 1044–50 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2003).
211

Winsor, 63 P.3d at 1044 (quoting A.R. Teeters & Assocs., Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 836 P.2d 1034, 1039 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)); see also Warne Invs.,
Ltd. v. Higgins, 195 P.3d 645, 650 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that Arizona
courts recognize the four traditional exceptions to the general rule of successor
non-liability) (citing Teeters, 836 P.2d at 1039).

212
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We find it unnecessary to discuss in detail
the competing policy concerns involved
in modifying Arizona’s successor liability
laws. It is clear to us, regardless of the
relative merits of both the present rule
and the proposed exceptions, that this
issue is best left to the legislature. 213
The court reasoned that it would “defer to the legislature in its
representative capacity, because (i) the core issue is one of policy for the
legislature, (ii) predictability in our commerce should be encouraged, (iii)
the proposed exceptions modify or minimize fundamental principles of
tort liability, and (iv) our present rule already allows for liability against
certain successor corporations.” 214
The Arizona courts have not developed any tests for the
express/implied assumption, de facto merger, or fraud exceptions. As the
court recently explained in Beals v. Moore, successor liability applies in
Arizona “only when ‘[a] corporation goes through a mere change in
form without a significant change in substance[.]’” 215 Limits in Arizona
also ensure that liability is not extended “beyond those entities who are
causally linked to the defective product by having placed it into the
stream of commerce.” 216
Arizona: The Mere Continuation Exception
“A crucial factor in determining if a successor corporation is a
mere continuation or reincarnation of a predecessor corporation is
whether there is a substantial similarity in the ownership and control of
the two corporations (e.g., identical directors, officers, stockholders,
213

Winsor, 63 P.3d at 1047.

214

Winsor, 63 P.3d at 1047–50.

Beals v. Moore, No. 2 CA-CV 2008-0090, 2009 WL 499531, at *5 (Ariz. Ct.
App. Feb. 27, 2009) (quoting Warne Invs., 195 P.3d at 645 (quoting Gladstone v.
Stuart Cinemas, Inc., 878 A.2d 214, 222–23 (Vt. 2005)).

215

216 Antone v. Greater Ariz. Auto Auction, Inc., 155 P.3d 1074, 1076 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2007) (citing Winsor, 63 P.3d at 1048–49).
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goods and services, and location).” 217 Arizona, like California, also
requires proof of “insufficient consideration running from the new
company to the old.” 218 Successor liability in Arizona based on the mere
continuation exception can be found even if the only assets transferred
are intangible—e.g. goodwill. 219 If mere continuation is found, the
successor corporation may be held liable for all debts of the
predecessor. 220

Arkansas
The Arkansas courts recognize the general rule of successor nonliability in asset purchases 221 and the four traditional exceptions. 222 In
addition, the Arkansas Supreme Court appears to have recognized a
continuity of enterprise theory without actually using the term. 223 In Ford
Teeters, 836 P.2d at 1039–40. (citing Culinary Workers & Bartneders Union
No. 596 Health & Welfare Tr. v. Gateway Cafe, 91 588 P.2d 1334, 1343 (Wash.
1979)).

217

218 Teeters, 836 P.2d at 1040 (quoting Maloney v. Am. Pharm. Co., 255 Cal. Rptr.
1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)) (“[B]efore one corporation can be said to be a mere
continuation or reincarnation of another it is required that there be insufficient
consideration running from the new company to the old.”); see also Warne Invs.,
195 P.3d at 651 (stating that there must be proof of “insufficient consideration
running from the new company to the old” to find that a corporation is a mere
continuation of a predessor) (quoting Teeters, 836 P.2d at 1040).
219

Warne Invs., 195 P.3d at 651–653.

220

Id. at 657.

Ford Motor Co. v. Nuckolls, 894 S.W.2d 897, 903 (Ark. 1995) (citing Fort
Smith Refrigeration & Equip. Co. v. Ferguson, 230 S.W.2d 943 (Ark. 1950));
Granjas Aquanova S.A. de C.V. v. House Mfg., Co., No. 3:07CV00168 BSM,
2010 WL 2243673, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Jun. 4, 2010) (“The general rule in
Arkansas is that a purchaser corporation does not succeed to the liabilities of
the selling corporation.”) (citing Ford Motor, 894 S.W.2d at 903).

221

Ford Motor, 894 S.W.2d at 903 (citing Swayze v. A.O. Smith Corp., 694 F.
Supp. 619, 622 (E.D. Ark. 1988)).

222

See Ford Motor, 894 S.W.2d at 904 (finding that a common identity of
managers and employees and a continuity in good production between the
selling and purchasing corporations was sufficient evidence for a jury to
consider the continuation exception or the express assumption exception).

223
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Motor Co. v. Nuckolls, the court held that the evidence presented was
sufficient to warrant jury instructions on the “continuation exception or
the express assumption exception[.]” 224 The court noted that although
the successor’s new owner “was in charge after the purchase, [he] relied
on employees of the [successor] . . . to continue the day-to-day operation
of the company.” 225 Moreover, the successor’s president and “[o]ther
managers and employees testified as to their continued employment and
the continuity in production of goods after the . . . purchase.” 226

California
California courts recognize the four traditional exceptions to the
general rule of successor non-liability in asset purchases. 227 Importantly,
the California Supreme Court is also responsible for creating the product
line exception to non-liability. 228

224

Ford Motor, 894 S.W.2d. at 904.

Ford Motor, 894 S.W.2d. at 904.
Ford Motor, 894 S.W.2d at 904; see also Granjas Aquanova, 2010 WL 2243673,
at *3 (“[M]ost jurisdictions that recognize the “mere continuation” doctrine
emphasize a common identity of officers, directors, and stock between the
selling and purchasing corporations.”) (citing Swayze, 694 F. Supp. at 622). In
addition to these factors, Arkansas courts have applied the exception where
there is a continuation of management. See Ford Motor, 894 S.W.2d at 904
(considering the common identity of managers between the selling and
purchasing corporations in concluding that there was sufficient evidence for a
jury to consider the continuation exception).

225
226

227 Daniell v. Riverside Partners I, L.P., 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 717 (Cal. Ct. App.
2012) (citing, inter alia, Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977)) (noting that
successor liability would also entitle the purported successor to the defenses of
the predecessor, including anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public
Participation) protection); see In re Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litig.,
527 F. Supp. 2d, 1011, 1031 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (citing Ray, 560 P.2d at 7);
Orthotec, LLC v. REO Spineline, LLC, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1128 (C.D. Cal.
2006) (quoting Franklin v. USX Corp., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 11 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001)); Henkel Corp. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 62 P.3d 69, 73 (Cal.
2003); CenterPoint Energy, Inc. v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 202, 218
(Cal. Ct. App. 2007); Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1022,
1063 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (quoting Ray, 560 P.2d at 7).
228

Ray, 560 P.2d at 11.
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California: The Express or Implied Assumption Exception
In determining whether there was an express or implied
assumption of liability, courts will examine the language of the asset
purchase agreement or other document governing the transaction as well
as consider extrinsic evidence if there are alleged ambiguities in the
contract language. 229
California: The De Facto Merger Exception
The California Supreme Court noted the situations in which the
de facto merger exception generally applies:
[The de facto merger exception] has been
invoked where one corporation takes all
of another’s assets without providing any
consideration that could be made
available to meet claims of the other’s
creditors . . . or where the consideration
consists wholly of shares of the
purchaser’s stock which are promptly
distributed to the seller’s shareholders in
conjunction with the seller’s liquidation . .
. . 230
In Marks v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., the Court of Appeal of
California set out a five factor test to determine “whether a transaction
cast in the form of an asset sale actually achieves the same practical result
as a merger:” 231 (1) [W]as the consideration paid for the assets solely

See Fisher v. Allis–Chalmers Corp. Product Liability Trust, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d
310, 315–18 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (finding an assumption of successor liability
based on the language of a transfer agreement and extrinisic evidence
concerning the transfer agreement).

229

Ray, 560 P.2d at 7 (citations omitted) (citing Shannon v. Samuel Langston
Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 801 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Malone v. Red Top Cab Co. of
Los Angeles, 60 P.2d 543 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936)).

230

Marks v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 594, 598 (Ct. App.
1986) (citing Shannon, 379 F. Supp. at 801; Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F.

231

832

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 18

stock of the purchaser or its parent; (2) did the purchaser continue the
same enterprise after the sale; (3) did the shareholders of the seller
become shareholders of the purchaser; (4) did the seller liquidate; and (5)
did the buyer assume the liabilities necessary to carry on the business of
the seller? 232
The Court of Appeal addressed the de facto merger exception at
length in CenterPoint Energy, Inc. v. Superior Court and appeared to combine
the standards applying to mere continuation and de facto merger. First,
the court stated that to prevail on a either a de facto merger or mere
continuation theory:
[The] plaintiff would have to demonstrate
(1) no adequate consideration was given
for the predecessor corporation's assets
and made available for meeting the claims
of its unsecured creditors; (2) one or
more persons were officers, directors, or
stockholders of both corporations . . . .
However, it is not dispositive that some
of the same persons may serve as officers
or directors of the two corporations.The
relevant inquiries are whether the two
corporations have preserved their

Supp. 817, 821–822 (D. Colo. 1968); 15 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL.,
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 7122,
7165.5, pp. 188–90, 339–40 (rev. perm. ed. 1983)).
Marks, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 598 (citing Shannon, 379 F. Supp. at 801; Kloberdanz
v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 821–822 (Colo. 1968); 15 WILLIAM MEADE
FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS §§ 7122, 7165.5, pp. 188–90, 339–40 (rev. perm. ed. 1983)); see
also Leve v. Patient Safety Techs., Inc., No. B220274, 2011 WL 2347578, at *6
(Cal. Ct. App. June 15, 2011) (quoting Marks, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 598) (stating that
the five factors enumerated in Marks are “pertinent to a determination of
whether an asset sale achieves the same practical result as a merger[.]”).
232
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separate identities and whether recourse
to the debtor corporation is available. 233
To constitute a valid reorganization that
results in two separate entities, a
corporate transaction must meet certain
standards:
An asset acquisition can
amount to a de facto merger. This may
occur where the purchaser acquires all
assets, including choses in action, and also
assumes all liabilities of the seller; the
purchaser continues to operate the
business and the seller dissolves. The
crucial factor in determining whether a
corporate acquisition constitutes either a
de facto merger or a mere continuation is
the same: whether adequate cash
consideration was paid for the
predecessor corporation's assets. 234
The CenterPoint court then set out the five de facto merger factors
articulated in Marks v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., referring to them as
“a checklist for determining whether a de facto merger had taken place
that would render the successor company liable for the plaintiff's
product liability claim[.]” 235
The California Supreme Court has not recently addressed the
applicable tests for de facto merger, although the court of appeal, in Ibanez
v. S&S Worldwide, Inc., No. B238269, 2013 WL 2243841 (Cal. Ct. App.

CenterPoint Energy, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 219 (citations and quotations omitted)
(quoting Ray, 560 P.2d at 3; Beatrice Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 863 P.2d
683, 690 (Cal. 1993)).
233

CenterPoint Energy, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 219 (citations and quotations omitted)
(quoting Franklin v. USX Corp., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 11, 17 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)).
234

CenterPoint Energy, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 219 (quoting Marks, 232 Cal. Rptr. at
598).

235
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May 20, 2013), recent as of this writing, relied on the “adequate
consideration” test. 236
In 625 3rd St. Assoc., L.P. v. Alliant Credit Union the district court
held that California’s de facto merger doctrine was barred in that case by
federal preemption because it conflicted with the National Credit Union
Administration’s authority to repudiate a lease. 237
California: The Mere Continuation Exception
In Ray v. Alad, the California Supreme Court stated:
California decisions holding that a
corporation acquiring the assets of
another corporation is the latter’s mere
continuation and therefore liable for its
debts have imposed such liability only
upon a showing of one or both of the
following factual elements:
(1) no
adequate consideration was given for the
predecessor corporation’s assets and
made available for meeting the claims of
its unsecured creditors; (2) one or more
persons were officers, directors, or
stockholders of both corporations. 238

Ibanez v. S&S Worldwide, Inc., No. B238269, 2013 WL 2243841, at *4 (Cal.
Ct. App. May 20, 2013) (quoting Franklin, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19).

236

625 3rd St. Assocs., L.P. v. Alliant Credit Union, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1047
(N.D. Cal. 2009).
237

Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 7 (Cal. 1977) (citing Stanford Hotel Co. v. M.
Schwind Co. 181 P. 780 (Cal. 1919); Higgins v. Cal. Petroleum & Asphalt Co.
55 P. 155 (Cal. 1898); Econ. Ref. & Serv. Co. v. Royal Nat’l Bank of New York,
97 Cal. Rptr. 706 (Ct. App. 1971); Blank v. Olcovich Shoe Corp. 67 P.2d 376
(Cal. Ct. App. 1937); Malone v. Red Top Cab Co. of Los Angeles, 60 P.2d 543
(Cal. Ct. App. 1936)); accord Daniell v. Riverside Partners I, L.P., 142 Cal. Rptr.
3d 717, 722–723 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that successor entity can invoke
SLAPP Act protection when the predecessor entity would have been able to do
so if the first three forms of successor liability are present).
238
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Subsequent California decisions have held, however, that these
two elements must be present to impose liability 239 even when a
successor holds itself out as being a continuation of the predecessor. 240
Indeed, ‘“[t]he crucial factor in determining whether a corporate
acquisition constitutes either a de facto merger or a mere continuation is
the same: whether adequate cash consideration was paid for the
predecessor corporation's assets.’” 241
Furthermore, the California Supreme Court has made it clear that
“[the mere continuation] doctrine does not apply ‘when recourse to the
debtor corporation is available and the two corporations have separate
identities.’” 242
California: The Product Line Exception
In 1977 in Ray v. Alad, the Supreme Court of California imposed
liability on a successor corporation for an injury sustained by a plaintiff
See Beatrice Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 863 P.2d 683, 690–91 (Cal.
1993) (holding that the predecessor could “not rely on a suggestion that
because the second element is present here, [the successor] was liable for the
liabilies covered by the assumption agreement”); Franklin, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
18–19 (noting that all of the opinions cited in Ray in support of its test for mere
continuation “involved the payment of inadequate cash consideration, and
some also involved near complete identity of ownership, management or
directorship after the transfer”); Bradford v. Winter, 2d Civil No. B216235,
2010 WL 3260011, *1–4 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2010) (following Franklin v.
USX); accord Orthotec, LLC v. REO Spineline, LLC, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1122
(C.D. Cal. 2006) (quoting Ray, 560 P.2d 3) (citing Franklin, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d
11).
239

240 Maloney v. Am. Pharm. Co., 255 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (citing
Ray, 560 P.2d 3; Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556 (Cal. Ct. App.
1975)); see Annuityzone.com, Inc., v. Indep. Advantage Fin. & Ins. Serv., Inc.,
No. D045176, 2005 WL 1745393, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (relying on Maloney
in holding that mere continuation liability did not exist for a successor
corporation despite the successor holding itself out as a continuation of the
predecessor because there was adequate consideration).

Center Point Energy, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 219 (quoting Franklin, 105 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 17) (other citations omitted).
241

Henkel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 62 P.3d 69, 73 (Cal. 2003)
(quoting Beatrice, 863 P.2d at 690).
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who fell from a ladder manufactured by the predecessor corporation. 243
The court imposed liability under a new species of successor liability: the
“product line” exception. 244 The California product line exception is
based upon the following justifications set forth in Ray:
Justification for imposing strict liability
upon a Successor to a manufacturer
under the circumstances here presented
rests upon (1) the virtual destruction of
the plaintiff’s remedies against the original
manufacturer caused by the successor’s
acquisition of the business, (2) the
successor’s ability to assume the original
manufacturer’s risk-spreading role, and
(3) the fairness of requiring the successor
to assume a responsibility for defective
products that was a burden necessarily
attached to the original manufacturer’s
good will being enjoyed by the successor
in the continued operation of the
business. 245
These justifications have generally been treated by California
courts as elements, i.e., requirements. 246 In 2003, the California Supreme
Court implicitly affirmed this treatment by the lower courts, referring to
the “conditions” of Ray v. Alad. 247
See Ray, 560 P.2d at 10–11 (imposing liability for a product defect on a
successor corporation that acquired a manufacturing business and continued
producing the line of products previously distributed by the acquired
manufacturing business).

243

244
245

Ray, 560 P.2d at 11.
Id. at 8–9.

See, e.g., Chaknova v. Wilbur–Ellis Co., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 871, 876 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1999) (referring to the “three criteria” of Ray); Stewart v. Telex
Commc’ns., Inc., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 669, 672–73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (referring to
the Ray “considerations”); Lundell v. Sidney Mach. Tool Co., 236 Cal. Rptr. 70,
73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (referring to Ray’s “three-prong test”).
246
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1.

The First Condition of Ray v. Alad

Under the first condition of Ray v. Alad, the successor’s
acquisition of the business must cause the virtual destruction of the
plaintiff’s remedies against the predecessor. 248 Courts applying the first
condition consistently require some level of causation. 249 In Henkel, the
California Supreme Court concluded the first condition is not met
when “there are no grounds for claiming that [the predecessor] was
destroyed by the . . . sale of its . . . business to [the successor].” 250 In
Kaminski, a successor corporation exercised complete control over the
predecessor and “could have at any time forced [the predecessor] into
bankruptcy;” the California Court of Appeal held that the causation
element was satisfied, despite the fact that the successor did not
expressly require the dissolution of the predecessor. 251 The court held
that the successor’s financial and managerial control over the
predecessor “at least substantially contributed to the absence of [the
predecessor] from the recovery pool of product liability plaintiffs[.]” 252
For example, where a corporation bought an asbestos product line from
a predecessor, the predecessor remained in business for fifteen months
after the sale, and the successor played no role in the predecessor’s
decision to dissolve, the causation or substantial contribution
requirement was not met. 253 “[T]o be liable, [the successor] must have
‘played some role in curtailing or destroying the [plaintiff’s] remedies.’” 254

247

Henkel Corp., 62 P.3d at 73 (quoting Ray, 560 P.2d at 9).

248

Ray, 560 P.2d at 9.

249 See, e.g., Stewart, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 674 (“[S]ome causual connection between
the succession and the destruction of the plaintiff’s remedy must be shown.”).
250

Henkel Corp., 62 P.3d at 74 (citing Chaknova, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 871).

Kaminski v. W. MacArthur Co., 220 Cal. Rptr. 895, 902–03 (Ct. App. 1985);
see Phillips v. Cooper Labs., Inc., 264 Cal. Rptr. 311, 316 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)
(relying on the Kaminski rationale for the first condition of Ray).
251

252

Kaminski, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 903.

253

Chaknova, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 876–77.

Lundell v. Sidney Mach. Tool Co., 236 Cal. Rptr. 70, 75 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)
(quoting Kaminski, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 902); see also Kline v. Johns-Mansville, 745

254
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The causation requirement in the first condition of Ray v. Alad
has been analyzed several times in the context of bankruptcy sales. In
the bankruptcy context, a successor who purchases assets at a
bankruptcy sale is not considered the cause of a plaintiff’s lack of remedy
against the predecessor. 255 The Ninth Circuit articulated this general
principle in Nelson v. Tiffany Industries, Inc. 256 In Nelson, the predecessor
manufactured grain augers. 257 Four years after manufacturing the auger
at issue, the predecessor filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11. 258
The successor purchased all of the predecessor’s assets in a bankruptcy
court-approved sale. 259 The court stated:
It is our view that the California Supreme
Court’s decision in Ray does not apply
where there is a good faith dissolution in
bankruptcy which is not intended to
avoid future tort claims against the
predecessor. Under such circumstances,
the successor corporation has not
contributed to or caused the destruction
of the plaintiff’s remedies. 260
The court remanded the case to the district court because the record did
not specify whether the court “considered the evidence offered by the
plaintiff for the purpose of showing that [the predecessor] filed its
F.2d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1984) (concluding that Ray “require[s] that the asset
sale contribute to the destruction of the plaintiffs’ remedies”).
See Nelson v. Tiffany Indus., Inc., 778 F.2d 533, 538 (9th Cir. 1985)
(“[W]here there is a good faith dissolution in bankruptcy which is not intended
to avoid future tort claims against the predecessor[,] . . . the successor
corporation has not contributed to or caused the destruction of the plaintiff’s
remedies.”).

255

256

Nelson, 778 F.2d at 538.

257

Nelson, 778 F.2d at 537.

258

Nelson, 778 F.2d at 537.

259

Nelson, 778 F.2d at 537.

260

Nelson, 778 F.2d at 538.
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petition pursuant to a collusive agreement with [the successor].” 261 The
Ninth Circuit noted that “[i]f the evidence shows that [the successor]
induced [the predecessor] to file for bankruptcy to avoid future tort
liability, the Ray exception to the general rule would be applicable.” 262
In Stewart v. Telex Commc’ns, Inc., the California Court of Appeal
addressed successor liability relating to a predecessor’s manufacture of a
defective antenna design. 263 The court noted that “the sole distinction
between Alad and the present case is that [the successor] purchased [the
predecessor] assets through the intermediary of the bankruptcy courts[ ]
rather than directly.” 264 This court noted that the Kaminski court found
successor liability where a successor “substantially contributed” to the
demise of the predecessor but stated, “[n]evertheless, some causal
connection between the succession and the destruction of the plaintiff’s
remedy must be shown.” 265 The court discussed the balance between
products liability policy and corporate needs of limiting risk exposure,
concluding:
It is the element of causation, however,
that tips the balance in favor of imposing
successor liability.
The traditional
corporate rule of nonliability is only
counterbalanced by the policies of strict
liability when acquisition by the successor,
and not some [other] event or act,
virtually destroys the ability of the
plaintiff to seek redress from the
manufacturer of the defective product. 266
261

Nelson, 778 F.2d at 538.

262

Nelson, 778 F.2d at 538.

Stewart v. Telex Commc’ns, Inc., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 669, 670 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991).

263

264

Id. at 673.

265

Id. at 674–75.

266 Id. at 675 (quoting Hall v. Armstrong Cork, Inc., 692 P.2d 787, 792 (Wash.
1984).
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The Stewart court held the product line exception did not apply,
finding “no showing of causation here in the voluntary bankruptcy of
[the predecessor], nor any showing it was a mere subterfuge to avoid the
holding of Alad[.]” 267
Thus, both California and Ninth Circuit precedent demonstrate a
continued causation requirement in applying the first condition of Ray.
Cases addressing successor liability following a bankruptcy sale suggest
that a successor who buys assets from a predecessor in a bankruptcy sale
will not be liable for the predecessor’s products liability absent collusion
or subterfuge. 268
2.

The Second Condition of Ray v. Alad

Under the second condition from Ray v. Alad, the court must
consider “the successor’s ability to assume the original manufacturer’s
risk-spreading role[.]” 269 In Ray, this condition was met because both
physical assets as well as “know-how” in the form of manufacturing
designs, continuing personnel, and consulting services from the
predecessor’s general manager gave the successor “virtually the same
capacity as [the predecessor] to estimate the risks of claims for injuries
from defects in previously manufactured ladders for purposes of
obtaining insurance coverage or planning self-insurance.” 270
3.

The Third Condition of Ray v. Alad

The third condition of Ray v. Alad requires the court to consider
“the fairness of requiring the successor to assume a responsibility for
defective products that was a burden necessarily attached to the original
manufacturer’s good will being enjoyed by the successor in the
continued operation of the business.” 271 The court noted the successor’s
267

Id. at 676.

See PATRICK A. MURPHY, CREDITOR’S RIGHTS IN BANKRUPTCY 7:5 (2d ed.
2004) (citing the following cases applying California law: Nelson v. Tiffany
Indust., Inc., 778 F.2d 533, 537, 538 (9th Cir. 1985); Stewart v. Telax
Commc’ns., Inc., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 669 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)).
268

269

Ray v. Alad, 560 P.2d 3, 9 (Cal. 1977).

270

Id. at 10 (citing Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1154 (1st Cir. 1974)).

271

Id. at 9.
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“deliberate albeit legitimate exploitation of [the predecessor’s] established
reputation as a going concern manufacturing a specific product line,” the
substantial benefit the successor received from this, and the fundamental
fairness of requiring the burden of potential liability to pass along with
the benefits exploited. 272 The court further stated that the imposition of
liability served the dual goals of requiring the one who receives the
benefit to take the burden and precluding a windfall to a predecessor
who was paid more by a successor to avoid successor liability and then
promptly liquidated. 273 This final condition of fundamental fairness
results in a very fact specific analysis.
California: Personal Jurisdiction of Successor Corporations
“In a case raising liability issues, a California court will have
personal jurisdiction over a successor company if: (1) the court would
have had personal jurisdiction over the predecessor, and (2) the
successor company effectively assumed the subject liabilities of the
predecessor.” 274

Colorado
Colorado courts recognize the general rule of successor nonliability and the four traditional exceptions. 275 In Johnston v. Amstead the
Colorado Court of Appeals expressly rejected the product-line and
continuity of enterprise exceptions after examining the relevant public
272

Id. at 10–11.

273

Id. at 11.

CenterPoint Energy, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 202, 218 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2007) (citing Williams v. Bowman Livestock Equipment Co., 927 F.2d
1128, 1132 (10th Cir. 1991); Richmond v. Madison Management Group, Inc.,
918 F.2d 438, 455 (4th Cir. 1990); Ray v. Alad, 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977); Sanders
v. CEG Corp., 157 Cal. Rptr 252 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); 9 WITKIN, SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAW, CORPORATIONS § 17 796–98 (10th ed. 2005).

274

Johnston v. Amstead Indus., Inc., 830 P.2d 1141, 1142–43 (Colo. App.
1992) (citing Ruiz v. ExCello Corp., 653 P.2d 415 (Colo. App. 1982)); CMCB
Enters. v. Ferguson, 114 P.3d 90, 93 (Colo. App. 2005) (citing Alcan Aluminum
Corp. v. Elec. Metal Prods., Inc., 837 P.2d 282, 283 (Colo. App. 1992); Baca v.
Depot Sales, LLC, 2007 WL 988061, at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2007) (citations
omitted).
275
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policy issues espoused by other courts that have adopted one or both of
the exceptions. 276 At least one Colorado court has found that the indirect
transfer of assets from a predecessor to a purported successor will not,
by itself, bar a claim of successor liability. 277
Colorado: The Mere Continuation Exception
In Alcan Aluminum Corp., Metal Goods Division v. Electronic Metal
Products, the Colorado Court of Appeals set out the test for the mere
continuation exception:
The “mere continuation exception”
applies when there is a continuation of
directors and management, shareholder
interest, and, in some cases, inadequate
consideration. . . . Thus, the test for
determining whether this exception
applies focuses on whether the
purchasing corporation is, in effect, a
continuation of the selling corporation,
and not whether there is a continuation of
the seller’s business operation. 278
In CMCB Enterprises, Inc. v. Ferguson, the Colorado Court of Appeals
noted:
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has
held that under Oklahoma law, a
prerequisite for the imposition of liability
against a corporation as a mere
continuation of a predecessor is a sale or
276

Johnston, 830 P.2d at 1143–47.

277

Id. at 1146–47.

Alcan Aluminum Corp., 837 P.2d at 283 (citing Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594
A,2d 564 (Md. 1991); see Bud Antle, Inc. v. Eastern Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d 1451
(11th Cir. 1985) (purchasing corporation); Martin v. Abbot Labs., 689 P.2d 368
(Wash. 1984) (discussing distinction in applying the successor liability doctrine
in products liability, as opposed to commercial, context)).
278
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transfer of all or substantially all the assets
of the latter to the former. However,
another federal circuit court of appeals
has held that the plaintiff need only
demonstrate a transfer of corporate
assets, and it is not necessary, as a matter
of law, that a single corporation acquire
all the divesting corporation's assets,
though that may be a pertinent factor.
Here, even if we assume, without
deciding, that a transfer of substantially all
the assets is a factor in imposing liability,
such a transfer in effect occurred. 279
Colorado: The De Facto Merger Exception
Colorado courts have not set out a test for the de facto merger
exception. The Johnston court, in discussing the merits of the continuity
of enterprise exception, stated that continuity of shareholders is probably
the most essential element of the de facto merger exception test. 280
Thereafter, in Cohig & Assocs. v. Stamm, an unpublished opinion, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, interpreting Colorado law, stated that
Colorado applied the following de facto merger test:
Under Colorado law, a de facto merger may
exist if there is evidence suggesting (1)
continuity of management, personnel,
physical location, assets, and business
operations; (2) continuity of shareholders;
(3) cessation of the seller's business and
CMCB Enters. v. Ferguson, 114 P.3d 90, 93–94 (citing Williams v. Bowman
Livestock Equip. Co., 927 F.2d 1128 (10th Cir. 1991); Ed Peters Jewelry Co. v.
C & J Jewelry Co., 124 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1997); Patin v. Thoroughbred Power
Boats, Inc., 294 F.3d 640 (5th Cir. 2002); Alcan Aluminum Corp., 837 P.2d at
283; Ed Peters Jewelry Co., 124 F.3d at 252)).

279

Johnston, 830 P.2d at 1146–47 (citing Nguyen v. Johnson Machine & Press
Corp., 433 N.E.2d 1104 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)).

280
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liquidation of its assets; (4) assumption by
the purchaser of those liabilities of the
seller necessary to continue uninterrupted
the seller's former business operations. 281
Furthermore, “[t]he absorbing corporation receives the added capital and
franchise of the merged corporation and holds itself out to the world as
continuing the business of the seller.” 282
Colorado: The Express/Implied Assumption and Fraud Exceptions
Colorado courts have not yet articulated tests for the
express/implied assumption or fraud exceptions.

Connecticut
In Chamlink Corp. v. Merritt Extruder Corp., 283 the Connecticut
Court of Appeals adopted the four exceptions to the traditional rule of
non-liability following a corporate asset purchase:
The mere transfer of the assets of one
corporation to another corporation or
individual generally does not make the
latter liable for the debts or liabilities of
the first corporation except where the
purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to
assume the obligations, the purchaser is
merely a continuation of the selling
corporation, the companies merged or the

Cohig & Assocs. v. Stamm, No. 97-1119, 149 F.3d 1190 (unpublished table
decision), 1998 WL 339472, at *4 (10th Cir. June 10, 1998); see Johnston, 830
P.2d at 1146–47; cf Ekotek Site PRP Comm. V. Self, 948 F. Supp. 994, 1002 (D.
Utah 1996); V.C. Video, Inc. v. National Video, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 962, 969 (D
Kan. 1990).
281

282

Cohig & Assocs., 149 F.3d at 1190, at *4.

Chamlink Corp. v. Merritt Extruder Corp., 899 A.2d 90, 93 (Conn. App. Ct.
2006).

283
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transaction is entered into fraudulently to
escape liability. 284
In doing so, it followed the holding of Ricciardello v. J.W. Gant & Co., in
which the federal district court had preceded and predicted this same
holding seventeen years earlier. 285
The Chamlink court also considered the continuity of enterprise
exception as an alternative to the common law mere continuation
exception, but it did not expressly accept the doctrine because it was not
applicable to the facts of the case. 286 In Kendall v. Amster, the appellate
court, following Chamlink, upheld the imposition of successor liability
based on the continuity of enterprise exception. 287 One unpublished
superior court decision prior to Chamlink recognized the product line
exception. 288
Connecticut: The Express or Implied Assumption Exception
The one Connecticut decision that specifically addressed the
express/implied assumption exception looked to the language of the
asset purchase agreement to determine if the successor assumed the
predecessor’s liabilities. 289 That court did not articulate a specific test.
284 Chamlink, 899 A.2d at 93 (quoting 19 C.J.S. 314, Corporations § 657 (1990)
(citing LiButti v. United States, 178 F.3d 114, 124 (2d Cir. 1999))).
285

Ricciardello v. J.W. Gant & Co., 717 F. Supp. 56, 59–60 (D. Conn. 1989).

286 Chamlink,

899 A.2d at 93.

Kendall v. Amster, 948 A.2d 1041, 1051 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008); see also
Altman v. Motion Water Sports, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 2d 234, 242–43 (D. Conn.
2010) (“In Kendall the Appellate Court makes it plain that ‘continuity of
enterprise’ is not just a theory of successor liability, it is a recognized principle
of Connecticut law.”).

287

Sullivan v. A.W. Flint Co., No. CV 920339263, 1996 WL 469716, at *8
(Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 1996); see also Beriguette v. Innovative Waste Systems,
2009 WL 2450773 at *5 n.2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jul. 7, 2009) (noting that the
Superior Court had accepted the product line exception in Chamlink).

288

Peglar & Assocs., Inc. v. Prof’l Indem. Underwriters Corp., No.
CV020813164S, 2002 WL 1610037, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 19, 2002).

289
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Connecticut: The Mere Continuation Exception
The Chamlink290 court set forth a simple test for the mere
continuation exception: “Under the common law mere continuation
theory, successor liability attaches when the plaintiff demonstrates the
existence of a single corporation after the transfer of assets, with an
identity of stock, stockholders, and directors between the successor and
predecessor corporations.” 291 According to a 2009 Superior Court case,
factors considered in determining if this test has been met include:
[C]ontinuity of management; continuity
of personnel; continuity of physical
location, assets and general business
operations; and cessation of the prior
business shortly after the new entity is
formed. Also relevant is the extent to
which the successor intended to
incorporate the predecessor into its
system with as much the same structure
and operation as possible. 292
Further, although not mentioned in Chamlink, at least one court
of appeals has found that a threshold requirement for mere continuation
liability is that the predecessor “no longer represents a viable source of
relief.” 293

290 Chamlink,
291

899 A.2d at 93.

Id. (quoting Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 229, 240 (2d Cir. 1998)).

Robbins v. Physicians for Women, No. CV065002633, 2009 WL 1218818, at
*3 (Conn. Super. Ct. April 16, 2009).

292

293 Robbins v. Physicians for Women’s Health, LLC, 133 Conn. App. 577, 587
(Conn. App. Ct. 2012).

2017] A TAXONOMY AND EVALUATION OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY (REVISITED) 847

Connecticut: The Continuity of Enterprise Exception
The court in Chamlink 294 discussed the continuity of enterprise
exception as a potential alternative to the traditional test for mere
continuation. The court noted that under the “continuity of enterprise”
theory, a mere continuation exists “if the successor maintains the same
business, with the same employees doing the same jobs, under the same
supervisors, working conditions, and production processes, and
produces the same products for the same customers.” 295 The court
stated, however, that “[b]ecause it is clear under both [the traditional
mere continuation theory and the continuity of enterprise theory] that
Merritt Extruder Connecticut is not a mere continuation of Merritt
Davis, we need not adopt one theory over the other at this time.” 296
In Kendall v. Amster, however, the Connecticut Appellate Court,
following Chamlink, upheld the imposition of successor liability based on
the continuity of enterprise exception where the successor “was in the
same business [as the predecessor], restoring rare, expensive, vintage
automobiles; used the same personnel[;] . . . and had the same
customers.” 297 Moreover, a federal district court in Connecticut recently
stated: “In Kendall the Appellate Court makes it plain that ‘continuity of
enterprise’ is not just a theory of successor liability, it is a recognized
principle of Connecticut law.” 298 As with mere continuation, a threshold

294

Chamlink, 899 A.2d at 93.

Id.; Robbins, 2009 WL 1218818, at *3 (citing B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99
F.3d 505, 519 (2d Cir. 1996)).

295

296 Chamlink,
297

899 A.2d at 93 n.3.

Kendall v. Amster, 948 A.2d 1041, 1051 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).

Altman v. Motion Water Sports, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 2d 234, 242–43 (D.
Conn. 2010); accord Call Ctr. Techs., Inc. v. Grand Adventures Tour & Travel
Publ’g Corp., 635 F.3d 48, 53 (2d Cir. 2011); Garcia v. Serpe, No. 3:08cv1662,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14026, at *38.

298
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requirement for continuity of enterprise liability is that the predecessor is
not a viable source of liability. 299
Connecticut: The De Facto Merger Exception
The courts have not developed a test for de facto merger that
differs from the factor-based mere continuation test used by Connecticut
superior courts prior to the Chamlink decision. 300 The factor based
balancing test consists of four non-dispositive factors:
(1) whether there is a continuity of
management, personnel, physical location,
assets and general business operations; (2)
whether there is a continuity of
shareholders;
(3)
whether
the
[predecessor] ceased its ordinary business
operations, liquidates, and dissolves; and
(4) whether [the successor] assumed those
liabilities and obligations of [the
predecessor] ordinarily necessary for the
uninterrupted continuation of normal
business
operations
of
[the
301
predecessor].
The court goes on to say that “[n]ot every one of these indicia must be
established, however, . . . the court should apply a balancing test.” 302
Robbins v. Physicians for Women’s Health, LLC, 133 Conn. App. 577, 587
(Conn. App. Ct. 2012).
299

Peglar & Assocs., Inc. v. Prof’l Indem. Underwriters Corp., No.
CV020813164S, 2002 WL 1610037, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 19, 2002).

300

301 Sav.

Bank of Manchester v. Daly, No. CV020813164S, 2004 WL 3130581, at
*1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 2004) (citing Peglar & Assocs., Inc., 2002 WL
1610037, at *7); see also Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Konover, No. 3:05–cv–1924,
2011 WL 1225986, at *18–
19 (D. Conn. Mar. 28, 2011); Collins v. Olin
Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 97, 103 (D. Conn. 2006).
Sav. Bank of Manchester, 2004 WL 3130581, at *1 (citing Peglar & Associates,
Inc., 2002 WL 1610037, at *7; Collins, 434 F. Supp. 2d, at 103); see also Cargill,
Inc. v. Beaver Coal & Oil, Inc., 676 N.E.2d 815, 818 (Mass. 1997).

302
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Connecticut: The Fraud Exception
The fraud exception is governed by Connecticut’s Uniform
Fraudulent Transfers Act found at Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552(e)
(2005). 303
Connecticut: The Product Line Exception
The Sullivan v. A.W. Flint 304 decision provides the only insight
into Connecticut’s version of the product line exception, as no other
Connecticut court has discussed or applied the product line exception;
however, a 2009 Superior Court decision stated that it has been
accepted. 305 The Sullivan court listed the following requirements needed
in order to establish the product line exception:
(1) the transferee has acquired
substantially all the transferor’s assets,
leaving no more than a corporate shell,
(2) the transferee is holding itself out to
the general public as a continuation of the
transferor by producing the same product
line under a similar name, and (3) the
transferee is benefiting from the goodwill
of the transferor. 306

S. Conn. Gas Co. v. Waterview of Bridgeport Ass'n., No. CV054005335,
2006 WL 1681005, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 1, 2006); see also Pirrotti v.
Respironics, Inc., No. 3:11–CV–00439, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99775, at *9 (D.
Conn. Sept. 6, 2011).
303

304 Sullivan v. A.W. Flint, No. CV 920339263, 1996 WL 469716, at *161 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1996)).)

Beriguette v. Innovative Waste Sys., No. CV054006895, 2009 WL 2450773,
at *1 n.2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jul. 7, 2009) (noting that the superiorSuperior
Csuperior ourt had accepted the product line exception).
305

Sullivan, 1996 WL 469716 at *6; see Ramirez v. Amsted Indust., Inc., 431
A.2d 811, 825 (N.J 2011); Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 9–11 (Cal. 1977);
Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 387 (Wash. 1984).

306
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The court agreed with the policy justifications of the product line
exception but stated, “[T]he acceptance of the product line theory in
order to effectuate the goals sought to be achieved by the imposition of
strict liability in the first place does not mean it should be liberally
applied.” 307 In support of its view that the product line exception should
be narrowly applied, the court recognized the requirement that the
successor corporation must cause the destruction of the plaintiff’s
remedy. 308 If the plaintiff can proceed against the predecessor, then the
product line exception does not apply. 309

Delaware
A federal district court decision provides the most
comprehensive discussion of Delaware successor liability law. In Elmer
v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., the District Court of Delaware adopted the
traditional exceptions to successor non-liability and then discussed the
express/implied assumption and mere continuation exceptions. 310 Elmer
v. Tenneco Resins has been cited with approval in unreported decisions by
the Delaware Superior Court. 311
Delaware: The Express or Implied Assumption Exception
Based on Elmer, the Delaware courts will review the language of
the asset purchase agreement to determine if there was an express or
implied assumption of liabilities. 312 In the Elmer case, the purchasing
corporation expressly assumed, subject to certain conditions, all liabilities
307

Sullivan, 1996 WL 469716 at *8.

308

Id.

309

Id.

Elmer v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 535, 540 (D. Del. 1988); see also
In re Stone & Webster, Inc., 558 F.3d 234, 241 (3d Cir. 2009); In re Safety-Kleen
Corp., 380 B.R. 716, 739–40 (Bankr. D. Del., 2008).

310

Ross v. Desa Holdings Corp., No. 05C-05-013, 2008 WL 4899226, at *4
n.11 (Del. Super. Ct. Sep. 30, 2008); In re Asbestos Litig. v. Haveg Indust., Inc.,
C.A., No. 92C-10-100, 1994 WL 89643, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 1994).
311

312

In re Safety-Kleen Corp., 380 B.R. at 735.
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of the seller that existed at the closing date. 313 “One of the conditions
was that [the seller] provide a complete listing of its absolute or
contingent liabilities and pending or threatened claims or litigation.” 314
The purchaser/successor argued that it was not liable to the plaintiff
because the schedules attached to the asset purchase did not list the
seller’s potential liability for the manufacture of the product that injured
the plaintiff. 315
The court, in denying summary judgment to the purchaser,
stated, “While it seems clear that there was no express assumption of this
liability, the Court finds that there is a question whether [the purchaser]
impliedly assumed any [product] liability of [the seller].” 316 The court
based its conclusion on the fact that “[the purchaser] agreed to assume
‘all . . . liabilities of [the seller] . . . whether accrued . . . contingent or
otherwise . . . exist[ing] at the Closing Date.’” 317 The court reasoned that
the asset purchase agreement was contradictory, as one section expressly
rejected all liabilities not listed, while another expressly assumed all
liabilities. 318
Delaware: The Mere Continuation Exception
Delaware employs a narrow mere continuation exception. The
test is whether the former corporation is “the same legal entity” as the
latter corporation:
In order to recover under this theory in
Delaware, it must appear that the former
313

Elmer, 698 F. Supp. at 541.

314

Id.

315

Id.

Id. at 541; see Gee v. Tenneco, 615 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1980) (Tenneci
documents reasonably susceptible to conflicting interpretations); Bouley v.
American Cyanamid, 1987 WL 18738 (D. Mass. Oct. 21, 1987) (reasonable
persons may differ as to meaning of 1963 contract).

316

317

Elmer, 698 F. Supp. at 541.

318

Id.
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corporation is the same legal entity as the
latter; that is, “it must be the same legal
person, having a continued existence
under a new name.” The test is not the
continuation of the business operation,
but rather the continuation of the
corporate entity. 319
The Asbestos Litigation decision also indicates that continuity of
ownership may be a threshold requirement for a finding of mere
continuation: “[U]nder this theory, it must be established that the
transaction . . . was an arm’s length transaction and not simply a change
of corporate name and that [the successor] has different owners than
[the predecessor].” 320
Delaware: The De Facto Merger and Fraud Exceptions
There are currently no cases employing Delaware law that
explain the de facto merger or fraud exceptions.

District of Columbia
The District of Columbia recognizes the four traditional
exceptions to the general rule of successor non-liability. 321 In Bingham v.
Goldberg, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia elaborated
on the mere continuation exception but did not address the other

Id. at 542 (quoting Fountain v. Colonial Chevrolet Co., No. 86C–JA–117,
1988 WL 40019, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 13, 1988)); see also Ross v. Desa
Holdings Corp., 2008 WL 4899226, at *4 n. 11 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2008).
319

In re Asbestos Litig. v. Haveg Indust., Inc., C.A., No. 92C–10–100, 1994 WL
89643, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 1994).

320

Goldberg. Marchesano. Kohlman. Inc. v. Bingham, 637 A.2d 81, 89–90
(D.C. Cir. Ct. 1994); Reese Bros., Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 477 F. Supp. 2d 31,
40–41 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting Acheson v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 523 F.2d
1327, 1329–30 (9th Cir. 1975)); see also Baltimore Luggage v. Holtzman, 562
A.2d 1286, 1289–90 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989), cert denied, 568 A.2d 28 (Md.
1990); Brockman, 565 S.W.2d at 798.

321

2017] A TAXONOMY AND EVALUATION OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY (REVISITED) 853

three. 322 In Debnam v. Crane Co., the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that summary judgment was improper where the
purchase agreement was ambiguous and susceptible to the reasonable
interpretation that the defendants expressly or impliedly assumed the
liability at issue. 323 In Reese Brothers, Inc., the federal district court held
that a claim for successor liability shall go to trial unless the defendant
“can show beyond doubt” that the plaintiff “can prove no set of facts in
support of its claims.” 324
District of Columbia: The Mere Continuation Exception
The Bingham court did not apply a specific test for the mere
continuation exception. The court analyzed the facts of the case
according to a non-exclusive list of factors. 325 Although the court stated
that a “common identity of officers, directors, and stockholders in the
purchasing and selling corporations” is “a key element,” the existence of
common directors did not dispose of the issue. 326 The court did note,
however, that the key inquiry is whether or not there is a continuation of
the entity, rather than the business operations of the predecessor. 327

Florida
Florida courts have adopted the four traditional exceptions to the
general rule of successor non-liability and expressly rejected the
continuity of enterprise and product-line exceptions. 328 In Laboratory
322

Bingham, 637 A.2d at 90.

323

Debnam v. Crane Co., 976 A.2d 193, 198–200 (D.C. 2009).

324

Reese Bros., 477 F. Supp. 2d at 41.

325

Bingham, 637 A.2d at 91–92.

Bingham, 637 A.2d at 91 (citing Bud Antle, Inc. v. Eastern Foods, Inc., 758
F.2d 1451, 1458–59 (11th Cir. 1985).
326

327

Bingham, 637 A.2d at 92 (citing Bud Antle, 758 F.2d at 1458).

328 Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., Inc., 409 So. 2d 1047, 1049–51 (Fla. 1982); Graef
v. Hegedus, 698 So. 2d 655, 655–56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); see Gary Brown
& Assocs., Inc. v. Ashdon, Inc., 268 F. App’x Appx837, 842–84343 (11th Cir.
2008) (quoting Orlando Light Bulb Serv. v. Laser Lighting & Elec. Supply, Inc,
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Corporation, the appellate court appeared to collapse the de facto merger
and mere continuation exceptions, setting out the same test for both:
whether “one corporation is absorbed by another, i.e., there is a
continuity of the selling corporation evidenced by such things as the
same management, personnel, assets, location, and stockholders.” 329
Florida: The De Facto Merger Exception
Florida courts have applied the following test for a de facto
merger, requiring continuity of ownership:
A de facto merger occurs where one
corporation is absorbed by another, but
without compliance with the statutory
requirements for a merger. To find a de
facto merger there must be continuity of
the selling corporation evidenced by the
same management, personnel, assets and
physical location; a continuity of the
stockholders, accomplished by paying for
the acquired corporation with shares of
stock; a dissolution of the selling
corporation; and assumption of the
liabilities. 330

523 So. 2d 740, 742 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)); Miller v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1269 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (quoting Lab. Corp. of Am. v.
Prof’l Recovery Network, 813 So. 2d 266, 269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)); Jones
v. Honeywell Int’l., Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1269 (M.D. Fla. 2005); In re
Metro Sewer Servs., Inc., 374 B.R. 316, 322–23 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007)
(quoting Orlando Light Bulb Serv., 523 So. 2d at 742 (citing Bernard, 409 So. 2d at
1049)); Reina v. Gingerale Corp., 472 So. 2d 530 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); cf
Kelly v. American Precision Indust., 438 So. 2d 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
329

Lab. Corp., 813 So. 2d at 270.

Amjad Munim, M.D., P.A. v. Azar, 648 So. 2d 145, 153–54 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1994) (citing Arnold Graphics Indus. v. Indep. Agent Ctr., 775 F.2d 38
(2d Cir. 1985)) (other citations omitted); Ladjevardian v. Laidlaw-Coggeshall,
Inc., 431 F. Supp. 834, 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)); see Carnes v. Fender, 936 So. 2d
11, 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Lab. Corp., 813 So. 2d at 270; Chicago Title
Ins. Co. v. Alday-Donalson Title Co. of Florida, Inc., 832 So. 2d 810, 814 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
330
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In Florio v. Manitex Skycrane, LLC, the federal district court
collected cases to summarize the de facto merger doctrine as applied in
Florida and noted that the state has not adopted the continuity of
enterprise exception:
In applying the de facto merger doctrine,
Florida courts have uniformly required a
finding of substantial continuity of
ownership. Compare Bernard, 409 So.2d at
1049 (declining to “delet[e] a historical
requirement of substantial identity of
ownership”), and Viking Acoustical, 767
So.2d at 636 (de facto merger did not
occur when there was no identity of
officers, directors, or shareholders), with
Kelly v. Am. Precision Indus., 438 So.2d 29
(Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (successor
corporation was responsible for liability
of predecessor corporation in delivering
allegedly defective garbage truck where
successor purchased all of predecessor's
stock and stripped it of all its assets, with
the benefit thereof going solely to
successor), and Lab. Corp. of Am. v. Prof'l
Recovery Network, 813 So.2d 266, 269-70
(Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (fact questions
remained as to whether a de facto merger
occurred where the owner was the sole
officer and shareholder in both
corporations). Although a minority of
jurisdictions have expanded corporate
successor liability by adopting the
“continuity of enterprise” exception,
which eliminates the necessity of proving
a common identity of officers, directors,
and shareholders, see, e.g., Turner v.
Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244
N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976), Florida has not
done so. 331

Florio v. Manitex Skycrane, LLC, No. 6:07-cv-1700-Orl-28KRS, 2010 WL
5137626, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2010).
331
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Florida: The Mere Continuation Exception
In Florida, the mere continuation exception is based primarily on
continuity of officers, directors, and stockholders in the selling and
purchasing corporations.
The “change is in form, but not in
substance.” 332
In Serchay v. NTS Fort Lauderdale Office Joint Venture, the court
stated that a successor is a continuation of the predecessor when it has
“the same assets, management, personnel, stockholders, location,
equipment, and clients.” 333 In Azar, the court found sufficient evidence
to impose liability based on the mere continuation exception where the
following facts were present:
The old [Professional Association] ceased
rendering medical services shortly after
the judgment was entered against it. The
next day the baton was passed to the new
P.A. which commenced full operations.
It provided the same type of medical
services in the same office with the same
files, patients, nurses, clerical help, office
manager and the same major player, Dr.
Munim-the sole stockholder in and
president of each P.A. 334
Florida: The Fraud Exception
Florida courts have not developed or adopted a test for fraud
that is specific to the issue of successor liability. The court in Azar,
however, imposed liability on a successor corporation based on the
doctrine of fraudulent transfers but then continued its analysis, holding
that the successor was also liable under common law successor liability

Azar, 648 So. 2d at 154 (citing Bud Antle, Inc. v. E. Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d
1451, 1458 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc), reh’g denied, 765 F.2d 154 (1985) (citations
omitted).
332

Serchay v. NTS Fort Lauderdale Office Joint Venture, 707 So. 2d 958, 960
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); see also Azar, 648 So. 2d at 154.

333

334

Azar, 648 So. 2d at 154.
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principles. 335 In Florida, therefore, the fraud exception may not have
utility based on the fact that the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
already governs fraudulent contractual obligations, thus, such an
exception may be redundant.
Florida: The Express or Implied Assumption Exception
There are few Florida cases that directly address the express or
implied assumption exceptions; one, however, expressly recognized the
effectiveness of disclaimers of successor liability in an asset purchase
agreement. 336 Another, from the Federal District Court, indicates that a
purported successor’s preferential assumption of some but not all of a
predecessor’s liabilities is not fraudulent and provides no basis for
imposing successor liability, generally, to benefit the non-preferred
creditors of the predecessor. 337

Georgia
Georgia courts have expressly adopted the traditional exceptions
to the general rule of successor non-liability and have declined to adopt
the continuity of enterprise and product line exceptions based on
particular facts at issue in each respective case. 338

335

Id. at 152–55.

Krogen Express Yachts, LLC v. Nobili, 947 So. 2d 581, 583 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2007).
336

Mitutoyo Am. Corp. v. Suncoast Precision, Inc., No. 8:08-MC-36-T-TBM,
2011 WL 2802938, at *2–3 (M.D. Fla. July 18, 2011)).

337

See Farmex, Inc. v. Wainwright, 501 S.E.2d 802, 804 (Ga. 1998) (holding that
the continuity of enterprise exception set out in Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501
F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974) and the product line exception set out in Ray v. Alad,
560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977) were not applicable because the purchaser did not
continue to manufacture the product that injured the plaintiff after the asset
purchase); Bullington v. Union Tool Corp., 328 S.E.2d 726, 728 (Ga. 1985)
(declining to adopt the continuity of enterprise or product line exceptions
because the facts presented would not satisfy either, since the successor did not
manufacture or sell the same type of product (table saws) that injured the
plaintiff). Note that in 1987, the Georgia State Legislature amended its strict
liability laws to limit the imposition of strict liability only on manufacturers,
rather than mere sellers, of defective products. See Ga. Code Ann., § 51-1-11.1.

338
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Georgia: The De Facto Merger Exception
Under Georgia law, the following four elements must be present
for the de facto merger exception to apply:
(1) There is continuation of the
enterprise of the seller corporation, so
that there is a continuity of management,
personnel, physical location, assets, and
general business operations.
(2) There is a continuity of shareholders
which results from the purchasing
corporation paying for the acquired assets
with shares of its own stock, this stock
ultimately coming to be held by the
shareholders of the seller corporation so
that they become a constituent part of the
purchasing corporation.
(3) The seller corporation ceases its
ordinary business operations, liquidates,
and dissolves as soon as legally and
practically possible.
(4) The purchasing corporation assumes
those liabilities and obligations of the
seller ordinarily necessary for the
uninterrupted continuation of normal
business operations of the seller
corporation. 339
Georgia: Mere Continuation
Under Georgia law, the mere continuation exception to nonliability applies when “‘there is a substantial identity of ownership and a
complete identity of the objects, assets, shareholders, and directors’ as
between the purchasing corporation and the selling company.” 340 Note
that complete identity of ownership is not required. 341
Perimeter Realty v. GAPI, Inc., 533 S.E.2d 136, 145–46 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)
(citing Howard v. APAC-Georgia, Inc., 383 S.E.2d 617, 619 (Ga. Ct. App.
1989)); see also Douglas v. Bigley, 628 S.E.2d 199, 208 n.27 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).

339

Perimeter Realty, 533 S.E.2d at 145 (quoting Davis v. Concord Commercial
Corp., 434 S.E.2d 571, 573 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (holding no successor liability
340
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Georgia: The Fraud Exception
There are no cases employing Georgia law that explain the
current state of the fraud exception.
Georgia: The Express or Implied Assumption Exception
Whether a successor corporation assumed the liabilities of the
predecessor corporation depends on the language of the parties’ asset
purchase agreement. 342 In Gwinnett, the successor had expressly assumed
all liabilities of the predecessor. The court noted: “Had [the successor]
wished to limit its liabilities to certain types of claims, or to those
occurring within a certain time period, it could have done so in the
agreement.” 343

Hawaii
Hawaii is one of several jurisdictions that includes a fifth
exception in its formulation of the traditional exceptions to the general
rule of successor non-liability:
The [successor] corporation may be held liable for the debts and
liabilities of the [predecessor] corporation when[:]

where there was not identity of assets); see also Ney-Copeland & Assocs., Inc. v.
Tag Poly Bags, Inc., 267 S.E.2d 862, 862–63 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980).
Pet Care Prof’l Ctr., Inc. v. BellSouth Adver. & Publ’g. Corp., 464 S.E.2d
249, 251 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (successor liability established where both
businesses used the same name, operated from the same location, used the
same telephone service and accounts, and three of four partners in predecessor
corporation became stockholders in new corporation; the court noted that
“[a]lthough less than a complete identity of ownership between Center and Pet
Care resulted, only some identity of ownership was required.” (quoting
Bullington v. Union Tool Corp., 328 S.E.2d 726 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985); Cilurso v.
Premier Crown Corp., 769 F. Supp. 372, 374 (M.D. Ga. 1991).

341

See Gwinnett Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Massey, 469 S.E.2d 729, 731 (Ga. Ct. App.
1996).
342

343 Gwinnett Hosp. Sys., 469 S.E.2d at 731 (buyer agreed to assume liabilities and
obligations ‘only as of and with respect to periods following the [c]losing [d]ate’
(quoting Blum v. RES Assoc., 439 S.E.2d 712 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
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(1) there is an express or implied
assumption of liability;
(2) the transaction amounts
consolidation or merger;

to

a

(3) the transaction was fraudulent;
(4) some of the elements of a purchase in good
faith were lacking, as where the transfer was
without consideration; or
(5) the transferee corporation was a mere
continuation or reincarnation of the old
corporation. 344
The Hawaii courts have not articulated or applied tests for any of
these exceptions. However, in Del Monte Fresh Produce, Inc. v. Fireman’s
Fund Ins. Co., 345 the Hawaii Supreme Court held that a transfer of all the
predecessor’s assets and liabilities to the successor did not include an
assignment of the predecessor’s rights under insurance policies where
the policies contained a no assignment clause. The court explained:
Because Hawaii law requires every
insurance policy to be subject to the
general rules of contract construction, see
HRS § 431:10-237, and an assignment by
operation of law is merely an extension of
the common-law tort rule of successor
liability, see Northern Insurance, 955 F.2d at
1358, we hold the circuit court erred
when it concluded that an assignment by
operation of law is consistent with
Hawaii's rules governing construction of
insurance policies. 346
Evanston Ins. Co. v. Luko, 783 P.2d 293, 294 (Haw. Ct. App. 1989)
(emphasis added) (quoting 19 AM. JUR. 2D CORPORATIONS §2704 at 513
(1986)).
344

Del Monte Fresh Produce, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 183 P.3d 734,
745 (Haw. 2007).

345

346

Del Monte Fresh Produce, Inc., 183 P.3d at 745.
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Idaho
Idaho courts have recognized assumption of liabilities and fraud
as exceptions to the general rule of successor non-liability in asset
purchasers. 347 Courts have also recognized successor liability in the case
of a “reorganization,” which appears to be a fusion of the mere
continuation, continuity of enterprise, and de facto merger exceptions. 348
There are few modern Idaho cases in this area, and it is uncertain how
the Idaho courts would define the current state of successor liability law.
Idaho has a state constitutional provision that prevents the
legislature from allowing “the leasing or alienation of any franchise so as
to release or relieve the franchise or property held thereunder from any
of the liabilities of the lessor or grantor . . . .” 349 This would seem to limit
the legislature’s ability to pass anti-successor liability laws. 350

347 Anderson v. War Eagle Consol. Min. Co., 72 P. 671, 673, 675 (Idaho 1903)
(rejecting a rough continuity theory premised on commonality of management
and stock ownership in successor and predecessor).

Seymour v. Boise Co., Ltd., 132 P. 427, 430–31 (Idaho 1913) (“The
organization of the Boise Railroad Company and the transfer of all the property
and franchises of the Boise Traction Company to the railroad company was in
fact and law only a reorganization of the old company; the new corporation
having a board of directors who composed a majority of the board of directors
of the old corporation, and more than 98 percent of the subscribed stock of the
new corporation being held by the same stockholders who held the stock of the
old corporation”); see Moore v. Boise Land & Orchard Co., 173 P. 117, 118
(Idaho 1918); Super Grade, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Commerce & Labor, 162
P.3d 765, 771 (Idaho 2007)).)
348

349

IDAHO CONST. art. XI, § 15.

Towle v. Great Shoshone & Twin Falls Water Power Co., 232 F. 733, 738
(D. Idaho 1916), aff’d sub nom., Am. Waterworks & Elec. Co. v. Towle, 245 F.
706, 709–10 (9th Cir. 1917) (personal injury judgment against predecessor
becomes a lien against the franchise and property of the corporation in the
hands of a successor).
350
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Illinois
Illinois courts recognize only the four traditional exceptions to
the general rule of successor non-liability of asset purchasers. 351 The
Illinois courts “have consistently rejected taking a product line approach
to successor liability.” 352
Illinois: The Mere Continuation Exception
Under Illinois law, a “common identity of ownership” is an
essential requirement of the mere continuation exception. 353 In Vernon v.
Schuster, the Illinois Supreme Court explained the mere continuation
exception as follows:
The continuation exception to the rule of
successor corporate nonliability applies
Vernon v. Schuster, 688 N.E.2d 1172, 1175–76 (Ill. 1997) (citing Steel Co. v.
Morgan Marshall Indust., Inc., 662 N.E.2d 595 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)); Green v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 460 N.E.2d 595 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (quoting
Hernandez v. Johnson Press Corp., 388 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)); see
Brandon v. Anesthesia & Pain Mgmt. Assocs., 419 F.3d 594, 599 (7th Cir.
2005) (citing North Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon, Inc., 152 F.3d 642, 653 (7th Cir.
1998)); GMAC, LLC v. Hillquist, 652 F. Supp. 2d 908, 918 (N.D. Ill. 2009);
DeGuilio v. Goss Int'l Corp., 906 N.E.2d 1268, 1276 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009);
Consol. Servs. and Const., Inc. v. S.R. McGuire, 854 N.E.2d 715, 720 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2006); Flanders v. Cal. Coastal Cmtys., Inc., 828 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2005).

351

Diguilio v. Goss Int'l Corp., 906 N.E.2d 1268, 1278 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); see
Myers v. Putzmeister, Inc., 596 N.E.2d 754 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (citing Gonzales
v. Rock Wool Engineering & Equip. Co., 453N.E.2d 792 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983);
Nguyen v. Johnson Mach. & Press Corp., 433 N.E.2d 1104 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982);
Domine v. Fulton Iron Works, 395 N.E.2d 19 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Hernandez,
N.E.2d at 778; Johnson v. Marshall & Huschart Mach. Co. 384 N.E.2d 141 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1978)); see Nilsson v. Cont’l Mach. Mfg. Co., 621 N.E.2d 1032, 1035
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
352

Vernon, 688 N.E.2d at 1176 (quoting Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co., 645 F.2d
620, 625–26 (8th Cir. 1981) (citing, inter alia, Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565
F.2d 437, 440 (7th Cir. 1977)); see also Diguilio v. Goss Int’l., 906 N.E.2d at
1277 (citing Nilsson, 621 N.E.2d at 1032; Nguyen, 433 N.E.2d at 10321275
Joseph Huber Brewing Co., Inc. v. Pamado, Inc., 2006 WL 2583719, at *11–13
(N.D. Ill. 2006); see, e.g., Park v. Townson & Alexander, 679 N.E.2d 107, 110
(Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
353
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when the purchasing corporation is
merely a continuation or reincarnation of
the selling corporation. In other words,
the purchasing corporation maintains the
same or similar management and
ownership, but merely wears different
clothes. . . . [T]he majority of courts
considering this exception emphasize a
common identity of officers, directors,
and stock between the selling and
purchasing corporation as the key
element of a continuation. In accord with
the majority view, our appellate court has
“consistently required identity of
ownership before imposing successor
liability
under
the
continuation
exception. 354
The court rejected the dissent’s argument that continuity of
ownership should be one of several factors that the court considers
under a totality of circumstances evaluation. 355 This approach has been
mirrored in the Courts of Appeal. Since Vernon, the Illinois Supreme
Court has held that the continuation exception cannot apply without
commonality of ownership, regardless of what other facts may apply. In
Dearborn Maple Venture, LLC v. Sci Illinois Services, Inc. 356 the court of
appeals noted:
The test used to determine whether one
corporate entity is a continuation of
another is “whether there is a
continuation of the corporate entity of the
seller—not whether there is a continuation
of the seller’s business operations.”
A
common identity of officers, directors,
ownership and stocks between the selling
and purchasing corporation is a key
Vernon, 688 N.E.2d at 1176 (quoting Nilsson, 621 N.E. at 1032) (other
citations omitted).

354

355

Vernon, 688 N.E.2d at 1176, 1178.

356

968 N.E.2d 1222 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012), reh'g denied, (May 29, 2012).
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element of what constitutes a
“continuation.”
However,
“the
continuity of shareholders necessary to
finding of mere continuation does not
require complete identity between the
shareholders of the former and successor
corporations.” 357
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, citing Vernon v. Schuster,
has held that successor liability may lie under the mere continuation
exception even if the predecessor has not been dissolved. 358
Illinois: The De Facto Merger Exception
The Illinois Court of Appeals held that, like the mere
continuation exception, a prerequisite for imposing liability under the de
facto merger exception is continuity of ownership. 359 The court noted
that the mere continuation and de facto merger exceptions are similar but
apply in different circumstances: the former applies where no
corporation existed before the asset purchase and the latter involves the
combination of two existing corporations. 360 Aside from stating this
obvious difference between the exceptions, the Nilsson court provided no
further guidance on the contours of the de facto merger exception.

Id. at 1234 (emphasis added) (quoting Vernon, 688 N.E.2d at 1176; Park v.
Townson & Alexander, Inc., 679 N.E.2d 107, 110 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)) (other
citations omitted); accord Workforces Solutions v. Urban Servs. Of Am. Inc.,
Nos. 1-11-1410 and 1-11-3046 2012 Ill. App. LEXIS 714 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012);
Conser FS, Inc. v. Von Bergen Trucking, Inc., No. 2-10-1225, 2011 Ill. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 2165 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (the supreme court has hinted that the
common identity of officers, directors, and shareholders between the selling
and purchasing corporations need not be exact).
357

Brandon v. Anesthesia & Pain Mgmt. Assocs., 419 F.3d 594, 598–99 (7th
Cir. 2005) (finding that the predecessor was being preserved in a “ghostly
existence” by the successor precisely to defeat a finding of continuity of
ownership for successor liability purposes).

358

Nilsson v. Cont’l Mach. Mfg. Co., 621 N.E.2d 1032, 1035 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993).

359

360

Nilsson, 621 N.E.2d at 1034.
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In another decision by the Illinois Court of Appeals, the court
stated the following elements of a de facto merger:
(1) There is a continuation of the
enterprise of the seller corporation, so
that there is a continuity of management,
personnel, physical location, assets and
general business operations.
(2) There is continuity of shareholders
which results from the purchasing
corporation paying for the acquired assets
with shares of its own stock, this stock
ultimately coming to be held by the
shareholders of the seller corporation so
that they become a constituent part of the
purchasing corporation.
(3) The seller corporation ceases its
ordinary business operations, liquidates
and dissolves as soon as legally and
practically possible.
(4) The purchasing corporation assumes
those liabilities and obligations of the
seller ordinarily necessary for the
uninterrupted continuation of normal
business operations of the seller
corporation. 361
A later decision by the Court of Appeals affirmed that all four
elements are required for a showing of a de facto merger. 362 Recently, a
federal district court in Baxi v. Ennis Knupp & Assocs., 363 as well as the
361 Myers v. Putzmeister, Inc., 596 N.E.2d 754, 756 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)
(citations omitted); see Brandon v. Anesthesia & Pain Mgmt. Assocs., 419 F.3d
594 (7th Cir. 2005); Gray v. Mundelein Coll., 695 N.E.2d 1379, 1388 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1998).
362

Gray, 695 N.E.2d at 1388.

363 Baxi v. Ennis Knupp & Assocs., No. 10-CV-6346, 2011 WL 3898034, at *17
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 2011).
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Illinois Court of Appeals in Diguilio v. Goss Int’l. Corp. have indicated that
“the most important factor” in determining whether de facto merger has
occurred is the identity of the ownership of both the new and the prior
corporations. 364
Both courts treated identity of ownership as a
requirement—an “element” rather than a “factor” to be considered—
holding that neither the de facto merger or the mere continuation
exception applied because there was no common identity of
ownership. 365
Illinois: The Express/Implied Assumption Exception
In determining whether the successor corporation assumed the
liabilities of the predecessor, the Illinois courts are “governed by the
express provisions of the written document which dictates the agreement
between the parties.” 366
Illinois: The Fraud Exception
Illinois courts have not developed a specific test for the fraud
exception. However, the court in Putzmeister concluded that there was no
evidence of fraud in the transaction “notwithstanding the disparity
between the value of the predecessor’s debts and assets.” 367 The Seventh
Circuit held in Brandon, that, under Illinois law, it is not necessary to
demonstrate the existence of a majority of the eleven “badges of fraud”
listed in the fraudulent conveyance statute. 368

364

Diguilio v. Goss Int’l. Corp., 906 N.E.2d 1268, 1277 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).

365

Baxi, 2011 WL 3898034, at *17; Diguilio, 906 N.E.2d at 1277–78.

366

Putzmeister, 596 N.E.2d at 756.

367

Id. at 756.

Brandon v. Anesthesia & Pain Mgmt. Assocs., 419 F.3d 594, 599–600 (7th
Cir. 2005).
368
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Indiana
Indiana courts recognize the four traditional exceptions to the
general rule of successor non-liability. 369 Indiana courts have also
required that the predecessor corporation dissolve before a court can
impose liability on the successor under any of the exceptions. 370
Although the Indiana courts have not expressly adopted either
the continuity of enterprise or product line exceptions, the court in
Guerrero v. Allison Engine Co., after discussing the supporting and
opposing policies of the product line exception, stated:
The product line exception may be an
appropriate means by which to balance
the seemingly juxtaposed concepts of
strict liability under the Indiana Product
Liability Act, and freedom of contract long supported by common law, as well
as both state and federal constitutions. 371
The Guerrero court did not adopt the product line exception based on the
facts presented because the successor corporation did not cause the
destruction of the plaintiffs remedy—the predecessor was still in
existence at the time of the suit. 372 The court stated “the inequities which
would warrant our full consideration of this proposed fifth exception to
successor non-liability under Indiana law are not present.” 373 Based on
Cooper Indust., LLC v. S. Bend, 899 N.E.2d 1274, 1287–91 (Ind. 2009);
Winkler v. V.G. Reed & Sons, Inc., 638 N.E.2d 1228, 1233 (Ind. 1994);
Rodriguez v. Tech Credit Union Corp., 824 N.E.2d 442, 447 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005); see U.S. Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Reliable Automatic Sprinkler Co., 719
F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1028 (S.D. Ind. 2010); see also Glentel v. Wireless Ventures
LLC, 362 F. Supp. 2d 992 (N.D. Ind. 2005) (holding that asset sale conducted
as UCC foreclosure does not insulate purchaser from successor liability).
369

Ziese & Sons Excavating, Inc. v. Boyer Constr. Corp., 965 N.E. 2d. 713
(2012) (citing Sorenson v. Allied Prods. Corp., 706 N.E.2d 1097, 1099 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1999)); Guerrero v. Allison Engine Co., 725 N.E.2d 479, 483 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2000).
370

371

Guerrero, 725 N.E.2d at 487 (emphasis in original).

372 Id.
373

Id.
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the Guerrero court’s favorable treatment of the product-line exception, an
Indiana appellate court may adopt the product line exception if it is
presented with the appropriate factual record. Note that the Guerrero
court’s approval of the product line exception directly contradicts
Hernandez v. Johnson Press Corp., 374 a 1979 case in which an Illinois
Appellate Court applying Indiana law expressly rejected the product line
exception on the theory that the legislature, not the court, is the
appropriate forum to resolve policy concerns related to expanded
successor liability. 375 In U.S. Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Reliable Automatic
Sprinkler Co., the federal district court declined to apply the product line
exception in a commercial dispute. The court stated, citing Guerrero,
“this exception applies only when the claim is one for product liability
involving personal injury.” 376
In cases involving the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), Indiana courts will impose
liability under CERCLA upon a successor corporation without regard to
contract or merger. 377 CERCLA is the federal “catch-all environmental
statute” that applies to cases where “environmental legal action” is
possible. 378 In P.R. Mallory, the court stated that under CERCLA:
“Kraft is considered a corporate successor to Mallory because there is
sufficient corporate succession to support the transfer of Mallory's
liability and rights to coverage to Kraft by operation of law.” 379

374

Hernandez v. Johnson Press Corp., 388 N.E.2d 778, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).

375

Hernandez, 388 N.E.2d at 780.

U.S. Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Reliable Automatic Sprinkler Co.,719 F.
Supp. 2d 1020, 1031 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (quoting Guerrero, 725 N.E.2d at 480).

376

P.R. Mallory & Co., Inc. v. Am. States Ins. Co., No. 54C01-0005-CP-00156,
2004 WL 1737489, at *10 (Ind. Cir. Ct. July 29, 2004); see also Terra Products,
Inc. v. Kraft General Foods, Inc., 653 N.E.2d 89, 90–91 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).

377

378

Cooper Indus., LLC v. S. Bend, 899 N.E.2d 1274, 1280–81 (Ind. 2009).

379

P.R. Mallory, 2004 WL 1737489, at *10.
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Indiana: The Express or Implied Assumption Exception
No Indiana decision has defined a particular test for the express
or implied assumption exception. The courts look to the language of the
applicable contract. 380
Indiana: The Fraud Exception
In Indiana the fraud exception is based on evidence of “a
fraudulent sale of assets done for the purposes of escaping liability.” 381
In Gorski v. DRR, Inc., the court noted:
Gorski filed his wrongful death action on
March 6, 1998, and LMB, Birk, and
Oliphant entered into their agreement on
August 26, 1998. Although this does not
definitively prove that DRR transferred
its assets to LMB and Birk due to
Gorski's complaint, it is sufficient
evidence to survive a Trial Rule 12(B)(6)
challenge. Therefore, the trial court erred
in granting LMB's and Birk's Motion to
Dismiss on the fraudulent transfer of
assets claim. 382
In Ziese & Sons Excavating Inc. v. Boyer Constr. Corp., 383 the court evaluated
the existence of fraud by examining eight “badges of fraud,” which
include:
1) the transfer of property by a debtor
during the pendency of a suit;
2) a transfer of property that renders the
debtor insolvent or greatly reduces his
See, e.g., Winkler v. V.G. Reed & Sons, Inc., 638 N.E.2d 1228, 1233 (Ind.
1994).

380

381

Winkler, 638 N.E.2d at 1233.

382

Gorski v. DRR, Inc., 801 N.E.2d 642, 647 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).

Ziese & Sons Excavating Inc. v. Boyer Construction Corp., 965 N.E.2d 713,
722 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

383
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estate;
3) a series of contemporaneous
transactions which strip the debtor of all
property available for execution;
4) secret or hurried transactions not in the
usual mode of doing business;
5) any transaction conducted in a manner
differing from customary methods;
6) a transaction whereby the debtor
retains benefits over the transferred
property;
7) little or no consideration in return for
the transfer; and
8) a transfer of property between family
members. 384
The court goes on to state, “When the facts of a case implicate several
badges of fraud, an inference of fraudulent intent may be warranted.” 385
Indiana: The De Facto Merger Exception
In Cooper Industries, LLC v. South Bend., a 2009 case, the Indiana
Supreme Court set out several non-exclusive factors for determining if
there was a de facto merger, stating: “Some pertinent findings might
include continuity of the predecessor corporation's business enterprise as
to management, location, and business lines; prompt liquidation of the
seller corporation; and assumption of the debts of the seller necessary to
the ongoing operation of the business.” 386
Id. at 722 (quoting Lee's Ready Mix and Trucking, Inc. v. Creech, 660
N.E.2d 1033, 1037 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
384

385

Id.

Cooper Indus., LLC v. S. Bend, 899 N.E.2d 1274, 1288 (Ind. 2009); see also
Sorenson v. Allied Prod. Corp., 706 N.E.2d 1097, 1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

386
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The court further noted, “To be sure, Delaware's version of de
facto merger is far more restrictive, . . . Focused as it is on shareholder
rights, Delaware may be something of an outlier on this subject, though
obviously a very influential one.” 387
In a 2005 case, Rodriguez v. Tech Credit Union Corp., 388 the court of
appeals generally stated that “‘[a s]uccessor in assets liability, under these
exceptions, takes place only when the predecessor corporation no longer
exists, such as when a corporation dissolves or liquidates in
bankruptcy.’” 389
Indiana: The Mere Continuation Exception
In Cooper, the Indiana Supreme Court set forth that:
The doctrine of “mere continuation” has
a slightly different focus [than de facto
merger].
[The doctrine of mere
continuation]
asks
whether
the
predecessor corporation should be
deemed simply to have re-incarnated
itself, largely aside of the business
operations. Factors pertinent to this
determination include whether there is a
continuation of shareholders, directors,
and officers into the new entity. 390

387

Cooper, 899 N.E.2d at 1288 n.10.

Rodriguez v. Tech Credit Union Corp., 824 N.E.2d 442, 447 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005).
388

Id. (quoting Markham v. Prutsman Mirror Co., 565 N.E.2d 385, 387 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1991)).

389

Cooper, 899 N.E. 2d at 1290 (citing Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Alday–Donalson
Title Co., 832 So.2d 810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).

390
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Iowa
Iowa courts recognize four exceptions to the general rule of
successor non-liability: express or implied assumption or liabilities,
fraud, consolidation or merger, and mere continuation. 391 The Iowa
Supreme Court expressly rejected the product line exception, stating:
We believe the product-line theory is
inconsistent and, as the law currently
stands, theoretically irreconcilable with
our law of strict liability in tort as well as
with our law of corporate liability. We
find the logic of those courts which have
rejected the doctrine more persuasive
than the logic of those courts which have
adopted it. Accordingly, we decline to
adopt the doctrine as the law of this state.
If the law is to be changed, the legislature
is the appropriate forum for action. 392
The Iowa Supreme Court also expressly declined to expand the
mere continuation exception based on the Cyr and Turner decisions. 393
Grundmeyer v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 649 N.W.2d 744, 751–52 (Iowa 2002)
(citing Arthur Elevator Co. v. Grove, 236 N.W.2d 383, 391–92 (Iowa 1975);
Pancratz v. Monsanto Co., 547 N.W.2d 198, 200 (Iowa 1996)); Lumley v.
Advanced Data-Comm, Inc., 773 N.W.2d 562 (Table), No. 09–0224, 2009 WL
2514084, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2009).
391

Delapp v. Xtraman, Inc., 417 N.W.2d 219, 222–23 (Iowa 1987) (citing Fish
v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 126 Wis. 2d 293, 311, 376 N.W.2d 820, 828–29 (1985);
Grand Labs., Inc. v. Midcon Labs of Iowa, 32 F.3d 1277, 1281 (8th Cir. 1994).

392

Pancratz, 547 N.W.2d at 201 (“We have never applied the mere continuation
exception where the buying and selling corporations had different owners . . . .
Moreover, we made plain in Delapp that we did not believe strict liability
policies would be furthered by imposing liability on a successor corporation
that was without fault in creating the defective product . . . . Such a radical
departure from traditional corporate principles, we observed, should be left to
the legislature . . . . ”); Grand Labs., 32 F.3d at 1281; Oeltjenbrun v. CSA

393
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Iowa: The Express or Implied Assumption Exception
Where a corporation purchases some of the seller’s assets and
assumes only limited liabilities, “[the Iowa courts] have said there is no
successor-in-interest liability.” 394 In Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Eco, Inc.,
the federal district court stated, “[a]n implied agreement is one in which
the agreement is inferred from the acts or conduct of the parties, instead
of being expressed by them in written or spoken words.” 395 The district
court then went on to apply five factors to determine if an implied
agreement to assume liability had taken place:
1) whether the successor used the same
name as the predecessor;
2) whether the successor took credit for
the predecessor's work;
3) whether the successor assumed
responsibility for completing a project;
4) whether the successor made efforts to
collect money on a project; and
5) whether a successor participated in
repairs to the predecessor's work. 396

Investors, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1048–49 (N.D. Iowa 1998) (quoting
Pancratz, 547 N.W.2d at 201 (“Although the Iowa Supreme Court noted that
there were more expansive formulations of the [mere continuation] rule, which
examine the ‘totality of the circumstances,’ it reaffirmed Iowa's adherence to
the ‘traditional’ formulation of the rule.”)).
394

Grundmeyer, 649 N.W.2d at 751 (citing Delapp, 417 N.W.2d at 220).

Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Eco, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1101 (S.D.
Iowa 2011) (citing Ambrose v. Southworth Prods. Corp., 953 F.Supp. 728, 735
(W.D.Va.1997)).
395

Archer, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 1101 (citing Richmond v. Madison Mgmt. Grp.,
Inc., 918 F.2d 438, 450–51 (4th Cir. 1990)).

396
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Iowa: The Mere Continuation Exception
Under Iowa’s mere continuation exception, “the controlling
factor is whether the transferor continues to own and control the new
corporation.” 397 In Pancratz, the court stated, “The mere continuation
exception, as traditionally applied, focuses on continuation of the
corporate entity.” 398 Furthermore, “[t]he exception has no application
without proof of continuity of management and ownership between the
predecessor and successor corporations. Thus, [t]he key element of a
continuation is a common identity of the officers, directors and
stockholders in the selling and purchasing corporations.” 399
The
Pancratz court also examined the new and expanded versions of the
continuation exception that originated in the Cyr and Turner decisions. 400
In response to the plaintiff’s request that the court adopt one of the
“totality of the circumstances” approaches to the continuation exception,
the court stated, “[w]e, however, find no departure in our cases from the
traditional formulation of the rule. Nor do we believe public policy
would be served by such an expansion of the ‘mere continuation’
exception.” 401
Iowa: The Fraud Exception
The court in Pancratz stated that “‘parties cannot circumvent the
mere continuation exception by inserting relatives as sham owners and
directors of a new company that is in substance the predecessor.’” 402 In
Grundmeyer, 649 N.W.2d at 752 (citing Arthur Elevator Co. v. Grove, 236
N.W.2d 383, 392–93 (Iowa 1975)).
397

Pancratz, 547 N.W.2d at 201 (emphasis in original) (citing Grand Labs., Inc.
v. Midcon Labs of Iowa, 32 F.3d 1277, 1283 (8th Cir. 1994)).
398

Pancratz, 547 N.W.2d at 201 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Leannais
v. Cincinatti, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 440 (7th Cir. 1977)) (citing Weaver v. Nash
Int'l, Inc., 730 F.2d 547, 548 (8th Cir. 1984); Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co., 645
F.2d 620, 625–26 (8th Cir. 1981)).
399

400

Pancratz, 547 N.W.2d at 201.

401 Id.

at 201; see also Lumley, 2009 WL 2514084 at *3–4.

Pancratz, 547 N.W.2d at 202 (quoting Grand Labs., 32 F.3d at 1283); see also C.
Mac Chambers v. Iowa Tae Kwon Do Acad., 412 N.W.2d 593 (Iowa 1987).
402
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Chambers a father, the sole owner of a corporation, formed a new
corporation and transferred all of his businesses’ assets to the newlyformed corporation. His son was the sole shareholder and director, but
the father continued to manage the business. 403 The Pancratz court stated
that, although the Chambers court imposed liability on a successor
corporation under the mere continuation exception, “in retrospect the
holding perhaps better exemplifies the fraud exception, not the mere
continuation exception, to the general rule of nonliability.” 404 The
Pancratz court held that the Chambers decision does not indicate that Iowa
courts do not require continuity of ownership under the mere
continuation exception. 405 In Lumley v. Advanced Data-Comm, Inc., the
court applied the traditional elements of fraud in determining that the
fraud exception did not apply, noting: “The elements of fraud are: (1)
representation, (2) falsity, (3) materiality, (4) scienter, (5) intent to
deceive, (6) reliance, (7) resulting injury and damage.” 406

Kansas
Kansas courts apply the four traditional exceptions to the general
rule of successor non-liability. 407 However, unlike other traditional rule
jurisdictions, Kansas does not require continuity of ownership under the
mere continuation exception. 408

403

Chambers, 412 N.W.2d at 595.

404

Pancratz, 547 N.W.2d at 202.

405 Id.

Lumley, 2009 WL 2514084, at *4 (citing Wilden Clinic, Inc. v. Des Moines,
229 N.W.2d 286, 292 (Iowa 1975).

406

Gillespie v. Seymour, 876 P.2d 193, 199–200 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting
Comstock v. Great Lakes Distrib. Co., 496 P.2d 1308 (Kan. 1972)); Equity
Asset Corp. v. B/E Aero., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (D. Kan. 2005); see also
YRC, Inc. v. Magla Prods, L.L.C., No. 12-2179-SAC, 2012 WL 2045954 (D.
Kan. June 6, 2012); Stratton v. Garvey Int’l, Inc., 676 P.2d 1290, 1298 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1984) (discussing the merits of the product-line exception but refusing to
apply it because “Kansas adheres to the traditional majority rule of successor
nonliability.”).
407

Stratton, 676 P.2d at 1299 (quoting Tift v. Forage King Indust., Inc., 322
N.W.2d 14 (1982) (“A court merely need determine that the defendant, despite
408
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In Avery v. Safeway Transfer & Storage, Co., the Supreme Court of
Kansas applied a narrow form of the mere continuation exception as
early as 1938, though it did not classify it as such. 409 Although the court
did not name the exception explicitly, the Kansas Supreme Court
adopted the “traditional rule” two years earlier in Mank v. S. Kansas Stage
Lines Co. 410 The Avery court held that where certain facts were presented,
the effect of a transaction was fraudulent, regardless of the intent of the
parties involved.
Sometimes this sort of conduct on the
part of corporations whereby one
acquires all the assets of another is
characterized as fraudulent. But it may
not be intentionally so; perhaps no
intentional fraud inhered in this transfer.
But where the transfer of assets strips a
debtor corporation of all its assets, and
disables the corporation from earning
money to pay its debts, resources to
which they may look for the payment of
their due, the net result is in legal effect a
fraud; and the courts will subject the
transferee to liability for the satisfaction
of claims against the corporation whose
assets it has absorbed. 411
The Avery court, therefore, subjected the transferee to liability
based on the going concern value of the purchased assets. Unlike other
jurisdictions that have imposed liability under similar circumstances,
limiting a creditor’s recovery to the liquidation value of the predecessor’s
assets at the time of the transfer (e.g., California), Kansas courts imposed
business transformations, is substantially the same as the original
manufacturer”)).
409

Avery v. Safeway Transfer & Storage, Co., 80 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Kan. 1938).

410

Mank v. S. Kansas Stage Lines Co., 56 P.2d 71 (Kan. 1936).

411

Avery, 80 P.2d at 1101.
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liability based on the asset’s going concern value and held the successor
liable for the predecessor’s debts without limitation.
Kansas: The Express or Implied Assumption Liability
Currently, there do not appear to be any Kansas cases that define
a test for or discuss the contours of the express or implied assumption of
liabilities exception.
Kansas: The Mere Continuation Exception
Kansas courts use a five element test in finding a mere
continuation:
(1) [The] transfer of corporate assets (2)
for less than adequate consideration (3) to
another corporation which continued the
business operation of the transferor (4)
when both corporations had at least one
common officer or director who was in
fact instrumental in the transfer . . . and
(5) the transfer rendered the transferor
incapable for paying its creditor’s claims
because it was dissolved in either fact or
law.” 412
Note, if there is a party whom the creditor can sue, then the
mere continuation exception does not apply, even if the party is
judgment proof. 413
Kansas: The De Facto Merger Exception
In Comstock v. Great Lakes Distributing Company, the Kansas
Supreme Court defined the consolidation or merger exception by

Gillespie, 876 P.2d at 200 (quoting Stratton, 676 P.2d at 1298–99); see also
Crane Const. Co. v. Klaus Masonry, LLC, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1119 (D. Kan.
2000).
412

413 Gillespie, 876 P.2d at 200 (citing Stratton, 676 P.2d at 1297–98) (refusing to
impose successor liability against the successor because the claimant sued a
partner of the predecessor).

878

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 18

reference to Fletcher’s Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations,
stating:
Strictly speaking, a consolidation signifies
such a union as necessarily results in the
creation of a new corporation and the
termination of the constituent ones,
whereas a merger signifies the absorption
of one corporation by another, which
retains its name and corporate identity
with the added capital, franchises and
powers of a merged corporation. 414
The court held the continuation or merger exception did not
apply because there was no evidence of direct dealing between the
successor and the predecessor; rather, the successor acquired its interest
from intervening purchasers of the predecessor’s assets. 415
Kansas: The Fraud Exception
In Comstock, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he incorporation of
[the successor] in 1965, and the subsequent bona fide acquisition of
some [of the predecessor’s] property after foreclosure and sale, cannot
serve as a premise for a claim of fraud.” 416
In Moore v. Pyrotech, 417 the Tenth Circuit, applying Kansas law,
upheld a finding of successor liability based on the fraud exception. In
that case, the trial court had found:
[The predecessor] entered into the share
exchange agreement about a month after
Comstock v. Great Lakes Distrib. Co., 496 P.2d 1308, 1311 (Kan. 1972)
(quoting 15 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7041 (rev. perm. ed. 1983)).

414

Comstock, 496 P.2d at 1311; 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL.,
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7122
(rev. vol. Sept. 2008).
415

416

Comstock, 496 P.2d at 1312.

417 Moore v. Pyrotech, 13 F.3d 406 (Table), No. 92-3404, 1993 WL 513834
(10th Cir. Dec. 10, 1993).

2017] A TAXONOMY AND EVALUATION OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY (REVISITED) 879

signing the letter of intent with plaintiffs,
but did not inform plaintiffs. Lee Derr,
president of [the predecessor] and [the
successor],
testified
that
the
[predecessor’s] shareholders were getting
restless, and the reverse takeover was
designed to provide them some
immediate return on their investment.
But by this time, [the predecessor] was
contractually obliged to reimburse
plaintiffs for their costs of investigating
the project. . . . [T]he net result was in
legal effect a fraud.
The plaintiffs
negotiated in good faith while [the
predecessor] and its principals secretly
created an intricate web of self-dealing to
create a business successor for [the
predecessor]. As Derr testified, this was
designed to give the investors a return on
their investment, not in and of itself
improper, but clearly so if done at
plaintiffs' expense. 418
The Tenth Circuit also noted: “Kansas cases finding successor liability
have found fraud, see Avery, 80 P.2d at 1101, whereas those finding no
liability have generally specifically indicated there was no fraud.” 419

Kentucky
Kentucky recognizes the general rule of successor non-liability
and the four traditional exceptions. 420 Also, while not using the term,
Moore, 1993 WL 513834 at *6 (quoting Moore v. Pyrotech Corp., No. 902178-0, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6425, at *3 (D. Kan. Apr. 7, 1992)).

418

Moore, 1993 WL 513834 at *6 (citing Stratton, 676 P.2d at 1299; Comstock, 496
P.2d at 1312).
419

420 Pearson v. Nat’l Feeding Sys., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46, 49 (Ky. 2002) (citing Am.
Ry. Express Co. v. Kentucky, 228 S.W. 433 (Ky. Ct. App. 1920); see also Excel
Energy, Inc. v. Cannelton Sales Co., 337 F. App'x 480, 482 (6th Cir. 2009);
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Kentucky appears to have recognized the continuity of enterprise
exception or seems to employ a more expansive mere continuation
exception. For example, in Parker, the appellate court stated:
In Kentucky, a determination of the
continuity of a corporation after a sale
depends on examining the sale agreement
to determine continuity of shareholders or
management. Even where an adequate
consideration was paid for the assets, a
successor company which continues with
the same business, by the same officers
and personnel, in the same location with
only a slight change in name will be
considered liable for the debts and
liabilities of the selling company. 421
However, in Pearson, the Kentucky Supreme Court expressly
rejected the product-line exception. 422
Kentucky: The Express or Implied Assumption Exception
In Pearson, the court reviewed the language of the relevant asset
purchase agreement and concluded that the successor did not assume the
predecessor’s pre-closing tort liabilities. 423 Even though the successor
expressly assumed certain liabilities that existed on the closing date, and
the contract did not specifically address pre-closing tort liabilities, the
court found that the successor did not impliedly assume pre-closing tort
liabilities. 424
Parker v. Henry A. Petter Supply Co., 165 S.W.3d 474, 478–79 (Ky. Ct. App.
2005).
Parker, 165 S.W.3d at 479 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Core
Med., LLC v. Schroeder, No. 2009-CA-000670-MR, 2010 WL 2867820, at *3
(Ky. Ct. App. Jul 23, 2010).
421

422

Pearson, 90 S.W.3d at 53.

423

Id. at 50.

424

Id.
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Kentucky: The De Facto Merger Exception
Without defining a specific test for the de facto merger exception,
the Pearson court held that liability would not be imposed on a successor
that purchases assets “essentially” through a bankruptcy sale. 425 The
court indicated that continuity of shareholders, management, or other
indicia of merger or consolidation is necessary before the de facto merger
exception will apply. 426
In Wallace v. Midwest Fin. & Mortg. Servs., Inc., the federal district
court noted that Kentucky recognizes the four traditional exceptions and
states:
The following factors guide the Court in
its determination whether to apply the de
facto merger doctrine:
(1) continuity of management, personnel,
location, assets, and general business
operations; (2) continuity of shareholders
which results from the purchasing
corporations paying for the acquired
assets with shares of its own stock; (3)
whether the seller corporation ceases
business operation and liquidates or
dissolves as soon as is legally or practically
possible; (4) whether the purchasing
corporation assumes the obligations of
the sellers which are ordinarily necessary
for the continuation of the seller's normal
business; and (5) adequacy of the
consideration received by the selling
corporation. 427
425

Id. at 51.

426

Id.

Wallace v. Midwest Fin. & Mortg. Servs., Inc., 728 F. Supp. 2d 906, 926
(E.D. Ky. 2010) (quoting Ogle v. U.S. Shelter Corp., No. 95–51, 1996 WL
380707, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 25, 1996)).
427
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Kentucky: The Mere Continuation Exception
Based on the Pearson court’s interpretation of the mere
continuation exception, there must be “continuity of shareholders or
management” in order to create a continuation sufficient to impose
liability on the purchasing corporation. 428 The court, however, did not
specify if continuity of ownership and control is necessary. The court did
not define a specific test for the exception. The court relied on “a
reading of the purchase and sale agreement, together with the fact that
the sale was essentially a bankruptcy sale” in finding that the purchaser
did not assume the liabilities of the seller. 429
In Parker v. Henry A. Petter Supply Co., the court held: “Even
where an adequate consideration was paid for the assets, a successor
company which continues with the same business, by the same officers
and personnel, in the same location with only a slight change in name
will be considered liable for the debts and liabilities of the selling
company.” 430 However, in that case the court held that there was no
“continuation” or “continuity of a corporation,” as the ownership,
management, and business practices of the successor differed
substantially from its predecessor. 431 In Competitive Auto Ramp Services v.
Kentucky Unemployment Insurance, the court stated that “merely continuing
the same business, even in the same location, is not, by itself, sufficient
to impose successor liability.” 432

428 Pearson, 90 S.W.3d at 51; Parker v. Henry A. Petter Supply Co., 165 S.W.3d
474, 479 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005).
429

Pearson, 90 S.W.3d at 51; Parker, 165 S.W.3d at 479.

Parker, 165 S.W.3d at 479; see also Core Med., LLC v. Schroeder, 2010 WL
2867820, at *3 (Ky. Ct. App. Jul 23, 2010).

430

431

Parker, 165 S.W.3d at 479–80.

432 Competitive Auto Ramp Serv. v. Ky. Unemployment Ins., 222 S.W.3d 249,
253 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).
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Kentucky: The Fraud Exception
The court in Pearson did not address the fraud exception because
the plaintiff in Pearson conceded that “no fraud exists in this case.” 433
There does yet not appear to be a subsequent case addressing this
specific exception.

Louisiana
In Pichon v. Asbestos Defendants, a 2010 case, a Louisiana appellate
court set out what it referred to as the “basic principle of corporate
successor liability[:]”
The general rule of corporate liability is
that, when a corporation sells all of its
assets to another, the latter is not
responsible for the seller's debts or
liabilities, except where (1) the purchaser
expressly or impliedly agrees to assume
the obligations; (2) the purchaser is
merely a continuation of the selling
corporation; or (3) the transaction is
entered into to escape liability. 434
In Bourque v. Lehmann Lathe, Inc., the court stated that the second
exception to non-liability, mere continuation, “would include the
surviving corporation in most mergers” as well as “some non-merger
sales in which one corporation or other business entity sells all its assets
to another legal entity.” 435 In discussing the third exception—entering
into a transaction in order to escape liability—the court used the term

Pearson, 90 S.W.3d at 51 (stating that the holding in American Railway still
governs successor non-liability in the state of Kentucky); Parker, 165 S.W.3d at
479.

433

Pichon v. Asbestos Defendants, 52 So. 3d 240, 243 (La. Ct. App. 2010)
(quoting Golden State Bottling Co. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 414 U.S. 168,
182 n. 5 (1973).

434

435 Bourque v. Lehmann Lathe, Inc., 476 So. 2d 1125, 1126–27 (La. Ct. App.
1985).
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436

“defraud.”
The fraud exception is also found in long standing
Louisiana precedent. 437
Finally, Louisiana courts have not adopted, or expressly rejected,
the product line theory of California’s Ray v. Alad. 438 Most recently, the
court in Pichon stated the exception did not apply to the facts before it
because the predecessor was a “viable defendant” when the suit was filed
and, in fact, was named as a defendant. 439 The court added: “The fact
that [the predecessor] subsequently filed for bankruptcy (but has not
been dissolved) is irrelevant to the determination of the legal question
presented here.” 440
Louisiana: The Express or Implied Assumption Exceptions
In discussing the express or implied assumption form of
successor liability in the context of a tort claim for injuries from a
defective lathe, the Bourque court stated that this form of successor
liability:
[I]s premised upon the concept that a
voluntary sale of all assets includes, or
should include, negotiations as to the
transfer of all aspects of the corporate
balance sheet. The parties to the sale are
free to bargain, and potential liability is
certainly one of the factors that rational
businessmen include in the negotiations
of such sales. 441

Bourque, 476 So. 2d at 1127; see also Wolff v. Shreveport Gas, 70 So. 789 (La.
1916) (successor liability imposed based on fraudulent schemes to escape
liability through sale of a company’s assets to a newly formed corporation
following an explosion).

436

437

Wolff, 70 So. at 794–95.

438

Pichon, 52 So. 3d at 244–45; Bourque, 476 So. 2d at 1128.

439

Id. at 245.

440

Id. at 245, n. 5.

441

Bourque, 476 So. 2d at 1127.
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The court noted that “[q]uite obviously, an auction pursuant to
involuntary bankruptcy proceedings is not a voluntary transaction in
which both parties negotiate terms of sale.” 442
Biller v. Snug Harbor Jazz Bistro of Louisiana, L.L.C., 443 deserves
mention. The case involved a restaurant that was transferred from a
deceased uncle (Mr. Brumat) to his living niece (Ms. Brumat) and an
injury that occurred at the restaurant while the deceased was still living.
Upon receiving her inheritance, Ms. Brumat formed Snug Harbor L.L.C.
with Mr. Schmidt, the former manager of Snug Harbor. The question
for the court was whether Snug Harbor, L.L.C. was a mere continuation
of Snug Harbor:
A newly organized corporation would be
liable as the successor of the old upon a
showing that the transaction was entered
into in fraud of the creditors of the old
corporation or when the circumstances
attending the creation of the new and its
succession to the business and property
of the old were of such a character as to
warrant a finding the new corporation
was merely a continuation of the old. 444
Ultimately, the court held that “Snug Harbor, L.L.C., is a separate,
distinct entity from the late Mr. Brumat and his estate, and therefore, not
liable for the debts of the succession . . . . Snug Harbor, L.L.C., did not
exist at the time of Mr. Biller’s accident and was formed after Mr.
Brumat’s death.” 445

442

Id.

Biller v. Snug Harbor Jazz Bistro of Louisiana, L.L.C., 99 So. 3d 730, 733
(La. Ct. App. 2012), reh'g denied, (Sept. 20, 2012), writ denied, 2012–2151 (La.
Nov. 21, 2012), 102 So. 3d 60.

443

444 Snug Harbor, 99 So. 3d at 732 (citing Wolff v. Shreveport Gas, 70 So. 789,
794 (La. 1916)).
445

Id. at 733.
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Louisiana: The Fraud or To Escape Liability Exception
Based on Wolff v. Shreveport Gas, 446 a 1916 case from the Louisiana
Supreme Court, courts will impose successor liability when there is
evidence of fraud in the transaction. 447 The Wolff court relied on the
trust fund doctrine, which holds that a surviving corporation is liable to
the predecessor’s creditors if the transaction was entered into
fraudulently. 448 The court in Wolff stated:
[A] newly organized corporation is liable
for the debts of an old one . . . where it is
shown that the succession was the result
of a transaction entered into in fraud of
the creditors of the old corporation, or
that the circumstances attending the
creation of the new . . . were of such a
character as to warrant the finding that
the new, is merely a continuation of the
old, corporation. 449
A “transaction . . . entered into to escape liability” is also an
enumerated exception to the general rule of non-successor liability. 450
Although, on its face, this exception appears to be potentially broad, the
court in Bourque, limits this exception to one involving fraud. 451 Also, in
446

Wolff v. Shreveport Gas, 70 So. 789 (La. 1916).

See Roddy v. NORCO Local 4-750, Oil, Chem., & Atomic Workers Int’l
Union, 359 So. 2d 957, 960 (La. 1978) (quoting Wolff, 70 So. at 794; see also
Hollowell v. Orleans Reg’l Hosp. LLC, 217 F.3d 379, 390 (5th Cir. 2000)
(emphasizing the difference between the fraud exception and the mere
continuation exception).
447

448

Wolff, 70 So. at 794.

449

Id.

Pichon v. Asbestos Defendants, 52 So. 3d 240, 243 (La. Ct. App. 2010)
(quoting 414 U.S. 168, 182 n.5 (1973); Bourque v. Lehmann Lathe, Inc., 476 So.
2d 1125, 1127 (La. Ct. App. 1985)).

450

451

Bourque, 476 So. 2d at 1127.

2017] A TAXONOMY AND EVALUATION OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY (REVISITED) 887

Pichon, the court indicated the exception applies only to “transaction[s]
entered into for the sole purpose of escaping liability.” 452
Louisiana: The De Facto Merger Exception
Although Louisiana courts do not use the term “de facto”
merger in discussing exceptions to the general rule of non-successor
liability, the Wolff court’s description of transactions that may give rise to
liability in part resembles the traditional de facto merger doctrine. 453
The Wolff court summarized the four general categories of
business reorganizations that may produce a “continuation” resulting in
successor liability—consolidations, mergers, continuations, and de
facto mergers:
The first of such groups comprehends
consolidations proper, where all the
constituent companies cease to exist and
a new one comes into being; the second,
cases of merger proper, in which one of
the corporate parties ceases to exist while
the other continues. The third group
comprehends cases where a new
corporation is, either in law or in point of
fact, the reincarnation of an old one. To
the fourth group belong those
transactions whereby a corporation,
although continuing to exist de jure, is in
fact merged in another, which, by
acquiring its assets and business, has left
of the other only its corporate shell. 454

452

Pichon, 52 So. 3d at 244 (emphasis added).

453

Wolff, 70 So. at 794.

454

Id.
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Louisiana: The Mere Continuation Exception
The court in Bourque explained the rationale for imposing liability
under the mere continuation exception, listing the following factors to be
considered:
[T]his rationale for liability would include
some non-merger sales in which one
corporation or other business entity sells
all its assets to another legal entity. The
key consideration is whether the
successor is, in fact, a “continuation” of
the predecessor. The extent to which
predecessor and successor have common
shareholders, directors, officers, or even
employees are pertinent considerations.
Further, prior business relationships
should be considered, as should the
continuity of the identity of the business
in the eyes of the public. 455
Recently, the appellate court ruled that the sale of all of a
predecessor’s assets to a successor is a threshold requirement. 456 In
Pichon, on appeal from summary judgment granted in favor of the
defendants, a successor purchased a division of General Motors (“GM”),
known as Detroit Diesel Allison Division. The sales agreement provided
that the successor would not assume or be liable for “any liabilities,
obligations or commitments of GM or of any of its Affiliates, . . .” 457
The court first noted:
In the absence of a transaction entered
into for the sole purpose of escaping
liability, which is covered by exception #
3 above, we believe the facts showing one
corporation to be merely a continuation
455

Bourque, 476 So. 2d at 1127.

456

Pichon, 52 So. 3d at 240.

457

Id. at 243.
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of the other would have to be especially
compelling to impose liability upon a
corporation that has expressly contracted
out of such liability. 458
The court did reach that issue, however, as it held that the plaintiff failed
to satisfy a threshold element. The court stated specifically that “[a]
threshold requirement to trigger a determination of whether successor
liability is applicable under the ‘continuation’ exception is that one
corporation must have purchased ‘all’ the assets of another.” 459
The dissent disagreed and maintained that summary judgment
was improper because the inquiry was factually intensive and required a
balancing and examination of the eight factors set forth in Hollowell v.
Orleans Regional Hospital LLC; 460 the factors are as follows:
(1) retention of the same employees;
(2) retention of the same supervisory
personnel;
(3) retention of the same production
facility in the same physical location;
(4) production of the same product;
(5) retention of the same name;
(6) continuity of assets;
(7) continuity
operations; and

458

of

general

business

Id. at 244 (citation omitted).

Id. (emphasis added) (citing Golden State Bottling Co. v. Nat’l Labor
Relations Bd., 414 U.S. 168, 182 n. 5 (1973)); National Sur. Corp. v. Pope Park,
Inc., 121 So. 2d 240 (La. 1960); Wolff v. Shreveport Gas, Electric Light &
Power Co., 70 So. 789 (La. 1916).
459

460

217 F.3d 379, 390 (5th Cir. 2000).
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(8) whether the successor holds itself out
as the continuation of the previous
enterprise. 461
Note that the majority did not address Hollowell or its eight factor
test associated with the continuity of enterprise doctrine.
In Russell v. SunAmerica Securities., Inc., 462a 1992 case, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit used the eight factor
continuity of enterprise test found in Mozingo v. Correct Manufacturing
Corp. 463 as its test for the Louisiana continuation exception; this is the
same test employed in Hollowell (2000) as well as in the precedential Cyr.
Federal district courts in Louisiana have followed Russell in using this
test, referring to it as “mere continuation,” rather than “continuity of
enterprise.” 464 It appears though that this test was, at least implicitly,
rejected by the Court of Appeal of Louisiana in the 2010 Pichon case. 465
Also note that in a 1960 case, the Louisiana Supreme Court
explained that under Wolff, that, in order for a continuation to be found,
there must be continuity of ownership between the selling and
purchasing corporations:
[T]he “continuation” doctrine of
the Wolff case can be invoked only when
it is shown that the major stockholders of
the selling corporation also have a
substantial or almost identical interest in
the
purchasing
corporation,
for,
otherwise, there would be no premise for

Pichon, 52 So. 3d at 246–47 (Belsome, J., dissenting) (quoting Hollowell, 217
F.3d at 390).
461

962 F.2d 1169, 1175 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Monzingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp.,
752 F.2d 168, 174 (5th Cir. 1985)).

462

463 752

F.2d at 175 (applying Mississippi law).

464

Hollowell, 217 F.3d at 390.

465

52 So. 3d at 240.
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concluding that the new corporation is a
reincarnation of the old. 466
However, more recent cases indicate that the key requirement is that all
of a predecessor’s assets be sold to the successor rather than merely just
identity of ownership. 467
Finally, in more recent cases involving contract-based or tax
claims, Louisiana appellate courts have not imposed successor liability
based on the perceived separate nature of the defendants involved. 468

Maine
In Director of Bureau of Labor Standards v. Diamond Brands, Inc., a
case involving liability for severance pay under M.R.S.A. § 625-B, the
Supreme Court of Maine stated:
[A]bsent a contrary agreement by the
parties, or an explicit statutory provision
in derogation of the established common
law rule, a corporation that purchases the
assets of another corporation in a bona
fide, arm’s-length transaction is not liable
for the debts or liabilities of the transferor
corporation. 469
466

Nat’l Sur. Corp. v. Pope Park, Inc., 121 So. 2d 240, 243 (La. 1960).

Pichon, 52 So. 3d at 243; Bourque, v. Lehmann Lathe Inc.,476 So. 2d 1125,
1127 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
467

See TLC Novelty Company, Inc. v. Perino’s Inc., 881 So. 2d 1267 (La. Ct.
App. 2004) (contract claim for breach of video game contracts with the first
Perino’s bar could not be asserted against the second and third bars of the same
name, each of which was separately incorporated by the same owner and each
managed by her son); see also Morrison v. C.A. Guidry Produce, 856 So. 2d 1222
(La. Ct. App. 2003) (state’s tax claim could not be asserted against company not
found to be a successor of the taxpayer under Wolff v. Shreveport Gas, Electric
Light & Power Co., 70 So. 789 (La. 1916)); Cent. Bus. Forms, Inc. v. N-Sure
Sys., Inc., 540 So. 2d. 1029 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
468

469 Dir. of Bureau of Labor Standards v. Diamond Brands, Inc., 588 A.2d 734,
736 (Me. 1991) (citation omitted) (citing Whiting v. Malden & Melrose R.R., 88
N.E. 907, 910 (Mass. 1909); 8 Z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §
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The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the defendant
was liable as a successor because it was a mere continuation of the seller
on the ground that plaintiff had not established facts on this issue.
However, the court did not explicitly state that the mere continuation
exception was not recognized as a successor liability doctrine in Maine. 470
Maine state courts do not appear to have addressed successor
liability in the tort context, and federal court cases provide mixed
guidance as to how state courts might approach successor liability in this
area. 471

Maryland
In Nissen Corp. v. Miller, the Maryland Court of Appeals
(Maryland’s highest court) adopted “the general rule of nonliability of a
successor corporation, with its four traditional exceptions.” 472 The
Nissen court recognized that the express assumption and de facto merger
exceptions were codified in Maryland’s Corporations Statutes, and the
fraud exception was codified in Maryland’s Fraudulent Conveyance
163.02(2)(c) (1990); 15 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7122 (rev. perm. ed.
1983).
Diamond Brands, 588 A.2d at 737. But see Janet M. Sing, Inc. v. Maine Dept. of
Labor, 492 A.2d 892 (Me. 1985) (discussing statutory employer continuation
liability under M.R.S.A. Title 26, § 1228).
470

Jordan v. Hawker Dayton Corp., 62 F.3d 29, 32–33 (1st Cir. 1995) (declining
to rule whether Maine would adopt the “majority rule” with the four traditional
exceptions, but stating the product line doctrine “is at most a minority rule
which has plainly not been adopted by Maine”); Ramirez v. DeCoster, 194
F.R.D. 348, 366 n.33 (D. Me. 2000) (citing Diamond Brands, 588 A.2d at 736 n.5)
(“Under Maine’s common law, a corporation may be liable for the debts of its
predecessor if the new corporation is a ‘mere continuation’ of the predecessor
or if the transaction was undertaken with a fraudulent intent to escape
liability.”); Saco River Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Shooshan Jackson, Inc., 826 F. Supp.
580, 583 (D. Me. 1993) (stating Maine did not appear to recognize the de facto
merger and continuity of enterprise “exceptions to the common law rule”).
471

Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564, 565 (Md. 1991); see also SherwinWilliams Co. v. Coach Works Auto Collision Repair Ctr., Inc., No. WMN–07–
2918, 2011 WL 709714, at *10 (D. Md. Feb. 22, 2011); Charter Oak Fire Ins.
Co. v. Marlow Liquors, LLC, No. JKS 09–1894, 2010 WL 2245039, at *3–4 (D.
Md. June 1, 2010).

472
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Act. 473 The court also concluded that the mere continuation exception is
based on sound policy. 474 Importantly though, the Nissen court expressly
rejected the continuity of enterprise exception. 475
Maryland: The Express and Implied Assumption Exceptions
Maryland courts look to the language of the asset purchase
agreement to determine if the purchasing corporation expressly assumed
the liabilities of the seller. 476 Unlike most jurisdictions, Maryland has
articulated a more narrow, totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine
whether the purchaser impliedly assumed the liabilities of the seller:
In order for a promise to be implied on
the part of a corporation to pay the debts
of another corporation, the conduct or
representations relied upon by the party
asserting liability must indicate an
intention of the buyer to pay the debts of
the seller. The presence of such an
intention depends on the facts and
circumstances of each case. 477
The Baltimore Luggage court, applying the preceding standard, held
that a purchasing corporation did not impliedly assume an employment
contract where the purchaser continued to pay the employee salary and
report his earnings on a W-2 because the purchaser deducted these
473

Nissen, 594 A.2d at 566.

474

Id. (citing Baltimore Luggage v. Holtzman, 562 A.2d 1286, 1293 (Md. 1989)).

Id. at 570–74; see also Academy of IRM v. LVI Environmental Services, Inc.,
687 A.2d 669, 678–79 (Md. 1997) (quoting Nissen, 594 A.2d at 567 (“The
gravamen of the traditional ‘mere continuation’ exception is the continuation of
the corporate entity rather than continuation of the business operation.”)); EHA
Consulting Group v. Hardin & Assoc., No. RDB 09–2859, P.C., 2010 WL
1137514, at *3 (D. Md. March 19, 2010).

475

476

Baltimore Luggage, 562 A.2d at 1286.

Baltimore Luggage, 562 A.2d at 1292. (citing 15 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §
7122 (rev. perm. ed. 1983)).
477

ET AL.,
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payments from the amount that the purchaser paid for the seller’s
assets. 478 In contrast, the purchaser was held liable in Ramlall v. MobilPro
Corp. 479 in which a reverse triangular merger agreement contained a
clause expressly assuming the seller’s liabilities.
Maryland: The Mere Continuation Exception
The Baltimore Luggage court also provided a test for whether a
purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the seller; in order for
a purchasing corporation to be liable for the debts of it predecessor, the
successor corporation must meet certain “indicia of continuation,”
which are:
[C]ommon officers, directors, and
stockholders[] and only one corporation
in existence after the completion of the
sale of assets. While the two foregoing
factors are traditionally indications of a
continuing corporation, neither is
essential.
Other factors such as
continuation of the seller's business
practices and policies and the sufficiency
of consideration running to the seller
corporation in light of the assets being
sold may also be considered. To find that
continuity exists merely because there was
common management and ownership
without considering other factors is to
disregard the separate identities of the
corporation without the necessary
considerations that justify such an
action. 480
478

Baltimore Luggage, 562 A.2d at 1286.

479

202 Md. App. 20 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011).

Baltimore Luggage, 562 A.2d at 1293 (quoting 15 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §
7122 (rev. perm. ed. 1983)).

480

ET AL.,
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In Baltimore Luggage, the trial court held that the purchaser was a
mere continuation of the seller based on evidence that the purchaser
continued to use the trade name of the seller, holding itself out as the
same entity so that customers would not know that the ownership had in
fact changed. 481 The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed because there
was no continuity of ownership between the corporations, the seller
remained in existence, and there was sufficient consideration given for
the assets. 482
In a later Court of Special Appeals decision, the court analyzed
the facts in front of them using a continuation test adopted by Rhode
Island—though they did not expressly endorse the test. 483 The Rhode
Island test was based on five non-dispositive factors:
“(1) there is a transfer of corporate
assets; (2) there is less than adequate
consideration; (3) the new company
continues the business of the transferor;
(4) both companies have at least one
common officer or director who is
instrumental in the transfer; (5) the
transfer renders the transferor incapable
of paying its creditors because it is
dissolved either in fact or by law.” 484
“[T]he ‘mere continuation’ exception is ‘designed to prevent a situation
whereby the specific purpose of acquiring assets is to place those assets
out of reach of [a] predecessor’s creditors.’” 485

481

Baltimore Luggage, 562 A.2d at 1293.

482 Id.
483

at 1294.

Acad. of IRM v. LVI Envtl. Servs., Inc., 687 A.2d 669, 680 (Md. 1997).

IRM, 687 A.2d at 680 (quoting H.J. Baker & Bros., Inc. v. Orgonics, Inc.,
554 A.2d 196, 205 (R.I. 1989)).

484

485 Progressive Septic, Inc. v. SeptiTech, LLC, No. ELH-09-03446, 2011 WL
939022, at *3 (D. Md. Mar. 15, 2011) (quoting Baltimore Luggage, 562 A.2d at
1293).
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It is important to note that neither mere continuation test applied
by the Maryland courts requires continuity of ownership. The Baltimore
Luggage court, however, noted that the mere continuation exception
applies where “the purchasing corporation maintains the same or similar
management and ownership but wears a ‘new hat.’” 486 In discussing the
four traditional exceptions, the Nissen court cited this quote from
Baltimore Luggage with approval. 487 In 2010, the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland, stated:
In Maryland, jurisdiction based upon a
theory of continuity of the entity is a basis
for successor liability, whereas jurisdiction
based upon continuity of the enterprise is
not a basis for successor liability . . . . As
the Court of Appeals of Maryland held in
Nissen, “The mere continuation or
continuity of entity exception applies
where there is a continuation of directors
and management, shareholder interest
and, in some cases, inadequate
consideration. The gravamen of the
traditional mere continuation exception is
the continuation of the corporate entity
rather than continuation of the business
operation.” . . . In comparison, “[A]
continuity of enterprise analysis seeks to
establish whether there is substantial
continuity
of
pretransaction
and
posttransaction
business
activities
resulting from the use of the acquired
assets. . . .” 488
Baltimore Luggage, 562 A.2d at 1293. (quoting Bud Antle, Inc. v. Eastern
Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d 1451 (11th Cir. 1985).

486

Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564, 566 (Md. 1991) (citing Baltimore
Luggage, 562 A.2d at 1293).

487

EHA Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Hardin & Assocs., P.C., No. CIV.A RDB 092859, 2010 WL 1137514, at *3 (D. Md. Mar. 19, 2010) (emphasis in original)

488
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Based on the current case law, it is difficult to tell what degree of
continuity is actually required before a court will impose liability based
on the mere continuation exception.
Maryland: The De Facto Merger Exception
As the Nissen court indicated, the de facto merger exception is
codified in Maryland’s Corporation Statute. Although the statute does
not use the term “de facto merger,” it provides that the surviving entity in
a merger situation is liable for the debts of the predecessor and does not
specify that such liability extends only to statutory mergers. 489 Maryland
courts have not yet articulated a test for what constitutes a de facto
merger.
Maryland: The Fraud Exception
In discussing the fraud exception, the Nissen court noted that
“the Maryland Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, § 15-201 et seq.,
Commercial Law Article, Maryland Annotated Code, protects the rights
of creditors of a corporation which transfers its assets with an intent to
defraud or without fair consideration in a manner similar to the fourth
[fraud] exception noted above.” 490

Massachusetts
Massachusetts courts:
“follow the traditional corporate law
principle that the liabilities of a selling
predecessor corporation are not imposed
upon the successor corporation which
purchases its assets, unless (1) the
successor expressly or impliedly assumes
liability of the predecessor, (2) the
transaction is a de facto merger or
(citations omitted) (quoting Nissen, 594 A.2d at 564 & n.1; and citing IRM, 687
A.2d 669).
489

MD. CODE ANN. § 3-114(e)(1) (1998).

594 A.2d at 566 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Smith v. Navistar
Intern. Transp. Corp., 687 F. Supp. 201, republished as corrected, 737 F. Supp.
1446, 1449 (D. Md.1988)).

490
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consolidation, (3) the successor is a mere
continuation of the predecessor, or (4)
the transaction is a fraudulent effort to
avoid liabilities of the predecessor.’” 491
The court in Guzman v. MRM/Elgin also expressly rejected the
product line exception, deferring to the legislature on this “matter[] of
social policy.” 492
Massachusetts: The Express or Implied Assumption Exception
Courts determine whether a purchasing corporation expressly or
impliedly assumed the liabilities of the selling corporation by looking at
the language of the relevant contract documents. 493
Massachusetts: The De Facto Merger Exception
In Massachusetts “[t]he ‘de facto merger’ theory of successor
liability ‘has usually been applied to situations in which the ownership,
assets and management of one corporation are combined with those of
another, preexisting entity.’” 494
In Cargill, Inc. v. Beaver Coal & Oil Co., the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts outlined a factor-based test for the de facto merger
exception:
The factors that courts generally consider
in determining whether to characterize an
asset sale as a de facto merger are whether
Milliken Co. v. Duro Textiles, LLC, 887 N.E.2d 244, 254–55 (Mass. 2008)
(citations omitted) (quoting Guzman v. MRM/Elgin, 567 N.E.2d 929, 931
(Mass. 1991)); Carreiro v. Rhodes Gill and Co., Ltd., 68 F.3d 1443, 1447 (1st
Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); JSB Indus., Inc. v. Nexus Payroll Servs., Inc., 463
F. Supp. 2d 103, 109 (D. Mass. 2006) (quoting Guzman, 567 N.E.2d at 931).
491

Guzman, 567 N.E.2d at 933 (quoting Mason v. General Motors Corp., 490
N.E.2d 437, 442 (Mass. 1986)).

492

Scott v. NG U.S. 1, Inc., 854 N.E.2d 981, 992 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006), rev’d,
450 Mass. 760 (2008); Goguen v. Textron Inc., 476 F. Supp. 2d 5, 12 (D. Mass.
2007).
493

Milliken, 887 N.E.2d at 255 (quoting National Gypsum Co. v. Cont’l Brands
Corp., 895 F. Supp. 328, 336 (D. Mass. 1995)).

494
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(1) there is a continuation of the
enterprise of the seller corporation so that
there is continuity of management,
personnel, physical location, assets, and
general business operations; whether (2)
there is a continuity of shareholders
which results from the purchasing
corporation paying for the acquired assets
with shares of its own stock, this stock
ultimately coming to be held by the
shareholders of the seller corporation so
that they become a constituent part of the
purchasing corporation; whether (3) the
seller corporation ceases its ordinary
business operations, liquidates, and
dissolves as soon as legally and practically
possible; and whether (4) the purchasing
corporation assumes those obligations of
the seller ordinarily necessary for the
uninterrupted continuation of normal
business operations of the seller
corporation . . . . No single factor is
necessary or sufficient to establish a de
facto merger . . . . 495
Thus, under Massachusetts law, continuity of ownership is not a
threshold requirement for finding a de facto merger; however, “[i]n
determining whether a de facto merger has occurred, courts pay particular
attention to the continuation of management, officers, directors and
shareholders.” 496 “[I]mposition of successor liability does not depend on
the status of a particular creditor as secured or unsecured” or on the
solvency or insolvency of the predecessor; “rather, the analysis focuses
Cargill, Inc. v. Beaver Coal & Oil Co., 676 N.E.2d 815, 818 (Mass. 1997)
(citations omitted) (citing In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor
Proceedings re Alleged PCB Pollution, 712 F. Supp. 1010, 1015 (D. Mass.
1989)); see also Milliken, 887 N.E.2d at 255; Gregorio v. Excelergy Corp., No.
07-2754BLS2, 2008 WL 2875430, at *4 (Mass. Super. 2008); Goguen, 476 F.
Supp. 2d at 12–14; JSB Indus., Inc., 463 F. Supp. 2d at 109–10; (quoting Acushnet,
712 F. Supp. at 1015); Scott, 854 N.E.2d at 991; Am. Paper Recycling Corp. v.
IHC Corp., 707 F. Supp. 2d 114, 119–20 (D. Mass. 2010) (citations omitted).

495

496

Cargill, 676 N.E.2d at 819.
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on whether one company has become another for purposes of its
corporate debt.” 497
In Massachusetts there is also no requirement that the
predecessor be formally dissolved. 498 “Rather, the principles of
successor liability will be imposed where a corporation ceases all of its
ordinary business operations, which are assumed by another corporation,
and liquidates its assets. When this occurs, the predecessor corporation,
for all practical purposes, has ceased to exist.” 499 In addition, Cargill
allows for the finding of a de facto merger when stock is only part of the
value exchanged in the deal, though the court noted that “[w]here no
stock is exchanged, corporate successor liability has more frequently
been imposed on a theory of ‘continuity of enterprise.’” 500
In ruling that successor liability could be imposed under the de
facto merger and mere continuation exceptions, the Massachusetts
Supreme court in Milliken explained:
Here, it was undisputed that Old Duro
ceased its ordinary business operations
following the foreclosure sale, it currently
has no offices or employees, and the
former chief executive officer of Old
Duro is now the chief executive officer of
New Duro. Fundamentally, Old Duro, as
a dyer, printer, finisher, and distributor of
textile products, no longer exists. It sold
its operating assets to New Duro, thereby
enabling New Duro to maintain the same
production capabilities and sell the same
goods without any interruption to the
business. We recognize that Old Duro
did not legally dissolve as a corporate
entity. Instead, it changed its name and
now rents to New Duro the real estate
Milliken Co. v. Duro Textiles, LLC, No. BRCV2002-1364, 2005 WL
1791562, at *8 (Mass. Super. June 10, 2005).

497

498

Milliken, 887 N.E.2d at 256.

499

Id. (citations omitted).

500

Cargill, 676 N.E.2d at 819 n.8.
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that it still owns in Fall River and recovers
tax refunds.
Notwithstanding this
particular fact, only one among several
for consideration, we decline to elevate
form over substance by concluding that
the nature of Old Duro's corporate
existence as Chace Street trumps the
existence of New Duro as the successor
corporation on whom liability properly
should be imposed. The existence of
Chace Street simply does not undermine
the nonexistence of Old Duro as a going
concern. 501
Massachusetts: The Mere Continuation Exception
In Milliken the supreme court described the mere continuation
exception as consisting of “minimal indices” as well as flexible factors:
The “mere continuation” theory of
successor
liability
“envisions
a
reorganization transforming a single
company from one corporate entity into
another . . . .” “[T]he indices of a
continuation are, at a minimum:
continuity of directors, officers, and
stockholders; and the continued existence
of only one corporation after the sale of
assets . . . .” In essence, the purchasing
corporation “is merely a ‘new hat’ for the
seller.” . . . Similar to the considerations
underlying a finding of a “de facto
merger,” the factors characterizing a
continuing corporation are traditional
indicators, but no single factor is
dispositive, and the facts of each case
must be examined independently . . . . 502

501

Milliken, 887 N.E.2d at 256 (footnote omitted).

Id. at 255–56 (citations omitted) (quoting McCarthy v. Litton Indus., Inc.,
570 N.E.2d 1008, 1013); Bud Antle, Inc. v. Eastern Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d 1451,

502
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Massachusetts: The Fraud Exception
In Groman v. Watman, the court held that a sale that violated the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act satisfied the fraud exception to the
general rule of no successor liability. 503 There, the court concluded the
plaintiff had proven (1) “a transfer by the debtor[/predecessor], (2) a
debt owed to [the plaintiff by the debtor/predecessor] that preceded the
transfer, (3) that [the debtor/predecessor] did not receive a reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for what it transferred, and (4) that the
[debtor/predecessor] was insolvent at the time of the transfer, or became
insolvent as a result thereof.” 504 In addition, the court found that many
factors or “badges of fraud” were present that indicated an “actual intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor.” 505
In JSB Industries, Inc. v. Nexus Payroll Services, Inc., the federal
district court stated that the lack of a showing of inadequate
consideration was significant to the negation of allegations of fraud. 506
Massachusetts: The Continuity of Enterprise Exception
The Massachusetts Supreme Court in McCarthy v. Litton Indus.,
Inc. applied the continuity of enterprise exception using all four of the
Turner v. Bituminous considerations, including “retention of key personnel,
assets, general business operations, and. . . name”, as elemental criteria
for the inquisition. 508 The court decided that neither the mere
continuation nor the continuity of enterprise exceptions were applicable
to the given facts, and therefore declined to adopt the continuity of
507

1458 (11th Cir. 1985)); see also Gregorio v. Excelergy Corp., No. 07-2754BLS2,
2008 WL 2875430, at *5 (Mass. Super. 2008).
503 Groman v. Watman, 27 Mass. L. Rptr. 359, No. 0300646, 2010 WL
4244833, at *3–5 (Mass. Super. July 1, 2010); MASS. GEN. LAW. ANN. Ch.
109A (Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act), §§ 5 & 6.
504

Groman, 2010 WL 4244833, at *2.

505

Groman, 2010 WL 4244833, at *4.

506

463 F. Supp. 2d 103, 110–11 (D. Mass. 2006).

507

570 N.E.2d at 1013.

508

Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 883–84 (Mich. 1976).
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enterprise doctrine at that time. 509 The court did not state whether or
not it would adopt the continuity of enterprise exception if given the
proper set of facts but noted in a footnote that the exception was
“distinctly a minority approach.” 510

Michigan
Michigan recognizes five exceptions to the general rule of nonliability including the traditional four plus “where some of the elements
of a purchase in good faith [are] lacking, or where the transfer was
without consideration and the creditors of the transferor were not
provided for.” 511 Most importantly, Michigan expanded the continuation
exception to what has become known as the “continuity of enterprise”
exception. 512 The continuity of enterprise exception applies in the
context of products liability and not always in a purely commercial
context. 513
Gorge v. Rapid Advance LLC 514 bears mentioning. The case offers
no analysis regarding any of the exceptions to successor non-liability;
however, it does describe (in atypical terms) the general rule of successor
non-liability: “The mere fact that a corporation acquires all the assets of
another does not necessarily mean it will be liable for the obligations of
509

McCarthy, 570 N.E.2d at 1013.

510

McCarthy, 570 N.E.2d at 1013 n. 6.

Oliver v. Perry, No. 296871, 2011 WL 2204128, *6 (Mich. Ct. App. June 7,
2011), appeal denied, 490 Mich. 983, 806 N.W.2d 531 (2011) (quoting Turner, 244
N.W.2d at 878 n.3); see also Foster v. Cone-Blanchard Mach. Co., 597 N.W.2d
506, 509–510 (Mich. 1999) (the Turner v. Bituminous court recognized only the
four traditional exceptions at the time it expanded the “mere continuation”
exception); Starks v. Mich. Welding Specialists, Inc., 722 N.W.2d 888 (Mich.
2006); Jeffrey v. Rapid Am. Corp., 529 N.W.2d 644 (Mich. 1995); accord First
Presbyterian Church of Ypsilanti v. H.A. Howell Pipe Organs, Inc., 2010 WL
419972, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 1, 2010); Perceptron, Inc. v. Silicon Video, Inc.,
423 F. Supp. 2d 722, 727 (E.D. Mich. 2006).

511

512

See Turner, 244 N.W. 2d at 883.

513

Starks, 722 N.W.2d at 889.

514 Gorge v. Rapid Advance LLC, No. 10-11474, 2011 WL 679842, at *1 (E.D.
Mich. Feb. 16, 2011).
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its predecessor. If it is liable for the predecessor's obligations, however, it
will be subject to longarm jurisdiction in a suit to enforce the obligation
if the predecessor would have been subject to such jurisdiction.” 515
Michigan: The Express/Implied Assumption Exception
Michigan recognizes express or implied assumption of liabilities
as an exception to the general rule of successor nonliability. 516 The
Michigan appellate court has, at least on one occasion, concluded that,
where the facts and circumstances surrounding a purchase agreement as
well as a deposition of the successor’s vice-president, suggest the
possibility of implied assumption, summary judgment for the successor
is inappropriate. 517
Michigan: The Fraud Exception
“The general rule of nonliability holds except where the
transaction is fraudulent as to creditors of the transferor. The creditors
may then follow the property to the transferee. Indicia of fraud may be
inadequate consideration paid to the transferor, and/or lack of good
faith.” 518
Both the fraud and mere continuation exceptions share the
element of inadequacy of consideration. A Michigan appellate court
addressed a trial court’s application of the fraud exception in Gougeon
Bros., Inc. v. Phoenix Resins, Inc. 519 In reviewing the trial court’s holding of
successor liability, the court stated:
The trial court held that plaintiff
demonstrated that defendant was subject
to successor liability because the sale of
Matrix’ [the predecessor] assets was a
Gorge, 2011 WL 679842, at *4 (quoting Inter-Americas Ins. Corp. v. Xycor
Systems, Inc., 757 F.Supp. 1213, 1217 (Miss. 2006); Neagos v. v. ValmetAppleton, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 682, 688–89 (E. D. Mich. 1992)).
515

516

See Foster, 597 N.W.2d at 509–10.

Safeco Ins. Co. v. Pontiac Plastics & Supply Co., No. 214079, 2000 WL
33538535, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2000).

517

518

Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 886–87 (Coleman, J., dissenting).

519

No. 211738, 2000 WL 33534582, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2000).
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fraudulent transfer designed to defraud
Matrix’ creditors and because defendant
was a mere continuation of Matrix. To
support this holding, the court made the
following findings of fact: defendant
bought Matrix’ assets for $3,000, while
Matrix’ sales had exceeded $115,000; the
same
two
persons
were
equal
shareholders of both Matrix and
defendant; defendant conducts business
at same [sic] address as did Matrix; and
defendant notified Matrix’ distributors
that MAS epoxy was now one of
defendant’s products, that defendant
would pay any currently owed invoices,
and that the distributors should continue
to use Matrix literature until the new
literature was available . . . .
These
findings demonstrate, at least, that
defendant is a mere continuation of
Matrix. 520
Implicit in this holding is that the threshold for finding a mere
continuation may be lower than the threshold for a finding of fraud.
Michigan: The De Facto Merger Exception
The court in Turner v. Bituminous, though most interested in
fashioning the continuity of enterprise exception, cited Shannon v. Samuel
Langston Co. 521 for the requirements of a de facto merger:
(1) There is a continuation of the
enterprise of the seller corporation, so
that there is a continuity of management,
personnel, physical location, assets, and
general business operations.
(2) There is a continuity of shareholders
which results from the purchasing
520

Gougeon, 2000 WL 33534582, at *2.

521

379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
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corporation paying for the acquired assets
with shares of its own stock, this stock
ultimately coming to be held by the
shareholders of the seller corporation so
that they become a constituent part of the
purchasing corporation.
(3) The seller corporation ceases its
ordinary business operations, liquidates,
and dissolves as soon as legally and
practically possible.
(4) The purchasing corporation assumes
those liabilities and obligations of the
seller ordinarily necessary for the
uninterrupted continuation of normal
business operations of the seller
corporation. 522
The Turner court noted that “the general results of a [de facto] merger are
that [(1)] the acquired corporation ceases to exist, [(2)] the acquiring
corporation takes over the entire operation of the acquired corporation
and [(3)] shareholders of the acquired corporation become shareholders
of the acquiring corporation,” and held that all three of these criteria
must be present in order to fulfill the de facto merger doctrine and
override the traditional rule of successor non-liability. 523
Michigan: The Mere Continuation Exception
As noted by the dissent in Turner, the mere continuation
exception is “the most confused of the four exceptions.” 524 “[T]he
Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 891; (Coleman, J., dissenting) (quoting Shannon 379 F.
Supp. at 801); see also Craig v. Oakwood Hosp., 684 N.W. 2d 296, 314–15
(Mich. 2004) (holding there was no de facto merger “simply because . . . the
purchasing corporation paid cash, not stock”); Tassos Epicurean Cuisine, Inc.
v. Triad Bus. Solutions, Inc., No. 2:05-CV-71510-DT, 2007 WL 956745, at *9
(E.D. Mich. 2007); Bestfoods v. Aerojet-General Corp., 173 F. Supp. 2d 729,
757–58 (W.D. Mich. 2001).
522

523

Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 892 (Coleman, J. dissenting).

524

Id. (Coleman, J., dissenting).
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exception seems to encompass the situation where one corporation sells
its assets to another corporation with the same people owning both
corporations.” 525 A recent Michigan decision has elucidated the situation
though, stating that “[a] new entity with different owners and a different
business purpose does not constitute a mere continuation of the old
entity.” 526
The Sixth Circuit examined the disparity among Michigan cases
dealing with the mere continuation exception, noting that “[t]he only
indispensable prerequisites to application of the exception appear to be
common ownership and a transfer of substantially all assets.” 527 Further,
“[b]eside these two factors, the most important consideration appears to
be the nature of the business performed by the successor corporation—
that is, whether its ‘main corporate purpose was to conduct the same
business’ as its predecessor.” 528
Michigan: The Continuity of Enterprise Exception
The Turner court expanded the mere continuation exception,
essentially removing the commonality of shareholders requirement from
the de facto merger test. Thus, the court stated that the test for continuity
of enterprise is:
(1) there is continuation of the seller
corporation, so that there is a continuity
of management, personnel, physical
location, assets, and general business
operations
of
the
predecessor
corporation;
(2)
the
predecessor
corporation ceases its ordinary business
operations, liquidates, and dissolves as

525

Id. (Coleman, J., dissenting).

Belfor USA Group, Inc. v. Alexis Manor Apts., No. 281444, 2009 WL
609558, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Shue & Voeks v. Amentiy Design &
Mfg., 511 N.W.2d 700, 702 (Mich. 1993)).
526

Stramaglia v. United States, No. 08–2624, 2010 WL 1923764, at *3 (6th Cir.
2010) (footnote omitted) (citatations omitted).
527

Id. at *3 (citations omitted) (quoting Pearce v. Schneider, 242 Mich. 28, 31,
217 N.W. 761, 762 (1928)).

528
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soon as legally and practically possible;
and (3) the purchasing corporation
assumes those liabilities and obligations
of the seller ordinarily necessary for the
uninterrupted continuation of normal
business operations of the selling
corporation. . . . [A]n additional principle
relevant to determining successor liability
[is] whether the purchasing corporation
holds itself out to the world as the
effective continuation of the seller
corporation. 529
The court in Foster v. Cone-Blanchard concluded that this test “applies only
when the transferor is no longer viable and capable of being sued.” 530
The Michigan Supreme Court, in denying an application for leave to
appeal, indicated that the Turner exception is inapplicable outside of the
products liability context. 531

Minnesota
“Minnesota follows the traditional approach to corporate
successor liability.” 532 The Minnessota Supreme Court described the
approach as follows:

Foster v. Cone-Blanchard Mach. Co., 597 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Mich. 1999)
(footnote omitted) (citing Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 883–84).
529

530

597 N.W.2d at 511 (citations omitted).

531 Starks v. Michigan Welding Specialists, Inc., 772 N.W.2d 888, 889 (Mich.
2006) (“Because an exception designed to protect injured victims of defective
products rests upon policy reasons not applicable to a judgment creditor, the
Court declines to expand the exception to the traditional rule set forth in
Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976), to cases in
which the plaintiff is a judgment creditor.”); see also DeWitt v. Sealtex Co., Nos.
273387, 273390, 274255, 275931, 2008 WL 2312668, at *2–4 (Mich. Ct. App.
Jun 5, 2008).

Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96, 98 (Minn. 1989); see also
Noack v. Colson Const., Inc., 2009 WL 305114, at *9 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 10,
2009); Dunn v. National Beverage Corp., 729 N.W.2d 637, 645 (Minn. Ct. App.
2007), aff’d, 745 N.W.2d 549 (Minn. 2008).

532
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[W]here one corporation sells or
otherwise transfers all of its assets to
another corporation, the latter is not
liable for the debts and liabilities of the
transferor, except: (1) where the
purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to
assume such debts; (2) where the
transaction amounts to a consolidation or
merger of the corporation; (3) where the
purchasing corporation is merely a
continuation of the selling corporation;
and (4) where the transaction is entered
into fraudulently in order to escape
liability for such debts. 533
In addition to the four traditional exceptions, “[another]
exception, sometimes incorporated as an element of one of the
[traditional four] exceptions, is the absence of adequate consideration for
the sale or transfer.” 534
Minnesota: The Mere Continuation Exception
A Minnesota appellate court has listed factors that are to be
considered when making the determination of whether or not a
successor is the mere continuation of its predecessor. The test
articulated by the Huray court is as follows:
The
traditional
indications
of
“continuation” are: common officers,
directors, and shareholders; and only one
corporation in existence after the
completion of the sale of assets . . .
Other factors such as continuation of the
Niccum, 438 N.W.2d at 98 (alteration in original) (quoting J. F. Anderson
Lumber Co. v. Myers, 206 N.W.2d 365, 368–69 (Minn. 2015); see also Noack,
2009 WL 305114, at *9; Dunn, 729 N.W.2d at 645; Sweeter v. Power Indus.,
Inc., No. A05-2466, 2006 WL 2865329, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006); Knott v.
AMFEC, Inc., No. 09–CV–1098, 2010 WL 1528393, at *6 (D. Minn. April 15,
2010); A.P.I., Inc. v. Home Ins. 706 F. Supp. 2d 926, (D. Minn. March 31,
2010).
533

534 J. F. Anderson Lumber Co., 206 N.W.2d at 369 (citing McKee v. HarrisSeybold Co, Division of Harris-Intertype Corp., 264 A.2d 98, 102 (N.J. 1970)).
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seller's business practices and polices and
the sufficiency of the consideration
running to the seller corporation in light
of the assets being sold may also be
considered. To find that continuity exists
merely because there was common
management and ownership without
considering other factors is to disregard
the separate identities of the corporation
without the necessary considerations that
justify such an action. 535
Minnesota: The Fraud Exception
Minnesota’s successor liability fraud exception is governed by the
Minnesota Fraudulent Transfers Act, which can be found in section
513.44 of the Minnesota Statutes. 536

Mississippi
Mississippi courts recognize the four traditional exceptions to the
general rule of successor nonliability. 537 In addition, Mississippi has
adopted a variation of the “continuity of enterprise” exception and
accepts the “product line theory as a viable basis for recovery.” 538

Huray v. Fournier NC Programming, Inc., No. C9-02-1852, 2003 WL
21151772, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (citations omitted).

535

536 Matson Logistics, LLC v. Smiens, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77454, at *25 (D.
Minn. 2012); see also Sweeter, 2006 WL 2865329, at *4.

See Paradise Corp. v. Amerihost Dev., Inc., 848 So. 2d 177, 179–80 (Miss.
2003); see also Stanley v. Mississippi State Pilots of Gulfport, Inc., 951 So. 2d
535, 538 (Miss. 2006).

537

Beck v. Koppers, Inc., Nos. 3:03CV60-P-D, 3:04CV160-P-D, 2006 WL
2228911, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 7, 2006); Paradise Corp., 848 So. 2d at 180
(continuity of enterprise); Huff v. Shopsmith, Inc., 786 So. 2d 383, 388 (Miss.
2001); Gregory ex rel. v. Central Sec. Life Ins. Co., 953 So. 2d 233, 238 (Miss.
2007) (acknowledging that Huff had accepted the product-line exception);
Stanley, 951 So. 2d at 539–40 (quoting the Paradise factors for continuity of
enterprise).
538
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Mississippi: The Continuity of Enterprise Exception
stated:

In Paradise Corporation v. Amerihost Development, Inc., the court
[Continuity of enterprise] considers the
traditional [mere continuation] factors as
well as other factors such as: (1) retention
of the same employees; (2) retention of
the same supervisory personnel; (3)
retention of the same production facilities
in the same physical location; (4)
production of the same product; (5)
retention of the same name; (6) continuity
of assets; (7) continuity of general
business operations; and (8) whether the
successor holds itself out as the
continuation of the previous enterprise. 539

This test is applicable where the “successor takes on the identity
of the predecessor company in every way except taking responsibility for
the predecessor’s debts.” 540 The Paradise court borrowed its analysis
from a Fifth Circuit case, Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 541 in which it was
made clear that the continuity of enterprise test adds more factors but
does not treat the common ownership factor as dispositive.
Mississippi: The Product Line Theory
The Mississippi Supreme Court explained the product line
exception as follows:
[U]nder the product line theory, successor
corporations which undertake the
manufacture of the same products as the
predecessor are liable for injuries caused
by the defects in that product and inherit
the liabilities associated with the product
Paradise Corp., 848 So. 2d at 180 (citing Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752
F.2d 168, 174 (5th Cir. 1985)); see also Stanley, 951 So. 2d at 540.
539

540

Paradise Corp., 848 So. 2d at 180.

541

Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 175 (5th Cir. 1985).
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even if sold and manufactured by the
predecessor corporation. . . . [C]ertain
elements must be present to subject a
successor corporation to liability for the
products of a predecessor. The successor
must produce the same product under a
similar name, have acquired substantially
all of the predecessor’s assets leaving no
more than a corporate shell, hold itself
out to the public as a mere continuation
of the predecessor, and benefit from the
good will of the predecessor. 542
Mississippi: The Fraud Exception
The Mississippi Supreme Court stated in Stanley v. Mississippi State
Pilots of Gulfport, Inc. 543 that the determination of whether or not a
transaction is fraudulent for purposes of successor liability is governed
by the Mississippi Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act; this piece of
legislation was enacted in 2006 and can be found in sections 15-3-101
through 15-3-121 of the Mississippi Code Annotated. 544

Missouri
Missouri follows the general rule of successor liability and
recognizes the four traditional exceptions. 545 The Missouri Court of
Appeals in Chemical Design, Inc. v. Am. Standard, Inc. addressed the
542 Huff,

786 So. 2d at 387–88 (citing Ramirez v. Amstead Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d
811, 825 (N.J. 1981)); Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 8–11 (Cal. 1977)); see also
Gregory, 953 So. 2d at 238; Sharp v. Atwood Mobile Products, No. 2:12–CV–
82–KS–MTP, 2012 WL 3024726, at *3 (S.D. Miss. July 24, 2012).
Stanley v. Mississippi State Pilots of Gulfport, Inc., 951 So. 2d 535, 540
(Miss. 2006).

543

544

Id. at 540.

Chem. Design, Inc. v. Am. Standard, Inc., 847 S.W.2d 488, 491 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1993); see also Med. Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. S.B.S. Pill Dr., Inc., 336 F.3d 801,
803 (8th Cir. 2003); ARE Sikeston Ltd. P’ship v. Weslock Nat’l, et. al., 120 F.3d
820, 828 (8th Cir.1997); Wallace v. Dorsey Trailers Se., Inc., 849 F.2d 341, 343
(8th Cir. 1988); Young v. Fulton Iron Works Co., 709 S.W.2d 927, 938 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1986).
545
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possibility of extending successor liability through the adoption of the
continuity of enterprise and product line exceptions, ultimately choosing
not to adopt either. 546 Public policy in Missouri favors successor liability
in cases involving nursing homes to prevent successors from avoiding
paying sanctions and penalties imposed against the predecessor. 547
The general rule in Missouri is that when all of the assets of a
corporation are sold or transferred the transferee is not liable for the
transferor's debts and liabilities. There are, however, four exceptions to
the general rule of nonliability . . . (1) where the purchaser expressly or
impliedly agrees to assume the debts or liabilities of the transferor; (2)
where the transaction amounts to a merger or consolidation; (3) where
the purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the selling
corporation; or (4) where the transaction is entered into fraudulently for
the purpose of escaping liability for the debts and liabilities of the
transferor. 548
Missouri: The Fraud Exception
In general, Missouri seems to treat fraud claims as those where
actual fraud is demonstrated and considers “continuation” and de facto
merger exceptions as a species of constructive fraud. 549

Chem. Design, 847 S.W.2d at 492 (“[C]ourts in Missouri have not seen fit to
depart from the traditional distinction between corporate mergers or the sale
and purchase of outstanding stock of a corporation, whereby preexisting
corporate liabilities also pass to the surviving corporation or to the purchaser,
and the sale and purchase of corporate assets which eliminates successor
liability.”). But see Roper Elec. Co. v. Quality Castings, Inc., 60 S.W.3d 708,
711–12 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (distinguishing the case from Chem. Design by
qualifying that opinion as one including the “extent of the involvement of prior
officers . . . as consultants.”).
546

Cedar Hill Manor, LLC v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 145 S.W.3d 447, 454 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2004).
547

ARE Sikeston Ltd. P’ship, 120 F.3d at 828 (citing Chem. Design, Inc. v. Am.
Standard, Inc., 847 S.W.2d 488, 491 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Ernst v. Ford Motor
Co., 813 S.W.2d 910, 917 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991)).
548

549 See Ingram v. Prairie Block Coal Co., 5 S.W.2d 413, 416–17 (Mo. 1928); see
also Sweeney v. Heap O’Brien Mining Co., 186 S.W. 739 (Mo. Ct. App. 1916).
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Missouri: The Express/Implied Assumption Exception
Missouri courts have not analyzed the express/implied
assumption exception to the general rule of successor nonliability.
Missouri: The Mere Continuation Exception
In Chemical Design, Inc. v. American Standard, Inc., the Missouri
Court of Appeals noted that Missouri continues to adhere to the concept
that the phrase “continuation of the corporation” should be applied
literally, necessitating the continuation of the corporate organization,
management, and operations, rather than merely the continuation of the
enterprise or the product line. 550 In Roper Elec. Co. v. Quality Castings, Inc.,
the Missouri Court of Appeals stated that “Missouri case law strongly
leans toward the view that a lack of identity of officers, directors, and
shareholders does not preclude a finding of corporate continuation, but that
such identity is merely one factor in making this determination.” 551 The
court went on to state that, “[i]n Missouri, identity of the officers,
directors, and shareholders for both corporations (although a substantial
factor) is not a precursor to invocation of the ‘corporate continuation’
doctrine . . . . [A]lthough the ‘identity’ factor is a ‘key’ element to be
considered, the lack thereof (standing alone) does not mandate reversal
of [a] trial court’s judgment.” 552 The court noted that other jurisdictions
take a contrary view and require “identity of officers, directors, and
shareholders in both corporations before a corporate continuation can

Chem. Design, Inc. v. American Standard, Inc., 847 S.W.2d 488, 493 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1993); see also Young v. Fulton Iron Works Co., 709 S.W.2d 927 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1986).
550

Roper Elec. Co. v. Quality Castings, Inc., 60 S.W.3d 708, 711 (Mo. Ct. App.
2001) (emphasis in original); see also Osborn v. Prime Tanning Corp., No. 09–
6082–CV–SJ–GAF, 2010 WL 1935980, at *9 (W.D. Mo. May 11, 2010);
Sundance Rehab. Corp. v. New Vision Care Assocs. II, Inc., No. 04-3571-CVS-FJG, 2006 WL 2850556, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 29, 2006); Boycom Cable
Vision, Inc. v. Howe, No. 1:04CV 38 LMB, 2006 WL 2727984, at *5 (E.D. Mo.
Sept. 22, 2006).

551

Roper Elec. Co., 60 S.W.3d at 712 (citing Flotte v. United Claims, Inc., 657
S.W.2d 387, 389 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Brockmann v. O'Neill, 565 S.W.2d 796,
798 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978)).

552
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be found to exist[,]” but that “Missouri does not ascribe to this . . .
view.” 553
Missouri: The De Facto Merger Exception
The court in Harashe v. Flinkote, Co. used the term “elements” in
setting out the test for a de facto merger but then stated that not all were
necessary in order to satisfy this exception; this view would appear to
indicate that they are factors to be considered (indicators) rather than
elements (requirements):
The elements of a de facto merger are: (1) a
continuation of management and
personnel
and
general
business
operations; (2) a continuity of
shareholders
resulting
from
the
purchasing corporation paying for the
assets with shares of its own stock so the
selling corporation stockholders become
a constituent part of the purchasing
corporation; (3) the seller corporation
ceasing ordinary business operation and
dissolving as soon as possible; and (4) the
purchasing corporation assuming those
obligations necessary to continue normal,
ordinary business operations . . . . It is
not necessary to find all the elements to
find a de facto merger. 554
The court in Harashe found that the facts satisfied all of the
considerations (be they elements or factors) listed.
There, the
predecessor, Zonolite, was purchased by the successor, Grace, under an
agreement where Zonolite would be dissolved as soon as possible, and
Grace would assume all obligations of Zonolite necessary to continue
the ordinary business of the predecessor. 555 Even though the agreement
553

Roper Elec. Co., 60 S.W.3d at 712 (emphasis omitted).

Harashe v. Flinkote Co., 848 S.W.2d 506, 509 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (citing15
WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7124.40 (rev. perm. ed. 1983)); see also Osborn, 2010
WL 1935980, at *7.
554

555

Harashe, 848 S.W.2d at 509.
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was “delineated as a reorganization through a purchase of assets, it
satisfied the test for a de facto merger.” 556

Montana
In Buck v. Billings Montana Chevrolet, Inc., the Supreme Court of
Montana described the state of of successor liability law in that state:
A successor corporation can be liable for
the debts of its predecessor, if it is merely
a continuation or reincarnation of the
first corporation. Generally, however,
before a corporation can be deemed a
successor, certain showings must be
made.
For example, it is generally
required that the plaintiff establish that
insufficient consideration ran from the
new company to the old and that only
one corporation existed at the completion
of the transfer. 557
The Buck court ultimately concluded that successor liability
should not be imposed in the case, stating:
The facts here do not support the
conclusion that Frontier Montana is a
successor corporation to Billings
Montana Chevrolet. According to the
record Billings Montana Chevrolet sold
some assets to Frontier-Montana.
However, Billings Montana Chevrolet has
actively remained in business and holds
equipment and real property received
from the sale of Frontier-Delaware. There
is no evidence that there was fraud in the
sale of the corporate assets from Billings
Montana Chevrolet to Frontier-Montana
or lack of consideration that would justify

556

Id.

Buck v. Billings Montana Chevrolet, Inc., 811 P.2d 537, 543 (Mont. 1991)
(citations omitted) (citing 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 271 (1964)).

557
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a finding that it was a successor
corporation. 558
Since the decision in Buck, there does not appear to have been a
published opinion in Montana addressing successor liability. In Hanson v.
Dix, an unpublished opinion, the Supreme Court of Montana held that
the successor owner of hotel was not liable for its predecessor's wrongful
discharge of an employee where the predecessor did not transfer the
hotel in order to escape liability (rather, he died) and where the successor
had no notice of a legal obligation owed to the former employee. 559 A
2008 published opinion mentions claims of successor liability in the
plaintiff’s amended complaint, but the case was decided on other
grounds. 560

Nebraska
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has addressed successor liability
at least three times: twice in the context of products liability and once in
the context of successor liability for contracts. 561 The Nebraska Supreme
Court first adopted the traditional rule of successor nonliability in asset
sales, excluding for the four traditional exceptions, in Jones v. Johnson
Mach. & Press Co. of Elkhart, Indiana. 562 The court listed the four
exceptions as follows:
(1) When the purchasing corporation
expressly or impliedly agreed to assume
the selling corporation's liability; (2)
558

Buck, 811 P.2d at 543.

559 Hanson v. Dix, 100 P.3d 167 (Table), No. 03-605, 2004 WL 2095539, at *3
(Mont. Sep. 21, 2004).

See Tin Cup Cnty. Water v. Garden City Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 200 P.3d
60, 70 (Mont. 2008).

560

See Earl v. Priority Key Servs., Inc., 441 N.W.2d 610 (Neb. 1989) (successor
liability action based on contractual relationship with predecessor); Timmerman
v. Am. Trencher, Inc., 368 N.W.2d 502 (Neb. 1985) (successor products
liability action based on an allegedly defective drop hammer);
Jones v. Johnson Mach. & Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481 (Neb. 1982) (successor
products liability action based on an allegedly defective punch press).

561

562

Jones, 320 N.W.2d at 484.
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When the transaction amounts to a
consolidation or merger of the purchaser
and seller corporations; (3) When the
purchaser corporation is merely a
continuation of the seller corporation; or
(4) When the transaction is entered into
fraudulently to escape liability for such
obligations. 563
The court next noted that some courts “have developed and
applied a theory in products liability cases which imposes liability on
successor corporations without regard to the ‘niceties’ of corporate
transfers where the successor acquires and continues the predecessor’s
business in an essentially unchanged manner.” 564 The court identified
three different theories used to “expand the focus of legal liability:” the
de facto merger (citing Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co.), 565 continuity of
enterprise (citing Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co.), 566 and the product-line
exception (citing Ray v. Alad Corp. 567). 568 However, the court decided not
to depart from the traditional exceptions under the facts of the case
before them, finding “no basic justification” for departing from the
traditional rule. 569
Although many states treat de facto merger as a traditional
exception, the court in Jones viewed it as a more expansive theory, stating:
“Various theories have been adopted to expand the focus of legal
liability. Some courts have looked to the nature and consequences of the
transaction and found a de facto merger for product liability purposes

563

Id. at 483.

564

Id. at 484.

565

Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974).

566

Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976).

567

Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977).

568

Jones, 320 N.W.2d at 483.

569

Id. at 484.
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even though the formal characteristics of a corporate merger were not
present.” 570
In Farris Engineering, Inc. v. Folgers Architects & Facility Design, Inc., a
Nebraska appellate court applied a de facto merger test while addressing
the mere continuation exception (see below). 571
Nebraska: The Mere Continuation Exception
In Timmerman v. American Trencher, Inc., the Nebraska Supreme
Court analyzed the factors necessary for the mere continuation
exception, a task which had not been undertaken in Jones. 572 Continuing
the business operations of a predecessor by itself is not enough to
constitute mere continuation. 573 “[A] commonality of officers, directors,
or stockholders is an important consideration in determining whether a
purchasing corporation is but a continuation of the corporate entity of a
selling corporation.” 574 The Timmerman court also looked back to a 1903
Nebraska case, Douglas Printing Co. v. Over, 575 reiterating two factors
considered in the continuation analysis: “[(1) T]here was commonality of
both ownership and leadership between the selling and purchasing
corporations, and . . . [(2) the] creation of the purchasing corporation
simply became a means of refinancing a major secured debt of the selling
corporation.” 576
570 Id.;

see Shannon 379 F. Supp. 797.

Farris Eng’g, Inc. v. Folgers Architects & Facility Design, Inc., Nos. A-991384, A-99-1385, 2001 WL 47017, at *5–6 (Neb. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2001).
571

572

Timmerman v. Am. Trencher, Inc., 368 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Neb. 1985).

Id. at 505 (“The mere fact that the purchaser continues the operations of the
seller does not of itself render the purchaser liable for the obligations of the
seller; to impose liability on the purchaser, it must be shown that the purchaser
represents “merely a ‘new hat’ for the seller” (quoting Armour-Dial, Inc. v.
Alkar Eng’g Corp., 469 F. Supp. 1198, 1201 (E.D. Wis. 1979)).
573

Timmerman, 368 N.W.2d at 506 (citing Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d
437 (7th Cir. 1977); Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977);
Armour-Dial, Inc. v. Alkar Engineering Corp., 469 F. Supp. 1198, 1201 (E.D.
Wis. 1979); Weaver v. Nash Intern., Inc., 562 F. Supp. 860 (S.D. Iowa 1983).
574

575

Douglas Printing Co. v. Over, 95 N.W. 656 (Neb. 1903).

576

Timmerman, 368 N.W.2d at 506.
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In Farris Engineering, Inc. v. Folgers Architects & Facility Design, Inc., a
Nebraska appellate court reversed a summary judgment order holding
the defendant liable as successor under the mere continuation
exception. 577 In its analysis, the court relied on Timmerman as well as
various de facto merger factors, stating:
The trial court based its decision on the
third exception set out in Timmerman v.
American Trencher, Inc., stating that as a
matter of law, FAL was a mere
continuation
of
FAFD
[(Folgers
Architects & Facility Design)].
The factors for establishing a de facto
merger are that (1) there is a continuation
of the enterprise of the seller corporation,
so that there is a continuity of
management, personnel, physical location,
assets, and general business operations;
(2) there is a continuity of shareholders
which results from the purchasing
corporation paying for the acquired assets
with shares of its own stock, this stock
ultimately coming to be held by the
shareholders of the seller corporation so
that they become a constituent part of the
purchasing corporation; (3) the seller
corporation ceases its ordinary business
operations, liquidates, and dissolves as
soon as legally and practically possible;
and (4) the purchasing corporation
assumes those liabilities and obligations
of the seller ordinarily necessary for the
uninterrupted continuation of normal
business operations of the seller
corporation. 578

Farris Eng’g, Inc.. v. Folgers Architects & Facility Design, Inc., Nos. A-991384, A-99-1385, 2001 WL 47017, at *5–6 (Neb. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2001).
577

Farris, 2001 WL 47017, at *5 (citing Hernandez v. Johnson Press Corp., 388
N.E.2d 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).

578
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The court concluded:
In contrast [to Timmerman], in the instant
case, the facts support an inference that
FAL is not merely a continuation of
FAFD. The record shows that although
FAFD and FAL share common officers,
there is no commonality regarding FAFD
and FAL's shareholders and directors.
While both Folgers and Pappalardo were
shareholders and directors at FAFD,
Pappalardo is FAL's sole shareholder and
director. Given these facts, we conclude
that reasonable minds may differ as to
whether the inference that FAL is merely
a continuation of FAFD can be drawn.
Thus, we conclude that the trial court
erred in concluding as a matter of law that
FAL was merely a continuation of FAFD,
and we reverse that portion of the trial
court's order granting summary judgment
in favor of Farris on its contract action. 579
In the context of contractual successor liability, the Nebraska
Supreme Court found a successor to be liable for contractual obligations
of its predecessor where the parties described their relationship to
customers and employees as a merger (even though it was an asset
purchase), the business continued to provide the same service at the
same address to the same customers with the same employees, and the
predecessor virtually went out of business. 580 To date, no Nebraska case
has addressed the fraud or express/implied assumption exceptions to the
traditional rule.

Nevada
In 2005, the Nevada Supreme Court reaffirmed its adherence to
the traditional four exceptions to the general rule of successor nonliability in asset purchases and declined to adopt the continuity of

579

Farris, 2001 WL 47017, at *6.

580

Earl v. Priority Key Servs., Inc., 441 N.W.2d 610, 613-14 (Neb. 1989).
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581

enterprise exception in the negligence context. Additionally, the court
stated: “We will leave the consideration of this exception in CERCLA
and products liability claims for another day.” 582 It is difficult to predict
whether the Nevada Supreme Court would adopt the continuity of
enterprise exception. This court noted that “[c]ourts have adopted the
expanded doctrine in the limited circumstance of products liability
because they recognized that sound public policy favors the protection
of the public against dangerous products.” 583 However, the court also
stated that it was persuaded by the fact that “the trend in other
jurisdictions appears to be away from the expansion of successor
liability” and “in favor of retaining the traditional rule on
non-liability.” 584
The court set forth the following test for de facto merger’s: “(1)
whether there is a continuation of the enterprise, (2) whether there is a
continuity of shareholders, (3) whether the seller corporation ceased its
ordinary business operations, and (4) whether the purchasing
corporation assumed the seller's obligations.” 585 It noted that “some
courts give great weight to the question of whether the consideration
given by the seller consists of shares of the seller's own stock” but
concluded that the factors should be weighed equally, and therefore no
single factor is “'either necessary or sufficient to establish a de facto
merger.” 586 The court opined that “[t]his approach is more reasonable
because it properly balances the successor corporation's rights to be free
from liabilities incurred by its predecessor, with the important interest
involved in ensuring that ongoing businesses are not able to avoid

Village Builders 96, L.P. v. U.S. Labs., Inc., 112 P.3d 1082, 1087, 1091 (Nev.
2005).

581

582

Id. at 1091.

583 Id. at 1091 (citing Roll v. Tracor, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1083 (D. Nev.
2001); Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977)).

Village Builders, 112 P.3d at 1091 (quoting MBII v. PSI, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 778,
781 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)).

584

585

Id. at 1087.

Id. (quoting Kleen Laundry I, 817 F. Supp. at 230–31 (quoting In re Acushnet
River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1010, 1015 (D. Mass.1989))).

586
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liability by transferring their assets to another corporation that continues
to operate profitably as virtually the same entity.” 587
In applying the mere continuation exception, the court noted
that “[o]ne federal district court has opined that ‘the gravamen of the
“mere continuation” exception is the continuation of corporate control
and ownership, rather than continuation of business operations.’ Many
courts have likewise concluded that the key inquiry in resolving this issue
is whether there exists a continuation of the corporate entity. We
agree.” 588

New Hampshire
New Hampshire courts follow the general rule of successor
nonliability for asset purchases and recognize the four traditional
exceptions: express or implied assumption, de facto merger, mere
continuation, and fraud. 589 In Bielagus v. EMRE of New Hampshire Corp.,
the New Hampshire Supreme Court expressly rejected the product-line
exception and other “risk spreading” doctrines (including the continuity
of enterprise exception). 590 The court has also stated unequivocally that
Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., Inc. 591 does not represent a valid interpretation of

587

Id. at 1088.

Id. at 1091–92 (quoting East Prairie R-2 School Dist. v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,
813 F. Supp. 1396, 1400 (E.D. Mo. 1993)).
588

See J.G.M.C.J. Corp. v. C.L.A.S.S., Inc, 924 A.2d 400, 405-06 (N.H. 2007);
Thompson v. C&C Research & Dev. LLC, 898 A.2d 495, 501 (N.H. 2006);
Bielagus v. EMRE of New Hampshire Corp., 826 A.2d 559, 564 (N.H. 2003);
see also Members of Beede Site Group v. Fed Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No.
09-370 S, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30185 (D.N.H. 2011) (discussing standard of
CERCLA, de facto merger, and mere continuation successor liability).
589

See Bielagus, 826 A.2d at 569; Simoneau v. S. Bend Lathe, Inc., 543 A.2d 407
(N.H. 1988); see also Appeal of SAU #16 Coop. Sch. Bd., 103, 719 A.2d 613,
617 (N.H. 1998) (using federal successor liability standard); Russell v. Philip D.
Moran, Inc., 449 A.2d 1208, 1209–10 (N.H. 1982) (contractual indemnification
and warranty claims could be viable under a theory of successor liability);
Zimmerman v. Suissevale, Inc., 438 A.2d 290, 292 (N.H. 1981) (successor
liability under stock purchase agreement).

590

591

Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., Inc., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974).
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592

New Hampshire law. To date, no New Hampshire case has dealt with
the fraud or express/implied assumption exceptions to the traditional
rule of successor non-liability.
New Hampshire: The De Facto Merger Exception
The New Hampshire Supreme Court addressed the de factor
merger exception in detail in Bielagus, stating: “Under the de facto merger
exception, successor liability will be imposed ‘if the parties have achieved
virtually all of the results of a merger’ without following the statutory
requirements for merger of the corporations.” 593 Further, “a de facto
merger occurs when a company is completely absorbed into another
through a sale of assets; continues its operations by maintaining the same
management, personnel, assets, location and stockholders; but leaves its
creditors without a remedy for its outstanding debt.” 594 The court goes
on to say, “The fact-finder may look to other factors indicative of
commonality or distinctiveness with the corporations. ‘The bottom-line
question is whether each entity has run its own race, or whether there
has been a relay-style passing of the baton from one to the other.’” 595
The court also adopted the four, non-exclusive factor test
articulated in Kleen Laundry I:
(1) There is a continuation of the
enterprise of the seller corporation, so
that there is continuity of management,
personnel, physical location, assets, and
general business operations.
(2) There is a continuity of shareholders
which results from the purchasing
corporation paying for the acquired assets
Bielagus, 826 A.2d at 569; see also J.G.M.C.G. Corp. v. C.L.A.S.S. Inc., 924
A.2d 400, 405–07 (N.H. 2007).
592

Id. at 565 (quoting Kleen Laundry & Dry Cleaning v. Total Waste Mgt., 817
F. Supp. 225, 230 (D.N.H. 1993) (referred to as “Kleen Laundry I”).

593

594

Id. at 565.

Id. (quoting and citing 300 Pine Island Assocs., Inc. v. Stephen L. Cohen &
Assocs., P.A., 547 So. 2d 255, 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)); see also J.G.M.C.J.
Corp. v. C.L.A.S.S., Inc., 924 A.2d 400, 405 (N.H. 2007); Thompson v. C&C
Research & Dev. LLC, 898 A.2d 495, 501 (N.H. 2006).
595
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with shares of its own stock, this stock
ultimately coming to be held by the
shareholders of the seller corporation so
that they become a constituent part of the
purchasing corporation.
(3) The seller corporation ceases its
ordinary business operations, liquidates,
and dissolves as soon as legally and
practically possible.
(4) The purchasing corporation assumes
those obligations of the seller ordinarily
necessary
for
the
uninterrupted
continuation
of
normal
business
operations of the seller corporation. 596
The court noted that “[t]he factor that usually ‘tips the scales in favor of
finding a merger is continuity of ownership, usually taking the form of an
exchange of stock for assets.’” 597
New Hampshire: The Mere Continuation Exception
The Supreme Court noted in Bielagus that the mere continuation
exception is similar to that of the de facto merger. 598 The court explained:
“[U]nder the traditional application of the
‘mere continuation’ exception, the court
should not find a corporation to be the
continuation of a predecessor unless only
one corporation remains after the transfer
of assets and unless there is an identity of
stock, stockholders and directors between
the two corporations.”

Bielagus, 826 A.2d at 565-66 (citing Kleen Laundry I, 817 F. Supp. at 230-31);
see also J.G.M.C.G. Corp., 924 A.2d at 405; Thompson, 898 A.2d at 501.

596

Bielagus, 826 A.2d at 566 (quoting Devine & Devine Food v. Wampler
Foods, 313 F.3d 616, 619 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Welco Indus., Inc., v. Applied
Co., 617 N.E.2d 1129, 1134 (Ohio 1993))); see also J.G.M.C.G. Corp., 924 A.2d at
405.

597

598

Bielagus, 826 A.2d at 559.
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This traditional theory envisions a
corporate reorganization where one
company sells its assets to another
company under the same ownership.
Successor liability is imposed upon the
purchasing corporation because the
purchaser is merely the seller reincarnated
as a different entity. While continuity of
ownership is the key factor for imposing
successor liability under this exception,
some courts also look to the adequacy of
the consideration given in the asset sale
and to whether there is evidence of a
purchase made in good faith. 599

New Jersey
New Jersey courts recognize the four traditional exceptions to
the general rule of corporate successor nonliability, as well as a “‘fifth
exception, sometimes incorporated as an element of one of the above
exceptions[:] . . . the absence of adequate consideration for the sale or
transfer.’” 600 In 1981, the New Jersey Supreme Court also adopted the
Id. at 567–68 (citations omitted) (quoting Kleen Laundry I, 817 F. Supp. At
231 (citing Welco Indus., Inc. v. Applied Cos., 617 N.E.2d 1129, 1134 (Ohio
1993))); see also G.P. Publ’ns. v. Quebecor Printing, 481 S.E.2d 674, 680 (N.C.
1997).

599

Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811, 815 (N.J. 1981) (quoting
McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 264 A.2d 98 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970),
aff'd, 288 A.2d 585 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972), abrogated by Ramirez v.
Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811 (N.J. 1981)); see Marshak v. Treadwell, 595
F.3d 478, 490 (3d Cir. 2009); G-I Holdings, Inc. v. Bennet, 380 F. Supp. 2d 469
(D.N.J. 2005); see also Mark IV Transp. & Logistics, Inc. v. Lightning Logistics,
LLC, NO. 09-6480, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141721, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 28,
2012) (accord); Fink v. EdgeLink, Inc., No. 09-5078, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
42656, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2012) (accord); Menkevich v. Delta Tools, No. A1950-10T2, 2012 WL 986995, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 26, 2012);
Oticon, Inc. v. Sebotek Hearing Sys., LLC, No. 08-5489, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 93219, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 27, 2011) (accord); Ascencea LLC v. Zisook,
No. 08-5339, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36786, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 5, 2011)
(accord); Tatum v. Chrysler Group LLC, No.10-cv-4269, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 32362, at *8 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2011) (reciting general rule of successor
non-liability and the four traditional exceptions).
600
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product-line exception. 601 In doing so, the court stated it “has long
recognized the significance of the social policy of risk-spreading in
establishing the manufacturer’s duty to the product user under the
rapidly expanding principles of strict liability in tort.” 602 In New Jersey,
where successor liability has been found, the jury will assess the
defendant’s financial condition at the time of the wrongful conduct in
order to determine punitive damages. 603
New Jersey: The Express or Implied Assumption Exception
New Jersey courts have not extensively analyzed the express or
implied assumption exceptions to the general rule of corporate successor
nonliability. In McKee v. Harris-Seybold, Co., the court approached
assumption using a traditional contracts analysis, beginning with the
propositions:
A contract must be construed as a whole
and the language employed must be given
its ordinary meaning, in the absence of
anything to show that the language was
used in a different sense. Provisions of a
contract must be interpreted, if possible,

Ramirez, 431 A.2d at 825. (“[W]e hold that where one corporation acquires
all or substantially all the manufacturing assets of another corporation, even if
exclusively for cash, and undertakes essentially the same manufacturing
operation as the selling corporation, the purchasing corporation is strictly liable
for injuries caused by defects in units of the same product line, even if
previously manufactured and distributed by the selling corporation or its
predecessor.”); see also Bowen Eng’g v. Estate of Reeve, 799 F. Supp. 467
(D.N.J. 1992) (holding the product line exception adopted by Ramirez did not
apply to the case before it brought under CERCLA).
601

Ramirez, 431 A.2d at 820. But see Jenkins v. Anderson Mach. Sys., Inc., No.
A-3707-00T5, 2002 WL 31398172, at *6–7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 1,
2002) (unpublished opinion holding no successor liability based on operation of
similar business at predecessor’s location under similar name when successor
had not acquired assets of predecessor).
602

603

Tarr v. Bob Ciasulli’s Mack Auto Mall, Inc., 943 A.2d 866, 871 (N.J. 2008).
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so as to give effect to the general purpose
and intention of the parties. 604
Applying these general rules of construction, the court concluded that
the purchase agreement in question did not include any express
assumption by the purchasing corporation. 605
New Jersey: The Fraud Exception
Similar to the express or implied assumption exception, New
Jersey courts have not offered very much analysis regarding the fraud
exception. 606 In McKee, the court quickly disposed of both the fraud and
inadequate consideration exceptions. 607 While some jurisdictions have
concluded that inadequacy of consideration is the primary element of
fraud, the McKee court, though discussing both together, kept them
McKee, 264 A.2d at 102 (citations omitted) (citing Hudson County
Newspaper Guild v. Jersey Pub. Co., 88 A.2d 682 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div.1952); S.G. Young, Inc. v. B. & C. Distributors Co., 92 A.2d 519 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952)).

604

605

McKee, 264 A.2d at 102.

In a fraudulent transfer case that is roughly similar to a successor liability
action, in an unpublished opinion, Spikes v. Hamilton Farm Golf Club, LLC, No.
13-3669, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9088, at *10 (D.N.J. Jan. 22, 2014), the Federal
District Court for New Jersey confronted a plaintiff alleging that a golf club
transferred property to a business trust to “hinder, delay, or defraud any
creditor or debtor.” The court examined a number of factors for determining
fraudulent conveyance, including whether the transfer was to an insider; the
debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the
transfer; the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed; the transfer was
of substantially all the debtor’s assets; the value of consideration received by the
debtor was not reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred; and
the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was
made. The court held that the plaintiff’s allegations were insufficient, as the golf
club remained open for a substantial time after the transfer, and the plaintiffs
failed to show that the golf club was unable to pay its debts.
606

McKee, 264 A.2d at 106–07. (Although McKee has been overruled or severely
qualified by Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., 356 A.2d 458, 464 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1976) with regard to de facto merger and mere continuation, it appears to
remain good law in the areas of express or implied assumption of liabilities and
the fraud exception).
607
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analytically separate. The court quoted West Texas Refining & Dev. Co. v.
Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 608 stating:
It is equally well settled when the sale is a
bona fide transaction, and the selling
corporation receives money to pay its
debts, or property that may be subjected
to the payment of its debts and liabilities,
equal to the fair value of the property
conveyed by it, the purchasing
corporation will not, in the absence of a
contract obligation or actual fraud of
some substantial character, be held
responsible for the debts or liabilities of
the selling corporation. 609
Merrill Lynch Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Kupperman 610 provides a list of the
badges of fraud, derived from Gilchinsky v. Nat’l Westminister Bank N.J. 611
and New Jersey Statute § 25:2-26.
New Jersey: The Mere Continuation and De Facto Merger Exceptions
In Woodrick v. Jack. J. Burke Real Estate, Inc., a 1997 case, the court
noted that “[b]ecause [the mere continuation and de facto merger]
exceptions to the general rule of non-liability tend to overlap, with much
of the same evidence being relevant to each determination, these
exceptions are often treated in unison.” 612 “The standards for
West Texas Refining & Dev. Co. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 68 F.2d 77
(10th Cir. 1933).

608

McKee, 264 A.2d at 107 (quoting W. Tex. Refining & Dev. Co. v. Comm'r, 68
F.2d 77, 81 (10th Cir. 1933).

609

Merrill Lynch Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Kupperman, No. No. 064802DMC
MCA, 2010 WL 2179181, at *24 (D.N.J. May 28, 2010), aff'd, 441 F. App'x 938
(3d Cir. 2011).
610

611

Gilchinsky v. Nat’l Westminister Bank N.J., 732 A.2d 482, 489 (N.J. 1999).

612 Woodrick v. Jack J. Burke Real Estate, Inc., 703 A.2d 306, 312 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1997) (citing Glynwed, Inc. v. Plastimatic, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 265,
276 (D.N.J.1994)); see also Forman Indus., Inc. v. Blake-Ward, No. L-5332-06,
2008 WL 4191155, at *5 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Sept. 15, 2008); Einhorn v.
M.L. Ruberton Const. Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 463, 475–476 (D.N.J. 2009).
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application of the continuation theory of corporate successor liability are
not entirely clear.” 613 New Jersey decisions from the early 1970’s list
factors for a de facto merger, such as “transfer or sale of all assets,
exchange of stocks, change of ownership whereby stockholders, officers
and creditors go to the surviving corporation, and assumption of a
variety of liabilities pursuant to previously negotiated agreements.” 614
Elements needed to find a mere continuation include “use of the same
name, at the same location, with the same employees and common
identity of stockholders and directors.” 615 In McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., a
New Jersey superior court stated that continuity of interest was a
necessary, threshold requirement for mere continuation. 616 By 1991, one
superior court listed the factors to be considered for mere continuation as
“less than adequate consideration, common directorships or
management, and whether the transaction rendered the predecessor
entity incapable of satisfying its liabilities . . .” 617
The court Woodrick v. Jack. J. Burke Real Estate, Inc. listed the
following factors to be considered for both the mere continuation and de
facto merger exceptions:
In determining whether a particular
transaction amounts to a de facto

Tatum v. Chrysler Group LLC, No.10-cv-4269, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
32362, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2011).
613

614

Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., 356 A.2d 458, 464 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1976).

Id. at 464; see also Merrill Lynch Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Kupperman, 441
Fed. App’x 938, 941 (3d Cir. 2011) (offering a brief and vague description of
the mere continuatioin and de facto merger doctrines, concluding that one of the
defendants was liable thereunder due to proof of continuity of ownership,
continuity of management, continuity of a physical location, assets, and general
business operations, and cessation of the prior business of the predecessor
shortly after the successor entity was formed).
615

McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 264 A.2d 98, 106 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1970) (citing Bergman & Lefkow Ins. Ag. v. Flash Cab Co., 24 N.E.2d 729 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1969) (“For liability to attach, the purchasing corporation must
represent merely a ‘new hat’ for the seller.”).

616

Russell-Stanley Corp. v. Plant Indus., Inc., 595 A.2d 534, 547 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1991).

617
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consolidation or mere continuation, most
courts consider four factors: (i) continuity
of management, personnel, physical
location, assets, and general business
operations; (ii) a cessation of ordinary
business and dissolution of the
predecessor as soon as practically and
legally possible; (iii) assumption by the
successor of the liabilities ordinarily
necessary
for
the
uninterrupted
continuation of the business of the
predecessor; and (iv) continuity of
ownership/shareholders. 618
“Not all of these factors need be present for a de facto merger or
continuation to have occurred. Rather, [t]he crucial inquiry is whether
there was an ‘intent on the part of the contracting parties to effectuate a
merger or consolidation rather than a sale of assets.’” 619
When the plaintiff in the case contended that both the mere
continuation and de facto merger exceptions were inapplicable because
there was no continuity of ownership, the court stated, “[the plaintiff’s]
reliance on McKee for the proposition that a de facto merger is precluded
where the predecessor corporation receives no ownership interest in the
successor corporation, omits consideration of the more modern view of
New Jersey law as no longer requiring continuity of shareholder
interest.” 620 Applying the factors listed above, the court concluded:
“[b]ased on the foregoing facts, it appears that the intent of the asset
purchase transaction was to effectuate a merger of the two firms. This

618 Woodrick v. Jack J. Burke Real Estate, Inc., 703 A.2d 306, 312 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1997) (quoting Glynwed, Inc. v. Plastimatic, Inc., 869 F. Supp.
265, 276 (D.N.J. 1994) (applying New Jersey law on the issue of corporate
successor liability)).

Woodrick, 703 A.2d at 312 (citations omitted) (citing and quoting Luxliner
P.L. Export, Co. v. RDI/Luxliner, Inc., 13 F.3d 69, 73 (3rd Cir.1993) (applying
New Jersey law); see Berg Chilling Sys., Inc. v. Hull Corp., 435 F.3d 455, 462–63
(3d Cir. 2006); Marsdale v. Port Liberte Partners, No. L-5117-97, 2007 WL
92666, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App Div. Jan. 9, 2007).
619

620

Woodrick, 703 A.2d at 313.
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transaction resulted in nothing more than a change of hat for Burke, thus
constituting a mere continuation of the predecessor’s business.” 621
Thus, two courts have indicated that McKee v. Harris-Seybold does
not reflect the modern trend in New Jersey law. 622 Indeed, the court in
Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., stated that McKee’s application of both doctrines
was too narrow, limited, and harsh. 623
The right approach, according to Wilson, is to evaluate the
"continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets and
general business operations; [the] continuity of shareholders since the
purchasing corporation pays with its stock; [whether or not the] seller
ceases operations and dissolves; [and the] assumption of obligations
necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of normal business
operations," in order to determine whether a successor corporation is the
product of a de facto merger or a mere continuation. 624
Wilson rejected the "extremely limited" view set forth in McKee
and embraced the “more modern, fair-minded broad approach” in
which:
the most relevant factor is the degree to
which the predecessor's business entity
remains intact. The more a corporation
physically resembles its predecessor, the
more reasonable it is to hold the
successor fully responsible. In this way,
the innocent, injured consumer is
protected without the possibility of being
left without a remedy due to the
subsequent corporate history of the
manufacturer. 625
621

Id. at 314.

McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 264 A.2d 98, 106 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1970); see also Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., 356 A.2d 458, 464 (N.J. Ch. Div.
1976).

622

623

Wilson, 356 A.2d at 468.

624

Id. at 466.

625

Id.
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In Wilson, there were two predecessor companies. The court
found a de facto merger with regards to one predecessor and a
continuation as to the other. Thus, Wilson appears to reflect an
expansion of the doctrines of mere continuation and de facto merger in
New Jersey.
New Jersey: The Product Line Exception
In Ramirez v. Armsted Industries, Inc., 626 the Supreme Court of New
Jersey substantially adopted the product line analysis as articulated by the
California Supreme Court in Ray v. Alad. The Ramirez court applied the
same “three-fold justification” applied by the Ray court. The three
policy justifications from Ray are
(1) The virtual destruction of the
plaintiff’s remedies against the original
manufacturer caused by the successor’s
acquisition of the business, (2) the
successor’s ability to assume the original
manufacturer’s risk-spreading role, and
(3) the fairness of requiring the successor
to assume a responsibility for defective
products that was a burden necessarily
attached to the original manufacturer’s
good will being enjoyed by the successor
in the continued operation of the
business. 627
New Jersey’s application of the product line exception differs
most sharply from California’s application of the exception in that New
Jersey does not impose the same strict causation required by the first
prong of Ray. 628 In addressing the question of whether the product line

626

Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811, 819–20 (N.J. 1981).

627

Ray v. Alad, 560 P.2d 3, 9 (Cal. 1977).

LeFever v. K.P. Hovnanian Enter., Inc., 734 A.2d 290, 298–99 (N.J. 1999)
(“We believe, however, that the California court has focused on the first
justification for the product-line exception, specifically, that strict liability is
appropriate when the successor’s acquisition of the business has virtually
destroyed the plaintiff’s remedies, to the exclusion of the more dominant
themes.”).

628
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exception might apply to assets purchased at a bankruptcy sale, the court
opined,
We share the instinctive reaction of those
who hesitate to apply the product-line
exception to a successor at a bankruptcy
sale. At first glance, to apply the doctrine
to one who could be contemplating the
purchase of assets free and clear of any
predecessor liability seems unfair. That
concern turns out to be unfounded. 629
In justifying its departure from California’s more strict
application of the product line exception, the New Jersey Supreme Court
noted, “Ultimately, the question is whether the imposition of a duty on
the successor to respond to the complaints of its predecessor’s
customers is fair, when the successor trades on the loyalty of those
customers.” 630
On the same day that the New Jersey Supreme Court decided
Ramirez, 631 it also decided Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corp 632 in which it held
that the product line exception should be extended to include
intermediate successor corporations.
The court noted that the
intermediate corporation had contributed to the destruction of plaintiffs’
remedy against the original manufacturer and that the company “became
‘an integral part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise that
should bear the cost of injuries resulting from defective products.’” 633
This theory was employed again in 1998 in Class v. American Roller Die
Corp. 634 In both the Nieves and the Class cases, one of the key factors
Id. at 300; see also In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc., 467 B.R. 694, 697
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (applying New Jersey law and holding that the plaintiff’s
product line claims could not be foreclosed by a Bankruptcy Code § 363(f) sale
order that was entered before plaintiff’s injuries had occurred).

629

630

LeFever, 734 A.2d at 301.

631

Ramirez, 431 A.2d at 811.

632

Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corp., 431 A.2d 826, 831 (N.J. 1981).

633

Id. (quoting Ray v. Alad, 560 P.2d 3, 11 (Cal. 1977)).

Class v. Am. Roller Die Corp., 705 A.2d 390 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1998).

634
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influencing the court’s decision was that the intermediate companies
expressly retained liability for products sold prior to the asset sale when
they were liquidating the product line. This leaves the question open as
to whether or not intermediate successor corporations would be liable
under the product line theory if the companies they sold to were to
assume all liabilities as part of the sale. 635
The appellate court in Class went on to determine how fault
should be apportioned between multiple successor corporations. 636 The
court concluded that the Market Share method of apportionment was
most “fair,” imposing fault based on the number of units produced by
each successor corporation. 637 The court stated that this method most
comports with the policy reasons used to justify the imposition of
product line successor liability in the first place, namely each successor
corporation is liable for the portion of good will and benefit obtained
from their respective use of the original producers product line. 638 The
court then pointed out that data was not available on the number of
products sold by each corporation in this case. 639 It decided that in the
absence of data on number of units produced the court would apportion
fault based on the number of years that each company had actually
produced the product: 640
[I]t is fair and reasonable to apportion
plaintiff's damages among multiple

Nieves, 431 A.2d at 831–832; see also Class, v. Am. Roller Die Corp., 683 A.2d
595, 599 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1996) (published trial court decision affirmed without
further comment by Class, 705 A.2d 390, on the issue of whether successor
liability applied).
635

636

Class, 705 A.2d at 394–96.

637

Id. at 394.

Id. at 395 (“[T]he market share analysis ‘provides a ready means to apportion
damages among the defendants,’ by holding that ‘[e]ach defendant will be held
liable for the proportion of the judgment represented by its share of that
market unless it demonstrates that it could not have made the product which
caused plaintiff's injuries.’”) (quoting Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d
924, 937 (Cal. 1980)).

638

639

Id. at 394–96.

640

Id. at 394–95.
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successors based on the benefits received
from the product line as reflected by the
number of units produced, and in the
absence of that information, the number
of years that each corporation
manufactured the product. Similar to
damages apportioned based upon a
defendant's share of the market, these are
both appropriate measures to allocate
plaintiff's damages. . . . 641
The Class trial court also analyzed the potential affect of the
product line exception on a hypothetical company that had purchased a
product line through an asset sale but had ultimately never produced
anything from the line. 642 The court decided that such a company would
not be liable through the product line exception because such a company
did not actually receive a benefit from the assets or goodwill of the
predecessor—the hallmark of the Ramirez rationale for imposing
liability. 643 The Class appellate court did not review this determination, as
it was not contested by the parties. 644
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Mettinger v. Globe Slicing Mach.
Co. 645 decided the question of whether a defendant distributor or retailer
could use the product line exception to seek indemnification from a
corporate successor (normally, absent an asset sale, in New Jersey a
distributor can seek such indemnification against a manufacturer). 646
However, the court in Mettinger decided to expand the product line
exception to include defendant distributors and retailers. 647 It concluded
that, even though the principle purpose of the product line exception
was to provide a remedy to victims, applying the product line exception
641

Id. at 396.

642

Class, 683 A.2d 595, 606 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998).

643 Id.

at 606–07.

644 Class,

705 A.2d at 393 n.1.

645

Mettinger v. Globe Slicing Mach. Co., 709 A.2d 779 (N.J. 1998)

646

Id. at 783.

647

Id. at 783.
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to the defendant distributor seeking indemnification from the successor
manufacturer furthered the purpose ‘“of spreading the risk to society at
large for the costs of injuries from defective products.”’ 648 The court
stated:
“Public policy requires that having
received the substantial benefits of the
continuing manufacturing enterprise, the
successor corporation should also be
made to bear the burden of the operating
costs that other established business
operations must ordinarily bear . . . .”
Ordinarily, the manufacturer must bear
the cost of indemnifying entities lower in
the chain of distribution for injuries
caused by defects in its products . . . .
Therefore, the successor manufacturer
also must bear that cost. 649

New Mexico
The New Mexico Supreme Court first addressed the issue of
successor liability in Pankey v. Hot Springs National Bank, a 1941 case in
which the court adopted the four traditional exceptions to the general
rule of successor non-liability. 650 The Supreme Court of New Mexico
Id. at 785 (citations omitted) (quoting Ramirez v. Amstead Indus., Inc., 431
A.2d 811, 813 (N.J. 1981)).
648

649 Id.

at 785 (citations omitted) (quoting Ramirez, 431 A.2d at 822–23).

650 Pankey v. Hot Springs Nat. Bank, 119 P.2d 636, 640 (N.M. 1941) (quoting
W. Tex. Refining & Dev. v. Comm’r of Int. Rev., 68 F.2d 77, 81 (10th Cir.
1933)) (“‘The general rule is that where one corporation sells or otherwise
transfers all of its assets to another corporation, the latter is not liable for the
debts and liabilities of the transferor . . . . To this general rule there are four
well recognized exceptions, under which the purchasing corporation becomes
liable for the debts and liabilities of the selling corporation. (1) Where the
purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to assume such debts; (2) where the
transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of the corporations; (3)
where the purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the selling
corporation; and (4) where the transaction is entered into fraudulently to
escape liability for such debts . . . .’”).
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did not address successor liability in the context of products liability until
1997, when it recognized the four traditional exceptions as well as
adopted the product line exception. 651 In Garcia v. Coe Mfg. Co., the only
traditional exception potentially applicable to the facts of the case was
the mere continuation exception. 652 However, the court noted that
“[t]he ‘key element of a “continuation” is a common identity of officers,
directors and stockholders in the selling and purchasing
corporations.”’ 653 “Thus, the mere continuation exception ‘has no
application without proof of continuity of management and ownership
between the predecessor and successor corporations.’” 654 The Garcia
court, finding the mere continuation exception inapplicable, adopted the
product-line exception as articulated in Ray v. Alad. 655 The Garcia court
held that “[w]hen a successor corporation continues to market many of
the same products and represents to the public and its predecessor’s
customers that it is continuing the predecessor’s enterprise, it essentially
picks up where the predecessor left off.” 656

New York
The law of successor liability in New York appears unsettled in
several key areas. 657 In general, New York courts recognize the four
traditional exceptions to the general rule of nonliability for asset
purchasers. 658 In 2006, the Court of Appeals, New York’s court of last
651

See Garcia v. Coe Mfg. Co., 933 P.2d 243, 247–50 (N.M. 1997).

652

Id. at 246.

Id. at 247 (quoting Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 440 (7th Cir.
1977)).

653

654

Id. (quoting Pancratz v. Monsanto Co., 547 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa 1996)).

655

Id. at 248.

656

Id.

See In re Seventh Jud. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 788 N.Y.S.2d 579, 582–83 (N.Y.
2005).
657

658 Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 451 N.E.2d 195, 198 (N.Y. 1983); see
Battino v. Cornelia Fifth Ave., LLC, 861 F. Supp. 2d 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2012);
Semenetz v. Sherling & Walden, Inc., 851 N.E.2d 1170 (N.Y. 2006); BT Ams.
Inc. v. ProntoCom Mktg., Inc., 859 N.Y.S.2d 893 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008);
Morales v. N.Y., 849 N.Y.S.2d 406, 408–09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007); Hoover v.
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resort, expressly rejected the product line exception in Semenetz v. Sherling
& Walden, Inc., an issue which had previously split the Appellate
division. 659 The Semenetz court made no decision on the continuity of
enterprise exception, noting that the plaintiff was no longer relying on
that theory. 660 Although the continuity of enterprise exception was
adopted by a lower court in 1985, no New York court has adopted or
applied the exception since Semenetz was decided. 661
New York: The Express/Implied Assumption Exception
New York courts recognize the express or implied assumption
exception to the general rule of nonliability. In cases that have addressed
this exception, courts have looked at the language of the purchase
agreement and other sale documents in order to determine whether the
successor has expressly or impliedly assumed any of the liabilities of the
predecessor. 662
New Holland N. Am., Inc., 898 N.Y.S.2d 401, 402 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010); I &
G Lexington L.L.C. v. Ayers Serota Assocs., Inc., 836 N.Y.S.2d 39 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2007).
659 Semenetz, 851 N.E.2d at 1173–75; see also New York v. Nat’l Serv. Indus.,
Inc., 460 F.3d 201, 214 (2d Cir. 2006); Colon v. Multi-Pak Corp., 477 F. Supp.
2d 620, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Broydo v. Baxter D. Whitney & Sons, Inc., No.
36387/04, 2009 WL 1815092, at *2–3 (N.Y. Super. Ct. June 23, 2009).
660

Semenetz, 851 N.E.2d at 1173 n. 2.

See, e.g., Salvati v. Blaw-Knox Food & Chem. Equip., Inc., 497 N.Y.S.2d 242,
247 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (adopting the continuity of enterprise exception as
articulated in Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 879 (Mich.
1976)).

661

See, e.g., In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 493 F. Supp. 2d 723, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(finding successor corporation liable when they had assumed “all debts” of the
predecessor over objections of the successor that they did not assume the
“acts” of the predecessor. “[T]he issue is not the assumption of acts. It is the
assumption of liability for those acts.”); see also, e.g., Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., Inc. v. Canron, Inc., 373 N.E.2d 364, 364–65 (N.Y. 1977) (finding
no express or implied assumption by a successor in a purchase agreement);
Valenta Enters., Inc. v. Columbia Gas of N.Y., Inc., 455 N.Y.S.2d 996, 998
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (finding neither express assumption of liability nor
anything “presented to the court which would warrant a finding of implied
commitment to assume such responsibilities.”); Wensing v. Paris Indus., 558
N.Y.S.2d 692, 694 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (“The applicable documents in this
662
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New York: The Fraud Exception
New York courts recognize the exception to the general rule of
nonliability for asset purchasers where “the transaction is entered into
fraudulently to escape [tort] obligations.” 663 A federal court has held
that this exception would apply where the evidence demonstrates a
fraudulent conveyance under New York Debtor and Creditor Law §
276. 664 Under § 276 a fraudulent conveyance is one made “with actual
intent . . . to hinder, delay, or defraud either present or future creditors. .
. .” 665 The court in Silverman Partners LP v. Verox Group articulated the
test for a finding of fraud, holding that:
Circumstantial evidence may be used to
infer actual intent to defraud and there
are certain “badges of fraud” to be used
when determining if actual intent exists,
which include: (1) the inadequacy of
consideration received, (2) the close
relationship between the parties to the
transfer, (3) information that the
transferor was insolvent by the
conveyance, (4) suspicious timing of
case reveal [the successor] purchased the assets without assuming ‘any warranty
obligations or product liability claims . . . with respect to any inventory sold,
shipped or delivered prior to [August 28, 1987].’ They further provide that
[successor] took the assets ‘free and clear . . . of . . . all claims for products
liability (to the extent that such claims are in existence or arise out of products
manufactured and sold prior to the closing date).’ These provisions evince a
clear intent that [the successor] was not assuming any liability for products sold
prior to its acquisition of assets.”); Emrich v. Kroner, 434 N.Y.S.2d 491, 492
(N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (finding that, “from the terms of the purchase
agreement . . . [the successor] agreed to assume the tort liability of [the
predecessor] arising out of incidents occurring after the closing date.”); see also
Hoover, 898 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
663

Schumacher, 451 N.E.2d at 198.

Silverman Partners LP v. Verox Grp., No. 08 CIV 3103(HB), 2010 WL
2899438, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2010).

664

665

N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 276 (LexisNexis 2013).
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transactions or existence of pattern after
the debt had been incurred or a legal
action against the debtor had been
threatened, or (5) the use of fictitious
parties. 666
New York: The De Facto Merger Exception
One of the traditional exceptions to the general rule of
nonliability exists where there has been a “consolidation or merger of
seller and purchaser.” 667 “A transaction structured as a purchase-ofassets may be deemed to fall within this exception as a ‘de facto merger,’
even if the parties chose not to effect a formal merger . . . .” 668 The
following factors are considered “the hallmarks” of a de facto merger in
New York:
continuity of ownership; cessation of
ordinary business and dissolution of the
acquired corporation as soon as possible;
assumption by the successor of the
liabilities ordinarily necessary for the
uninterrupted continuation of the
business of the acquired corporation; and,
continuity of management, personnel,
physical location, assets and general
business operation . . . . 669
Silverman Partners, 2010 WL 2899438, at *6 (citing A.J. Heel Stone, L.L.C. v.
Evisu Int'l, S.R.L., No. 03 CIV. 1097 (DAB), 2006 WL 1458292, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2006)).

666

667

Schumacher, 451 N.E.2d at 198.

In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 15 A.D.3d 254, 256 (N.Y. App. Div.
2005).

668

Fitzgerald v. Fahnestock & Co., 286 A.D.2d 573, 574, , 72 (N.Y. App. Div.
2001) (citation omitted); see also New York v. Nat’l Serv. Indus., Inc., 460 F.3d 201
(2d Cir. 2006); Battino v. Cornelia Fifth Ave., LLC, 861 F. Supp. 2d 392
(S.D.N.Y. 2012); Crowley v. VisionMaker, LLC, 512 F. Supp. 2d 144 (S.D.N.Y.
2007); Colon v. Multi-Pak Corp., 477 F. Supp. 2d 620, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 2007);
Riverside Mktg., LLC v. SignatureCard, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 523, 535

669
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Courts have stated that not all of these factors necessarily need
be present for a finding of de facto merger. 670 There is a split of authority,
however, regarding whether continuity of ownership is a threshold
element as opposed to a mere factor. 671 In New York City Asbestos
Litigation the court noted: “It has been held that, because continuity of
ownership is ‘the essence of a merger,’ it is a necessary element of any de
facto merger finding, although not sufficient to warrant such a finding by
itself . . . .” 672
Since then, several federal courts in the Second Circuit have held
that continuity of ownership is a required element of the de facto merger
exception. 673 At least one New York state court has agreed, 674 though
another has held that the four factors should be analyzed in a flexible
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); Rodriguez v. Printco Indus., No. 9420/07, 2010 WL 2679898,
at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 11, 2010); Buja v. KCI Konecranes Int’l. PLC., 815
N.Y.S.2d 412 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006); In re Seventh Jud. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 788
N.Y.S.2d 579 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005); In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 15 A.D.3d
at 256; Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A. v. SIB Mortg. Corp., 801 N.Y.S.2d 821 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2005); Sweatland v. Park Corp., 587 N.Y.S.2d 54, 56 (N.Y. App. Div.
1992).
Fitzgerald, 286 A.D.2d at 573–74; see also Sweatland, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 56;
Morales v. N.Y., 849 N.Y.S.2d 406, 411–13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007).
670

Silverman Partners, 2010 WL 2899438, at *4; In re New York City Asbestos Litig.,
15 A.D.3d at 256 (citing Fitzgerald, 286 A.D.2d at 573–74); Kretzmer v. Firesafe
Prods. Corp., 805 N.Y.S.2d 340, 341 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); Wash. Mut. Bank,
801 N.Y.S.2d at 822 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); In re Seventh Jud. Dist. Asbestos Litig.,
788 N.Y.S.2d at 583; Morales, 849 N.Y.S.2d at 411; Buja, 815 N.Y.S.2d at 415);
see also Rodriguez, 2010 WL 2679898 at *4.

671

672 In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 15 A.D.3d at 256 (quoting Cargo Partner
AG v. Albatrans, Inc., 352 F.3d 41, 46–47 (2d Cir. 2003)).

See e.g., New York v. Nat’l Serv. Indus., Inc., 460 F.3d 201, 213-14 (2d Cir.
2006) (declining to certify the question to the Court of Appeals); Silverman
Partners, 2010 WL 2899438, at *4; Colon, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 626; Care Envtl.
Corp. v. M2 Techs., Inc., No. CV-05-1600, 2006 WL 148913, at *11 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 18, 2006); Riverside Marketing, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 536.
673

Buja, 815 N.Y.S.2d at 415 (quoting In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 15
A.D.3d at 256) (“Courts have determined that continuity of ownership ‘is a
necessary element of any de facto merger finding . . . .’”).

674
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manner, with no single one, including continuity of ownership, being
determinative. 675 One federal district court has held that the continuity
of enterprise and de facto merger exceptions are “so similar that they may
be considered a single exception.” 676
Shortly before New York City Asbestos Litigation was decided, a
New York supreme court held that the buyer of an auto parts store
could not be held liable for an injury allegedly caused by its predecessor's
sale of asbestos-containing products, neither under the de facto merger
theory nor the continuity of enterprise theory because the predecessor
was not immediately dissolved, the buyer did not assume seller's
liabilities, and the store's operations changed from primarily retail to
primarily wholesale. 677 That court noted:
Assuming . . . there is no one factor,
including continuity of ownership, which
is determinative of [a de facto merger],
there is very little, if any, distinction
between the exceptions of “continuity of
enterprise” and consolidation and merger.
In either instance, a court must weigh the
various factors on a case by case basis to
determine if tort liability should be
imposed upon a successor corporation. 678
Morales, 849 N.Y.S.2d at 411–13; see also Rodriguez, 2010 WL 2679898, at *11
(appearing to balance the factors in a flexible manner, ultimately denying
summary judgment in favor of the successor where there was evidence that
“some” (not most) of the owners of the predecessor and successor were the
same).

675

Battino, 861 F. Supp. 2d at 401 (quoting Cargo Partner AG, 352 F.3d at 45
n.3).
676

677

In re Seventh Jud. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 788 N.Y.S.2d at 583–84.

Id. at 583; see also Doktor v. Werner Co., 762 F. Supp. 2d 494 (E.D.N.Y.
2012); Jalili v. Xanboo Inc., No. 11 CIV. 1200 DLC, 2011 WL 4336690, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2011); see also Optigen, LLC v. Int'l Genetics, Inc., 777 F.
Supp. 2d 390, 394 (N.D.N.Y. 2011); Ortiz v. Green Bull, Inc., No. 10-CV-3747,
(ADS)(ETB), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131601, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2011);
Wexler v A.O. Smith Water Prod. Co., No. 190223/11, 2012 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 3233, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 2, 2012).
678
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New York: The Mere Continuation Exception
In order for the mere continuation exception to apply, the
predecessor must be completely extinguished; where the predecessor
survives the sale transaction as “a distinct, albeit meager, entity[,]” the
successor “cannot be considered a mere continuation . . . .” 679 Note that
the court in Morales held that “the dissolution of the predecessor/seller
corporation is not necessary for there to be a ‘de facto merger.’” 680
New York: The Continuity of Enterprise Exception
A New York supreme court, in 1985, adopted the continuity of
enterprise exception as articulated in Turner. 681 The court adopted
Turner’s three criteria test: “[(1)] whether there was a continuation of the
enterprise of the original entity; [(2)] whether the original entity ceased its
ordinary business operations and dissolved promptly after the
transaction; [(3)] and whether the purchasing entity assumed those
liabilities and obligations of the seller normally required for an
uninterrupted continuation of the seller’s operation.” 682 Interestingly, the
court’s application of Turner did not appear to require the destruction of
a plaintiff’s remedies in order to satisfy the second prong of the

Schumacher, 451 N.E.2d at 198; see also Sweatland v. Park Corp., 587
N.Y.S.2d 54, 56 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (mere continuation exception
inapplicable where the predecessor “survived the transaction, albeit in
bankruptcy, for several years”); Wensing v. Paris Indus., 558 N.Y.S.2d 692, 694
(N.Y. App. 694 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (“The record reveals that [the
predecessor] survived the asset transfer as a distinct corporation, albeit in
bankruptcy. Under such circumstances, [the successor] cannot be cast as its
mere continuation”); Morales, 849 N.Y.S.2d at 410; In re Seventh Jud. Dist. Asbestos
Litig., 788 N.Y.S.2d at 581–82 (“In summary, if a ‘predecessor corporation
continues to exist after the transaction, in however a gossamer of form, the
mere continuation exception is not applicable.’”) (quoting Diaz v. S. Bend
Lathe Inc., 707 F. Supp. 97, 100 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)).

679

680

Morales, 849 N.Y.S.2d at 410–11.

Salvati v. Blaw-Knox Food & Chem. Equip., Inc., 497 N.Y.S.2d 242, 247
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
681

Salvati, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 243 (citing Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244
N.W.2d 873, 879, 883 (Mich. 1976)).

682

2017] A TAXONOMY AND EVALUATION OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY (REVISITED) 945

continuity of enterprise test. 683 In applying Turner’s second prong, the
court stated, “[i]n the first sale, of course, [the predecessor] did not
dissolve promptly, but continued on, in some form, for several years.
What seems to be of greatest importance, however, is that it was
completely out of the coffee granulizer business.” 684 This particular
application of Turner (without the destruction of remedy requirement)
begins to look more like a Turner-Ray hybrid.
In the 2006 Semenetz case, however, the Court of Appeals of New
York expressly rejected the product line exception but made no decision
on the continuity of enterprise exception, since the plaintiff had not
relied on that theory on review. 685 The Court of Appeals has yet to
directly address the continuity of enterprise exception since expressly
deciding not to adopt it in the 1983 Schumacher case. 686 Additionally, in
1984, the Monroe County Supreme Court reiterated that Schumacher
refused to adopt the continuity of enterprise exception, 687 and as of
February 2017, no New York court has adopted or applied the
continuity of enterprise exception since Semenetz was decided.
Note that in In re Seventh Judicial Dist. Asbestos Litigation, a 2005
case, the Ontario County Supreme Court (a New York trial court) stated
that if no one factor in the de facto merger exception is determinative,
then “there is very little, if any, distinction between the exceptions of
“continuity of enterprise” and consolidation and merger. In either
instance, a court must weigh the various factors on a case by case basis
to determine if tort liability should be imposed upon a successor
corporation.” 688
683

Salvati, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 242–48.

684

Id. at 247.

Semenetz v. Sherling & Walden, Inc., 851 N.E.2d 1170, 1173 n.2, 1173–
1175 (N.Y. 2006).

685

Schumacher, 451 N.E.2d at 198; see also Radziul v. Hooper, Inc., 479 N.Y.S.2d
324, 326 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) (stating that the New York Court of Appeals has
“refused to adopt” the product line or continuity of enterprise exceptions).

686

687

Radziul, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 326.

688 In re Seventh Jud. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 788 N.Y.S.2d at 583; see also Battino, 861
F. Supp. 2d at 392 (accord).
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New York: Jurisdiction over Successor Corporations
One interesting question that has arisen in New York is whether
or not a successor corporation can be subject to personal jurisdiction
under New York’s long arm statute. At least one federal court has
answered this question in the affirmative. 689

North Carolina
North Carolina courts follow the traditional approach,
recognizing the four traditional exceptions to the general rule of
successor nonliability: “(1) where there is an express or implied
agreement by the purchasing corporation to assume the debt or liability;
(2) where the transfer amounts to a de facto merger of the two
corporations; (3) where the transfer of assets was done for the purpose
of defrauding the corporation's creditors; or (4) where the purchasing
corporation is a ‘mere continuation’ of the selling corporation in that the
purchasing corporation has some of the same shareholders, directors,
and officers.” 690
The court in G.P. Publ’ns, Inc. v. Quebecor Printing-St. Paul, Inc.,
further noted that:
[a] review of the case law reveals that
North Carolina follows the traditional
approach to the “mere continuation”
theory . . . . This jurisdiction also
considers two factors in addition to the
issue of continuity of ownership: (1)
689 Hughes v. BCI Int’l. Holdings, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 2d 290, 301 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (citing Linzer v. EMI Blackwood Music, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 207, 213
(S.D.N.Y. 1995)); see also Abbacor, Inc. v. Miller, No. 01 Civ. 803, 2001 WL
1006051, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2001) (internal quotations omitted) (“acts of
a predecessor corporation can be attributed to a successor corporation for the
purpose of establishing long arm jurisdiction where the predecessor and the
successor are one and the same”).

G.P. Publ’ns, Inc. v. Quebecor Printing-St. Paul, Inc., 481 S.E.2d 674, 679
(N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted) (citing Budd Tire Corp. v. Pierce Tire
Co, 370 S.E.2d 267, 269 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988)); see Atwell v. DJO, Inc., 803 F.
Supp. 2d 369 (E.D.N.C. 2011); Lattimore & Assocs., LLC v. Steaksauce, Inc.,
No. 10 CVS 14744, 2012 WL 1925729, at *3 (N.C. May 25, 2012).

690
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inadequate
consideration
for
the
purchase; and (2) lack of some of the
elements of a good faith purchaser for
value . . . . In fact, a purchaser conceivably
could be found to be the corporate successor of the
selling corporation even though there is no
continuity of ownership . . . . 691
The last sentence is particularly perplexing because the court
noted that North Carolina follows the traditional approach to mere
continuation in which at least some continuity of ownership is required
but then goes on to reject the “substantial continuity” or “continuity of
enterprise” exception. 692 The court stated:
In the instant case, we find that the trial
court erred by applying the “substantial
continuity” test rather than the more
restrictive traditional test to determine
whether a successor corporation is a mere
continuation of its predecessor. In the
context of a commercially reasonable sale
under UCC § 9-504, allowing successor
liability based on factors other than
inadequate consideration and identity of
ownership might have a chilling effect on
potential purchasers who would have to
be concerned that by acquiring a
foreclosed business, they would also
acquire liabilities they never intended to
assume. 693
It is worth noting that G.P. Publ’ns, Inc. indicated that the
purchaser could be the “corporate successor” versus the “mere
continuation” of the selling corporation even if there was not continuity
691

G.P. Publ’ns., 481 S.E.2d at 680 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

692

Id. at 680–81; see also Atwell, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 372.

693

G.P. Publ’ns., 481 S.E.2d at 682.
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of ownership. Following the traditional approach, this theory of
successor liability (based on lack of adequacy of consideration and a lack
of some of the elements of a good faith purchaser for value) would fit
under the fraud exception. Indeed, L.J. Best Furniture v. Capital Delivery
Serv., which the court cited, dealt exclusively with the fraud and mere
continuation exceptions. 694

North Dakota
North Dakota follows the traditional rule of corporate successor
nonliability, subject to the four traditional exceptions. 695 In Downtowner v.
Acrometal Prods. Inc., the North Dakota Supreme Court analyzed the
expanded approaches to successor liability found in Turner and Ray v.
Alad. After extensive analysis, the court concluded that the decision to
adopt an expanded exception should be made by the legislature, stating:
[W]hen the issue is whether successor
corporations should assume the liability
of their predecessors, and the primary
justification for the assumption is the
successors’ ability to bear the costs, then
before the successors should be required
to bear the costs we must be sure they
can do so. Legislatures and not courts are
in a much better position to determine
the issue. . . . We therefore conclude that
the established principles pertaining to
the liability of a cash purchaser of assets
are applicable to products liability cases. 696
L.J. Best Furniture Distribs., Inc. v. Capital Delivery Serv., 432 S.E.2d 437,
440 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (vacating summary judgment because there was a
dispute of fact as to whether or not the successor was a mere continuation of
the predecessor or whether the transfer of assets was made to defraud
creditors); see also Atwell, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 372.
694

Benson v. SRT Commc’ns, Inc., 813 N.W. 2d 552 (N.D. 2012); see also
Drayton Grain Processors v. NE Foods, Inc., No. CIV. 3:05-CV-73, 2007 WL
983825, at *5 (D.N.D. Mar. 30, 2007); Kristy's Inc. v. Allied Prods. Corp., No.
A2–89–100, 1991 WL 541160, at *2 (D.N.D. Jun 21, 1991); Downtowner, Inc.
v. Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118, 121 (N.D. 1984).
696 Downtowner, 347 N.W.2d at 124–25.
695
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In Axtmann v. Chillemi, in which the majority opinion addressed
piercing the corporate veil, not successor liability, Justice Kapsner’s
concurrence in part and dissent in part discussed five “factors” to be
considered when attempting to impose successor liability under the mere
continuation exception:
(1) [The] transfer of corporate assets (2)
for less than adequate consideration (3) to
another corporation which continued the
business operation of the transferor (4)
when both corporations had at least one
common officer or director who was in
fact instrumental in the transfer . . . and
(5) the transfer rendered the transferor
incapable of paying its creditors’ claims
because it was dissolved in either fact or
law. 697
In this case, Main Realty had been somewhat dissolved, but real
estate agents continued to work under its name and used the
commissions to pay off the prior debts of Main Realty, a fact which was
not made clear to the purchasers of real estate through those agents. 698
“
The trial court found each of the five factors . . . applied to the facts of
th[e] case,” and thus, Justice Kapsner maintained that liability should
have been imposed against the defendant corporation under the mere
continuation doctrine. 699

Ohio
The Supreme Court of Ohio has addressed separately the issue
of successor liability in the context of product liability and contract
claims. In Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Machine Co., the court recognized
only the four traditional exceptions to the general rule of successor non-

Axtmann v Chillemi, 740 N.W. 2d 838, 855 (N.D. 2007) (Kapsner, J.,
concurring/dissenting) (quoting Jackson v. Diamond T. Trucking Co., 241
A.2d 471, 476 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1968)).

697

698

Axtmann, 740 N.W.2d at 845–47.

699

Id. at 855.
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liability in the context of products liability claims.
In Welco Industries,
Inc. v. Applied Cos., the Supreme Court of Ohio refused to expand the
traditional exceptions or adopt the continuity of enterprise exception in
the context of contract liabilities. 701 The Flaugher court also declined to
adopt the product line exception, concluding that the legislature should
make major policy decisions. 702
700

Note that a federal court has held that it is not necessary to use
the phrase “successor liability” in the complaint in order to pursue the
theory at later stages of litigation. 703
Ohio: The Express or Implied Assumption Exception
The courts look to the language of the purchase agreement in
determining the extent to which a purchaser assumed the liabilities of the
seller. 704 If the court cannot determine, based on the “four corners of
the contract,” whether the successor assumed the liabilities of the

700 Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Mach. Co., 507 N.E.2d 331, 336 (Ohio 1987);
see also Delphi Auto. Sys., LLC v. Universal Pallets, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-113, 2011
WL 3297239, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 1, 2011); Pilkington N. Am., Inc. v.
Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 861 N.E.2d 121, 130 (Ohio 2006); Rondy &
Co.,Rondy & Co., Inc. v. Plastic Lumber Co., No. 25548, 2011 WL 5377741, at
*4 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2011).

Welco Indus., Inc. v. Applied Cos., 617 N.E.2d 1129, 1133 (Ohio 1993); see
also Pilkington N. Am., 861 N.E.2d at 130; Kuempel Serv., Inc. v. Zofko, 672
N.E.2d 1026, 1033 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
701

702

Flaugher, 507 N.E.2d at 337.

Kennedy v. Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d 456, 481 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (“[A]
plaintiff must put the defendant on notice that the plaintiff is pursuing a theory
of successor liability to further pursue it at trial. Notice, not specific pleading,
is the standard.”).
703

Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1134 (“It is clear that [the purchaser] did not expressly
or impliedly assume any contractual liability to [the seller]. The purchase
agreement expressly disclaimed both Welco's rights in its claim against Applied
and its liability in the counterclaim.”); see also Pilkington N. Am., 861 N.E.2d at
130–31; Dobbelaere v. Cosco, Inc., 697 N.E.2d 1016, 1022 (Ohio Ct. App.
1997).
704
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predecessor, the fact-finder must resolve any ambiguities in the
contract. 705
Ohio: The De Facto Merger Exception
The Welco court described a de facto merger as “a transaction that
results in the dissolution of the predecessor corporation and is in the
nature of a total absorption of the previous business into the successor. .
. . A de facto merger is a merger in fact without an official declaration of
such.” 706 Subsequently the court listed the “hallmarks” of a de facto
merger:
(1) the continuation of the previous
business activity and corporate personnel,
(2) a continuity of shareholders resulting
from a sale of assets in exchange for
stock, (3) the immediate or rapid
dissolution
of
the
predecessor
corporation, and (4) the assumption by
the purchasing corporation of all liabilities
and obligations ordinarily necessary to
continue the predecessor’s business
operations. 707
The court also indicated that a “transfer of assets for stock is the
sine qua non of [a de facto] merger.” 708 Even though the court initially
referred to them as “hallmarks,” the court later referred to the four listed
705

Davis v. Loopco Indus., Inc., 609 N.E.2d 144, 145 (Ohio 1993).

Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1134 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (citing
Flaugher, 507 N.E.2d at 340).

706

Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1134 (citing Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d
873, 879 (Mich. 1976)); see also Rondy & Co., 2011 WL 5377741, at *4 (Ohio Ct.
App. Nov. 9, 2011); Kennedy, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 476–80 (noting that “the fourth
factor does not examine if the specific liability in question was transferred;
rather, the fourth factor asks whether the predecessor company transferred to
the successor company the ‘liabilities ordinarily necessary to continue’ regular
business operations.”) This analysis appears to keep the de facto merger doctrine
conceptually distinct from the assumption of liabilities doctrine.

707

708

Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1134.
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709

characteristics as “elements.” Subsequent decisions by the Ohio Court
of Appeals indicate that all four elements must be present before a
successor can be held liable under the de facto merger exception. 710
Federal district courts, however, have held that under Welco not all four
hallmarks are required in order to find a de facto merger. 711 Also, Ohio
courts will liberally construe the “rapid dissolution” hallmark to include
situations where a predecessor survives but retains too few assets to
satisfy creditors. 712
709 Id. at 1134 (stating that “this transaction fails to satisfy the elements of a de
facto merger”).

Mohammadpour v. Thomas, No. 85474, 2005 WL 1793515, at *2 (Ohio Ct.
App. July 28, 2005) (referring to the hallmarks individually as “elements”);
Howell v. Atlantic-MEECO, Inc., No. 01CA0084, 2002 WL 857685, at * 3
(Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2002) (“Although AMI arguably meets the first of
those hallmarks of a de facto merger, because it is engaged in the same business
as its predecessors, the manufacture and sale of marine dock systems, that alone
cannot subject AMI to liability as a successor to the manufacturer of the Buck
Creek catwalk. The others must be shown, as well, and they are not.”).

710

Cytec Indus. Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 196 F. Supp. 2d 644, 657 (S.D. Ohio
2002) (“The Supreme Court of Ohio has never stated that it is an absolute
requirement that all of the “hallmarks” of a de facto merger be present before
concluding that a particular transaction is in fact a de facto merger. Further,
despite that court's acknowledgment that one court had found that an assetsfor-stock transfer is the sine qua non of a de facto merger, the court has never
stated that this is the only transaction in which there exists continuity of
shareholders. A rule mandating the presence of all of the ‘hallmarks’ of a de
facto merger or always requiring an assets-for-stock transaction would be too
rigid, as it would likely except some ‘transaction[s] that result[ ] in the
dissolution of the predecessor corporation and [that] [are] in the nature of a
total absorption of the previous business into the successor.’ Such a rule would
dilute the de facto merger doctrine, which recognizes transactions that are
mergers in fact without an official declaration of such”) (citing Welco, 617
N.E.2d at 1134); Kennedy, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 478 (“It is not a requirement that
all four factors be present for a court to find that a de facto merger occurred.”)
(citing Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1134).
711

Pottschmidt v. Klosterman, 865 N.E.2d 111, 119 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006)
(“[A]s to the fact that the original corporation technically still exists, we have
previously held that the continued existence of the transferor corporation does
not defeat a claim for de facto merger except if ‘the transferor retains sufficient
assets to satisfy the claims of its creditors.’ As has been discussed above, the
original corporation retained no assets. Moreover, the original corporation

712
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Ohio: The Mere Continuation Exception
The Flaugher court discussed the narrow and broad constructions
of the mere continuation exception but ultimately did not adopt either
approach. 713 The major distinction between the two approaches,
according to the court in Flaugher, is that one focuses on the continuation
of the entity and the other focuses on the continuation of the business
operation. The court declined to adopt one approach over the other,
stating: “It is obvious that even the expanded view of continuity has no
application under these facts.” 714
The Welco court explicitly refused to expand the mere
continuation exception and required continuity of ownership as a
threshold finding but limited its holding to contract-related actions. 715 In
the same year that the Supreme Court of Ohio issued the Welco decision,
it was presented with a “certified question presented by the appellate
court” asking “whether [Flaugher] adopted the traditional test or the
expanded test to determine whether a successor corporation is a mere
continuation of a predecessor corporation.” 716 Unfortunately, the court
declined to answer the certified question, concluding there was an issue
of fact as to whether liabilities were assumed under the asset purchase
agreement. 717

closed its corporate bank account, changed the name on the profit-sharing
accounts, and filed a final tax return with the IRS, which effectively constituted
an end of the original corporation”) (citations omitted) (citing Crisplip v.
Twentieth Century Heating & Ventilating Co., No. 13721, 1989 WL 11795, at
*4 (Ohio Ct. App., Feb. 15, 1989)).
713

Flaugher, 507 N.E.2d at 336.

714

Id.

Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1133; Mandalaywala v. Omnitech Elecs., Inc., No.
05AP-1216, 2006 WL 1556773, at *7–8 (Ohio Ct. App. June 8, 2006).

715

716

Davis, 609 N.E.2d at 145.

717

Id.
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Subsequently, it appears that Ohio appellate courts and federal
courts in the sixth circuit have concluded that the expanded mere
continuation test is also inapplicable in tort actions. 718
Ohio: The Fraud Exception
Under Ohio law, indicia of fraud include inadequate
consideration and lack of good faith. 719 It appears that inadequacy of
consideration is also one of the indicia of mere continuation. 720

Oklahoma
Oklahoma follows the traditional approach to successor liability,
recognizing the four traditional exceptions to the general rule of
successor nonliability; they include:
(1) Where there is an agreement to
assume such debts or liabilities (2) Where
the circumstances surrounding the
transaction warrant a finding that there
was a consolidation or merger of the
corporations, or (3) that the transaction
was fraudulent in fact or (4) that the

Miami Cty. Incinerator Qualified Trust v. Acme Waste Mgmt. Co., 61 F.
Supp. 2d 724, 729–30 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (collecting cases); see also Aluminum
Line Prods. Co. v. Brad Smith Roofing Co., 671 N.E.2d 1343, 1355 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1996); Howell, 2002 WL 857685, at *4; Pottschmidt, 865 N.E.2d at 120.
718

Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1134; Howell, 2002 WL 857685, at *3; see also Pottschmidt,
865 N.E.2d at 120 (holding that the evidence supported the imposition of
successor liability based on the fraudulent transaction exception where the new
corporation was formed one month after a third party sued predecessor
corporation; predecessor's and successor’s sole shareholder acknowledged that
new corporation was formed to escape liability, albeit distinct from third party's
lawsuit; and sole shareholder's accountant-attorney testified that accountantattorney had discussed lawsuit and damages with sole shareholder before the
new corporation was formed); Per-Co, Ltd. v. Great Lakes Factors, Inc., 509 F.
Supp. 2d 642, 653–54 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
719

Rondy & Co., 2011 WL 5377741, at *4; Delphi Auto. Sys., LLC v. Universal
Pallets, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-113, 2011 WL 3297239 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 1, 2011).
720
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purchasing corporation was a mere
continuation of the selling company. 721
Also, in order to establish the liability of a once-removed
successor corporation, “each company along the line of succession [must
meet] one of the four exceptions to non-liability.” 722
The Oklahoma Supreme Court explained in Crutchfiled: “The
mere continuation exception covers a re-organization of a corporation.
For this exception, the test is not whether there is a continuation of
business operations, but whether there is a continuation of the corporate
entity.” 723 In making this determination, courts “look[] to whether there
is a common identity of directors, officers, and stockholders before and
after the sale, whether there was good consideration for the sale, and
whether the seller corporation continues to exist in fact.” 724 Further,
“[t]he bare de jure existence of the seller corporation after the sale is
insufficient alone to establish that the successor corporation is not a
mere continuation of the seller company. 725 The Crutchfield court further
noted that “[i]n many states that employ the mere continuation
exception, the common identity of directors, officers, and shareholders is
the most important factor.” 726
In 1985, the Oklahoma appellate court addressed the productline exception, concluding that the rationale articulated by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court in Pulis, that is,“[t]he test is not the continuation of the

Pulis v. U.S. Elec. Tool Co., 561 P.2d 68, 69 (Okla. 1977); see also Murrah v.
EOG Res., Inc., No. CIV-10-994-M, 2011 WL 227652, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Jan.
21, 2011); CTI Servs. LLC v. Haremza, No. 09-CV-144-GKF-TLW, 2011 WL
2472566, at *6 (N.D. Okla. June 21, 2011); Crutchfield v. Marine Power Engine
Co., 209 P.3d 295, 300 (Okla. 2009); Coline Oil Corp. v. State, 88 P.2d 897, 898
(Okla. 1939).
721

722

Crutchfield, 209 P.3d at 300.

723

Id. at 301.

Id. at 300 (collecting cases and listing pertinent facts supporting imposition
and non-imposition of liability).

724

725

Id. at 301–02.

726

Id. at 302.
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business operation, but the continuation of the corporate entity,”
foreclosed any possibility of adopting the product-line exception. 727

Oregon
The Supreme Court of Oregon articulated the general rule of
successor nonliability and its four traditional exceptions in Erickson v.
Grande Ronde Lumber Co. 728 In this case, the court addressed whether a
successor corporation had assumed liability for services rendered to its
predecessor. 729 The other three exceptions to the general rule were not
analyzed. In 2000, an Oregon appellate court addressed successor
liability where a purchasing corporation had been ordered to reinstate a
worker injured while working for the selling corporation. 730 The court
noted the general rule and reiterated the four traditional exceptions,
ultimately holding that the consolidation or merger exception did not
apply because—among other things—the predecessor company
continued to exist, and the predecessor and successor companies had
“completely different ownership and management.” 731 The Ninth
Circuit, applying Oregon law, declined to adopt a broad interpretation of
the mere continuation exception that would include the substantial
continuation doctrine. 732

727

Goucher v. Parmac, Inc., 694 P.2d 953, 954 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984).

Erickson v. Grand Ronde Lumber Co., 92 P.2d 170, 174 (Or. 1939); Dahlke
v. Cascade Acoustics, Inc., 171 P.3d 992, 997 (Or. Ct. App. 2007); see Atchison,
Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358 (9th Cir.
1997); Century Indem. Co. v. Marine Group, LLC, 848 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (D.
Or. 2012).
728

729

Erickson, 92 P.2d at 174 (Or. 1939).

Tyree Oil, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor and Indus., 7 P.3d 571, 571–72 (Or. Ct.
App. 2000).

730

731

Tyree Oil, Inc., 7 P.3d at 574.

732 Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d
358 (9th Cir. 1997).

2017] A TAXONOMY AND EVALUATION OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY (REVISITED) 957

Oregon has explicitly declined to extend successor liability to
include the product line exception. In Dahlke v. Cascade Acoustics, Inc., 733 a
case involving the alleged successor to an asbestos manufacturer, the
Oregon Court of Appeals stated:
“[In a previous case] we explained that,
apart from the four exceptions [to
successor liability], ‘[i]t has long been the
general rule in Oregon that, when one
corporation purchases all of the assets of
another corporation, the purchasing
corporation does not become liable for the
debts and liabilities of the selling
corporation.’ . . . Plaintiff's proposed
modification of successor liability would
require us to depart from that established
rule.” 734

Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania courts generally recognize five species of successor
liability for corporate asset purchasers, including where
(1) the purchaser expressly or impliedly
agreed to assume liability, (2) the
transaction amounted to a consolidation
or merger, (3) the purchasing corporation
was merely a continuation of the selling
corporation, (4) the transaction was
fraudulently entered into to escape
liability, or (5) the transfer was without
adequate consideration and no provision
171 P.3d 992 (Or. Ct. App. 2007). See generally Cox v. DJO, Inc., No. 07–
1310–AA, 2009 WL 3855084, at *3–4 (D. Or. Nov. 16, 2009) (quoting Dahkle,
171 P.3d at 992 (quoting Tyree Oil, Inc., 7 P.3d at 573)).

733

734 Dahlke, 171 P.3d at 998 (quoting Tyree Oil, Inc., 7 P.3d at 573 (citing Erickson
v. Grande Ronde Lbr. Co., 92 P.2d 170 (Or. 1939)) (first and second alterations
added) (emphasis in original).
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were made for creditors of the selling
corporation. 735
In addition, in the context of products liability, the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania adopted a flexible product line exception based on a
combination of Ramirez v. Amsted Indus. Inc. 736 and Ray v. Alad Corp., 737

McClure v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 28 A.3d 951 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2011); Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Schneider, Inc., 873 A.2d 1286, 1291 (Pa. 2005)
(footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Simmers v. American Cyanamid
576 A.2d 386 (Pa. Super. Ct.1990) (citing Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules,
Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 308–09 (3rd Cir. 1985), and Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co.,
434 A.2d 106, 110 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981)); see, e.g., Adani Exports Ltd. v. AMCI
Corp., No. 2:05-cv-00304, 2006 WL 1785707, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jun. 26, 2006)
(citing Granthum v. Textile Mach. Works, 326 A.2d 449 (1974), and Lopata v.
Bemis Co., Inc., 383 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1974)); In re Total Containment,
Inc., 335 B.R. 589, 617 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2005) (quoting Cont’l Ins. Co., 873 A.2d
at 1291 (citing Philadelphia Elec. Co., 762 F.2d at 308–09); Fizzano Bros.
Concrete Prods., Inc. v. XLN, Inc., 973 A.2d 1016, 1019 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009)
(citing Cont’l Ins. Co., 873 A.2d at 1291, and Hill, 603 A.2d at 605), appeal granted
on other grounds, 994 A.2d 1081 (Pa. 2010) (quoting Hayduk v. Workers’ Comp.
Appeal Bd., 906 A.2d 622, 632 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006); In Re Thorotrast Cases,
No. 1135, 1994 WL 1251120, at *488–95 (Pa. Com. Pl. Jan. 13, 1994); see also
Tender Touch Rehab Servs. LLC v. Brighten at Bryn Mawr, No. 11-7016, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40656, at *10–11 (E.D. Penn. Mar. 23, 2012) (citing
Aluminum Co. of America v. Beazer East, Inc., 124 F.3d 551, 565 (3d Cir 1997)
(citing Philadelphia Elec. Co., 762 F.2d at 308)); Vital Pharms., Inc. v. USA
Sports, LLC, No. 3:11-CV-975, 2012 WL 760561, at *4 (M.D. Penn. Mar. 8,
2012) (quoting Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Lexington & Concord Search &
Abstract, LLC, 513 F. Supp. 2d 304, 315 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (citing Cont’l Ins. Co.,
873 A.2d at 1291)).
735

736

431 A.2d 811, 825 (N. J. 1981).

560 P.2d 3, 7–8 (Cal. 1977) (citing Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App.
3d 842, 846 (1975); Schwartz v. McGraw-Edison Co., 14 Cal. App. 3d 767,
780–81 (1971); Pierce v. Riverside Mtg. Secs. Co., 77 P.2d 226 (Cal. App. Ct.
1938); Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182 n.5 (1973); see also
Tender Touch Rehab Svcs. LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40656, at *10–11 (citing
Aluminum Co. of America, 124 F.3d at 565 (citing Philadelphia Elec. Co., 762 F.2d at
308)); Vital Pharms., 2012 WL 760561, at *4 (quoting Chicago Title Ins. Co., 513 F.
Supp. 2d at 315 (citing Cont’l Ins. Co., 873 A.2d at 1291)); Kloberdanz v. Joy
Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 820 (D. Colo. 1968).
737
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choosing to adopt a new exception rather than expanding the traditional
exceptions. 738
In Schmidt v. Boardman Co., the appellant/successor challenged the
product line exception, purporting that it was “inconsistent with the
rationale underlying strict products liability[] because it penalizes
successor corporations which did not design, make, sell, or otherwise
profit from a defective product, and which lacked any opportunity to
make the product safe.” 739 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not
decide the issue, however, ruling that because it had not been raised in
the lower courts, the matter was waived. 740 While acknowledging that it
had not adopted the product line exception, the court held that the
exception, as it existed in the lower courts, consisted more of flexible
factors, rather than elements or requirements. 741
The court in Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Schneider, Inc. held that a sale of
assets by a secured creditor “pursuant to Section 9-504 of the UCC [13
Pa.C.S. § 9504] does not, as a matter of law, preclude a creditor's claim
against the purchaser based upon successor liability.” 742

Dawejko, 434 A.2d at 10–11 (“It is perhaps only a matter of style how one
proceeds. One may retain the traditional exceptions but expand their
boundaries, so that ‘merger’ or ‘continuation’ are held to include cases they
once would not have included. Or one may adopt a new exception, such as the
product-line exception. We believe it better to adopt a new exception.”); see also

738

Fizzano Bros. Concrete Prods., Inc. v. XLN, Inc., 42 A.3d 951, 965–69 (Pa. 2012)
(quoting Glentel, Inc. v. Wireless Ventures, LLC, 362 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1003 (N.D. Ind.
2005) (citing Gallenberq Equip., Inc. v. Agromac Int’l., Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1055
(E.D. Wis. 1998)); Cont’l Ins. Co., 873 A.2d at 1291 n.6 (noting that the product
line exception applies in the context of products liability, but not otherwise).

Schmidt v. Boardman Co., 11 A.3d 924, 936 (Pa. 2011) (citing Cafazzo v.
Cent. Med. Health Servs., Inc., 688 A.2d 521, 524 (Pa. 1995)).

739

740

Schmidt, 11 A.3d at 942.

Id. at 944–45 (citing Ramirez, 431 A.2d 811 (N. J. 1981); Ray, 560 P.2d 3 (Cal.
1977); Hill, 603 A.2d 602 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Dawejko, 434 A.2d 106 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1981)).
741

742

810 A.2d 127, 133 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
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Pennsylvania: The Mere Continuation and De Facto Merger Exceptions
Many Pennsylvania courts note that, under Pennsylvania law, the
mere continuation and de facto merger exceptions are interrelated or
difficult to distinguish. 743 The court in Commonwealth v. Lavelle explained:
“[T]he first of the four exceptions
rendering the purchasing corporation
liable for duties of the seller is a
transaction amounting to a merger or
consolidation. In a merger a corporation
absorbs one or more other corporations,
which thereby lose their corporate
identity. “A merger of two corporations
contemplates that one will be absorbed by
the other and go out of existence, but the
absorbing corporation will remain.”. . . .
“Another of the . . . exceptions to the
general rule of nonliability arises when
there is a continuation. In a continuation,
Atlas Tool Co. v. Comm’r, 614 F.2d 860, 871 (3d Cir. 1980) (“As is
illustrated by the de facto merger cases, that exception is interrelated to the
second exception for continuity”); United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423
F.3d 294, 307 (3d Cir. 2005); Fiber-Lite Corp. v. Molded Acoustical Prods. of
Easton, Inc., 186 B.R. 603, 608 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (noting that “the continuity
exception which Fiber-Lite contended applied is actually subsumed by the de
facto merger exception”); Lavelle, 555 A.2d 218, 227 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)
(citing Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 365 (3d Cir.
1974)) (applying the de facto merger exception, but stating that “[e]mployment of
the mere continuation theory of liability would not alter our resolution of the
issue since the two theories are difficult to distinguish”); see also Berg Chilling
Sys., Inc. v. Hull Corp., 435 F.3d 455, 468 (3d Cir. 2006); Johnson v. Corr.
Physician Servs., 725 F. Supp. 2d 481, 488 (E.D. Pa. 2010); Tender Touch
Rehab Servs. LLC v. Brighten at Bryn Mawr, No. 11-7016, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 40656, at *11–12 (E.D. Penn. Mar. 23, 2012) (citing Lavelle, 555 A.2d at
228; Berg Chilling Sys., Inc., 435 F.3d at 468–69); Johnson v. Svcs.2010) (citing
Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d at 305; Cont’l Ins. Co., 810 A.2d at 134–35; Berg
Chilling Sys., Inc., 435 F.3d at 468–69; Greenway Conter. Inc v. Essex Ins. Co.,
369 Fed. App’x. 348, 352 (3d Cir. 2010)); Vital Pharms., 2012 WL 760561, at
*4–5 (quoting Berg Chilling Sys., Inc., 435 F.3d at 468; Cont’l Ins. Co., 810 A.2d at
134; Lavelle, 555 A.2d at 227).
743

2017] A TAXONOMY AND EVALUATION OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY (REVISITED) 961

a new corporation is formed to acquire
the assets of an extant corporation, which
then ceases to exist.” There is in effect
but one corporation which merely
changes its form and ordinarily ceases to
exist upon the creation of the new
corporation which is its successor.” 744
There is a difference in the iteration of the two tests, however.
The term “elements” is used in the context of a mere continuation and
“factors” used with de facto merger: “The primary elements of the
continuation exception are identity of the officers, directors, or
shareholders, and the existence of a single corporation following the
transfer.” 745 “[W]hen determining if a de facto merger has occurred,
courts generally consider four factors:” 746
(1) continuity of ownership; (2) cessation
of the ordinary business by, and
dissolution of, the predecessor as soon as
practicable; (3) assumption by the
successor of liabilities ordinarily necessary
for uninterrupted continuation of the
business; and (4) continuity of the
management, personnel, physical location,
and the general business operation.” 747
Lavelle, 555 A.2d at 227 (quoting Knapp v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d
361, 365 (3d Cir. 1974) (footnote omitted) (citing Dawejko, 434 A.2d at 107).

744

Cont’l Ins. Co., 810 A.2d at 134–35 (citing Fiber-Lite Corp., 186 B.R. 603;
Widerman v. Mayflower Transit Inc., No. CIV.A. 96–2036, 1997 WL 539684
(E.D. Penn. Aug. 6, 1997); see also Berg Chilling Sys., Inc., 435 F.3d at 468–69
(quoting Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 310 (3d Cir.
1985)).

745

746

Cont’l Ins. Co., 810 A.2d at 135 (citing Lavelle, 555 A.2d at 227)

Cont’l Ins. Co., 810 A.2d at 135 (citing Lavelle, 555 A.2d at 227); see also Berg
Chilling Sys., Inc., 435 F.3d at 468–69 (citing Philadelphia Elec. Co., 762 F.2d at
310); In re Total Containment, Inc., 335 B.R. at 617 (quoting Philadelphia Elec.
Co., 762 F.2d at 310); Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Lexington & Concord Search
and Abstract, LLC., 513 F. Supp. 2d 304, 315 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (citing Lavelle,

747
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Moreover, courts have noted that not all of the de facto merger
factors must be present for the exception to apply. 748
It may be that the tests have become interrelated in application
because, as a practical matter, if the facts fail to satisfy the factor-based de
facto merger exception, the same facts will fail to meet the elemental
requirements of the mere continuation exception.
Further confusion, though, is evidenced by the ruling of the
Superior Court in Fizzano Bros. Concrete Prods., Inc. v. XLN, Inc., that
continuity of ownership is perhaps not a mere factor of de facto merger;
rather, “[c]ontinuity of ownership is a key element that must exist in
order to apply the de facto merger doctrine[.]” 749 In response to this
Superior Court decision, “[t]he Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a
lengthy opinion explaining [the] contours [of the de facto merger
exception in 2012].” 750 The Supreme Court stated:
[A] broad holding could state that when
the underlying cause of action is
contractual or commercial in nature, the
de facto merger exception does require a
strict continuity of ownership, but where
the underlying cause of action is rooted in
a cause of action that invokes important
public policy goals, the continuity of
ownership prong may be relaxed.

555 A.2d at 227); In re Asousa P’ship., No. 01-12295DWS, 2006 WL 1997426,
*8 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. June 15, 2006) (citing Cont’l Ins. Co., 810 A.2d at 130))
Cont’l Ins. Co., 810 A.2d at 135 (citing Lavelle, 555 A.2d at 227); see also Berg
Chilling Sys., Inc., 435 F.3d at 469; Chicago Title Ins. Co., 513 F. Supp. 2d at 315
(citing Lavelle, 555 A.2d at 227); Asousa P’ship., 2006 WL 1997426 at *8.

748

Fizzano Bros. Concrete Prods., Inc. v. XLN, Inc., 973 A.2d 1016, 1020 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2009).

749

750 Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. v. Gateway Funding Diversified Mortg. Servs.,
L.P., 942 F. Supp. 2d 516, 524 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (citing Fizzano Bros. Concrete
Prod., Inc. v. XLN, Inc., 42 A.3d 951, 956 (Pa. 2012)).
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However, the better course requires that
we tailor our holding to the narrow facts
of the case sub judice . . . .
. . . [A]lthough the majority of the case
law that we have reviewed from other
jurisdictions would support a rigid
holding that where, as here, the
underlying cause of action is in contract
or breach of warranty, continuity of
ownership would be a necessary factor
for establishing a de facto merger, we resist
a mechanical, un-nuanced ruling . . . .
. . . [I]t would be incongruous [with
Pennsylvania statutory law] to adopt a
blanket rule that a de facto merger would
always require a rigid showing that the
shareholders
of
the
predecessor
corporation have exchanged their
ownership interests for shares of the
successor corporation. . . .
. . . [A] de facto merger analysis . . . requires
that a court look beyond the superficial
formalities of a transaction in order to
examine the transactional realities and
their consequences.
....
Accordingly, we hold that in cases rooted
in breach of contract and express
warranty, the de facto merger exception
requires “some sort of” proof of
continuity of ownership or stockholder
interest . . . . However, such proof is not
restricted to mere evidence of an
exchange of assets from one corporation
for shares in a successor corporation.
Evidence of other forms of stockholder
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interest in the successor corporation may
suffice; indeed 15 Pa.C.S. § 1922(a)(3)
contemplates that continuing shareholder
interest pursuant to a statutory merger
may take the form of “obligations” in lieu
of shares in the new or surviving
corporation. Further, de facto merger,
including its continuity of ownership
prong, will always be subject to the factspecific nature of the particular
underlying corporate realities and will not
always be evident from the formalities of
the proximal corporate transaction.
These realities may include an issue
concerning which entity is actually the
true predecessor corporation . . . .
Finally, the elements of the de facto
merger are not a mechanically-applied
checklist, but a map to guide a reviewing
court to a determination that, under the
facts established, for all intents and
purposes, a merger has or has not
occurred between two or more
corporations, although not accomplished
under the statutory procedure. 751
Pennsylvania: The Fraud Exception
In Commonwealth v. Lavelle the court held that the fraud exception
applied where:
Fizzano Bros. Concrete Products, Inc., 42 A.3d at 966–69 (citations omitted)
(emphasis in original) (quoting 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1922(a)(3)) (citing Berg
Chilling Systems, Inc., 435 F.3d at 465; Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Mid–
Atlantic States v. Clary & Moore, P.C., 123 F.3d 201, 206 (4th Cir.1997)); Bud
Antle, Inc. v. Eastern Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d 1451, 1458 (11th Cir. 1985);
Fizzano Bros. Concrete Products, Inc. v. XLN, Inc., 994 A.2d 1081 (Pa. 2010);
Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 143 A.2d 25, 28, 31 (Pa. 1958); Lavelle, 555 A.2d at
230.
751
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[The] . . . evidence was, when viewed as a
whole, sufficient to establish that William
A. Lavelle, III, was, at all relevant times,
possessed of an undisclosed ownership
interest in [the successor,] Lavco, Inc.,
and that the sole purpose for the
concealment of that ownership interest
was to avoid liability for the criminal acts
committed by [the predecessor] Wm. A.
Lavelle & Son, Co. under the direction of
William A. Lavelle III. 752
Pennsylvania: The Product Line Exception
In 1981, in Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania adopted the product line exception. 753 The court was
careful to keep the product line exception from being too restrictive. 754
In essence, the court adopted the New Jersey product line exception set
forth in Ramirez while acknowledging the relevance of the factors in
California’s Ray v. Alad by stating:
We also believe it better not to phrase the
new exception too tightly. Given its
philosophical origin, it should be phrased
in general terms, so that in any particular
case the court may consider whether it is
just to impose liability on the successor
corporation.
The various factors
identified in the several cases discussed
752

555 A.2d at 230.

434 A.2d 106, 111 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (citing Ramirez v. Amsted Indus.,
Inc., 431 A.2d 811, 825 (N.J. 1981)).

753

Dawejko, 434 A.2d at 111 (citations omitted); see also Kradel v. Fox River
Tractor Co., 308 F.3d 328, 331 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Dawejko, 434 A.2d at
110); Takacs v. Cyril Bath Co., No. Civ.A. 04–59, 2006 WL 840350, at *3–4
(W.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2006) (quoting Dawejko, 434 A.2d passim). But see Schmidt v.
Boardman Co., 958 A.2d 498, 514 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) (citing Takacs, 2006
WL 840350, aff'd on other grounds, 11 A.3d 924 (Pa. 2011)).
754
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above will always be pertinent—for
example,
whether
the
successor
corporation advertised itself as an
ongoing enterprise, Cyr v. B. Offen &
Co. . . . ; or whether it maintained the
same product, name, personnel, property,
and clients, Turner v. Bituminous Casualty
Co. . . . ; or whether it acquired the
predecessor corporation's name and good
will, and required the predecessor to
dissolve, Knapp v. North American Rockwell
Corp. . . . . Also, it will always be useful to
consider whether the three-part test
stated in Ray v. Alad Corp. . . . has been
met. The exception will more likely realize
its reason for being, however, if such
details are not made part of its
formulation. The formulation of the
court in Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc. . .
. is well-put, and we adopt it. 755
Since the 1981 Dawejko decision, Pennsylvania courts have
tightened the phrasing of the product line exception in subsequent
decisions. In Pizio v. Johns-Manville Corp., the Court of Common Pleas of
Pennsylvania concluded that the product line exception requires, as a
threshold matter, the successor to acquire all or substantially all of the
predecessor’s assets. 756 In Hill v. Trailmobile, Inc., 757 the Pennsylvania
755 Dawejko, 434 A.2d at 111 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see Ramirez,
431 A.2d at 811, 825 (“[W]here one corporation acquires all or substantially all
the manufacturing assets of another corporation, even if exclusively for cash,
and undertakes essentially the same manufacturing operation as the selling
corporation, the purchasing corporation is strictly liable for injuries caused by
defects in units of the same product line, even if previously manufactured and
distributed by the selling corporation or its predecessor.”).
756 No. 2676, 1983 WL 265433, at *452 (Pa. Com. Pl. Feb. 9, 1983) (citing Ray
v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 8–9 (Cal. 1977)) (“An examination of the relevant
case law reveals that the purpose of the product line exception is to afford a
claimant an opportunity to bring a products liability action against a successor
corporation where his or her rights against the predecessor corporation have
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Superior Court recast the three Ray factors as requirements. 758 Soon
thereafter, the Court of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania stated that “the
sale of the product line must cause the virtual destruction of the plaintiffs’
remedies . . . . If a business goes on for years profitably after the product
line is sold and goes bankrupt for other reasons, the sale of the product
line for adequate consideration did not ‘cause’ the destruction of the
remedy.” 759
In Schmidt v. Boardman Co., the appellant/successor (1) challenged
the validity of product line exception product-line exception maintaining
it was “inconsistent with the rationale underlying strict products liability,
because it penalizes successor corporations which did not design, make,
sell, or otherwise profit from a defective product, and which lacked any
opportunity to make the product safe,” and (2) argued in the alternative
that the product line exception should consist entirely of mandatory
requirements versus flexible factors. 760
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not decide whether the
product line exception was valid, ruling that the issue had not been raised
below and was thus waived. 761 Although it did not adopt the product
been essentially extinguished either de jure, through dissolution of the
predecessor, or de facto, through sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the
predecessor.”).
757

603 A.2d 602 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).

Hill, 603 A.2d at 606–07 (quoting Dawejko, 434 A.2d at 109 (quoting Ray,
560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1997)); see also Schmidt, 958 A2d at 507; Kradel, 308 F.3d at 332;
Dillman v. Indiana Rolls, Inc., No. 2001-C-1963, 2004 WL 2491772 at *299–
300 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2004) (citing Hill, 603 A.2d at 602); Griffiths v. Knoedler
Mfg. Inc., No. 2634 Civil 1995, 2004 WL 3321079, at *188– 89 (Pa. Com. Pl.
2004) (citing Dawejko, 434 A.2d at 106).
758

In re Thorotrast Cases, No. 1135, 1994 WL 1251120, at *504 (Pa. Com. Pl.
Jan. 13, 1994); see also Kradel, 308 F.3d at 332 (“It is thus clear that the inability
to recover from an original manufacturer is a prerequisite in Pennsylvania to
the use of the product line exception.”).
759

Schmidt v. Boardman Co., 11 A.3d 924, 936, 943–44 (citing Cafazzo v. Cent.
Med. Health Servs., Inc., 668 A.2d 521, 524 (1995) and Schmidt v. Boardman,
958 A.2d 498, 513–14 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008)) (Pa. 2011).

760

761

Schmidt, 11 A.3d at 942.
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line exception, the court addressed the second issue because of the
conflict in lower court cases and confirmed the flexible approach to the
product line exception set out in Dawejko. 762 The court stated:
Initially, it obviously poses some difficulty
for this Court to address the boundaries
of the product-line exception, where we
have not yet decided on developed
reasoning whether to adopt it in the first
instance. Nevertheless, there is confusion
manifest in both the trial and intermediate
appellate courts' opinions, which arises
from inconsistencies in the Superior
Court's application of the exception it has
adopted.
...
. . . [T]he Dawejko panel took pains to
clarify that it was adopting the Ramirez
test as the core, governing standard,
subject to more flexible consideration of
other relevant factors, including those
identified in Ray.
...
Thus, the most appropriate approach to
reconciling governing Superior Court
precedent is to correct Hill's mistake and
to revert to Dawejko. 763

762

Schmidt, 11 A.3d at 944–45.

763

Schmidt, 11 A.3d at 944–45 (citations omitted).
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Rhode Island
Rhode Island courts have recognized the four traditional
exceptions to the general rule of non-successor liability. 764 Of the four
traditional exceptions, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island has
articulated a test for the mere continuation exception 765 and has
recognized the express assumption, de facto merger, and fraud
exceptions. 766 The court in Angell v. Parillo, a 1986 case, briefly discussed
the product-line exception, concluding that the doctrine was inapplicable
because the predecessor did not dissolve subsequent to the asset
purchase. 767 That exception has not since been addressed by the Rhode
Island Supreme Court.

Ed Peters Jewelry Co., Inc. v. C & J Jewelry Co., Inc. 124 F.3d 252, 266 (1st
Cir. 1997); Blouin v. Surgical Sense, Inc., No. PC 07-6855, 2008 WL 2227781,
at *15–16 (R.I. Super. Ct., May 12, 2008); Asea Brown Boveri, S.A. v. Alcoa
Fujikura, Ltd., No. PC 02-1084, 2007 WL 1234523, at *46–58 (R.I. Super. Ct.,
April 11, 2007); Angell v. Parrillo, No. PC 02-1084, 1986 WL 716005, at *1
(R.I. Super. Ct., Feb. 14, 1986).

764

See, e.g., Casey v. San-Lee Realty, Inc., 623 A.2d 16, 18–19 (R.I. 1993) (citing
Jackson v. Diamond T. Trucking Co., 241 A.2d 471, 477 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1968);
H.J. Baker & Bro. v. Orgonics, Inc., 554 A.2d 196, 205 (R.I. 1989); Richmond
Ready-Mix v. Atlantic Concrete Forms, Inc., No. Civ. A. 92-0960, 2004 WL
877595, at *9 (R.I. Sup. Ct. April 21, 2004) (quoting H.J. Baker & Bro., 554
A.2d at 205) (citing Ed Peters Jewelry Co., Inc. v. C & J Jewelry Co., Inc., 124
F.3d 252, 268 (1st Cir. 1997) and Casey, 623 A.2d at 18–19)) .

765

766 Douglas v. Bank of New Eng., 566 A.2d 939, 941–42 (R.I. 1989) (affirming
the imposition of successor liability, stating: “Here we have not only a de facto
but a formal de jure merger governed by a federal statute and an agreement
formulated by the parties in pursuance thereto . . . . [W]e have a successor
corporation that has expressly assumed the liabilities as a part of a business
decision to utilize a formal de jure merger.”); see also H.J. Baker & Bro., 554 A.2d
at 205 (remanding for a new trial on the issue of the fraud exception, noting the
trial court’s grant of a new trial on the count of actual fraud was inconsistent
with its denial of a new trial on the count of successor liability based on fraud);
Blouin, 2008 WL 2227781, at *17.
767 Angell, 1986 WL 716005, at *2 (citing Ladjevardian v. Laidlaw-Coggeshall,
Inc., 431 F.Supp. 834
(S.D.N.Y. 1977)).
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Rhode Island: The Assumption of Liability
Courts look to the language of the pertinent documents covering
the transaction in determining whether the successor has expressly
assumed liability. 768 In Douglas v. Bank of New England, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court held that the following language in a merger agreement
included an assumption of liability for punitive damages:
“All assets as they exist at the effective
time of the merger, including trust powers
of each of the merging banks, shall pass
to and vest in the Association (Bank of
New England-Old Colony, N.A.) without
any conveyance or other transfer; and the
Association shall be responsible for all the
liabilities of every kind and description,
including arising out of the exercise of
trust powers of each of the merging
banks existing as of the effective time of
the merger.” 769
Rhode Island: The Mere Continuation Exception
The Rhode Island Supreme Court cited Jackson v. Diamond T.
Trucking Co., 770 for the following “five persuasive criteria for finding a
‘continuing’ entity[:]” 771
(1) there is a transfer of corporate assets;
(2) there is less than adequate
consideration; (3) the new company
continues the business of the transferor;
(4) both companies have at least one
768

See, e.g., Douglas, 566 A.2d at 941; Asea Brown, 2007 WL 1234523 at *51–58.

Douglas, 566 A.2d at 941 (emphasis supplied in original) (quoting merger
agreement).

769

770

241 A.2d 471 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1968).

771

H.J. Baker & Bros., 554 A.2d at 205 (citing Jackson, 241 A.2d at 477).
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common officer or director who is
instrumental in the transfer; and (5) the
transfer renders the transferor incapable
of paying its creditors because it is
dissolved either in fact or by law. 772
The court noted that “[o]ther courts have examined criteria such as the
common identity of officers, directors, and stockholders, and the
continued use of the same office space and service to the same client
base.” 773 The court considered all of these factors when holding that a
successor was indeed the mere continuation of its predecessor. 774 The
Asea Brown court, when analyzing the mere continuation exception,
noted that it “does not necessarily disagree” that all five factors are not
required but stressed the importance of the “less than adequate
consideration” factor, stating that “in this case, the Plaintiffs’ claim
cannot be maintained without at least some showing that less than
adequate consideration was paid.” 775 The court in Blouin v. Surgical Sense,
Inc., noted that all of the facts and circumstances should be considered as
a whole and that not all factors need be met for the mere continuation
exception to apply. 776

H.J. Baker & Bros., 554 A.2d at 205 (citing Jackson, 241 A.2d at 477); see also
Casey v. San-Lee Realty, Inc., 623 A.2d 16, 18–19 (R.I. 1993) (quoting H.J.
Baker & Bros., 554 A.2d at 205); Richmond Ready-Mix v. Atlantic Concrete
Forms, Inc., No. Civ.A. 92-0960, 2004 WL 877595, at *8–9 (R.I. Sup. Ct. April
21, 2004) (quoting H.J. Baker & Bros., 54 A.2d at 205); Peters Jewelry Co., Inc.
v. C & J Jewelry Co., Inc. 124 F.3d 252, 268 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing H.J. Baker &
Bros., 554 A.2d at 205 and Jackson, 241 A.2d at 477).
772

H.J. Baker & Bros., 554 A.2d at 205 (citing Dayton v. Peck, Stow & Wilcox
co., 739 F.2d 690, 693 (1st Cir. 1984); Bergman & Lefkow Ins. Agency v. Flash
Cab Co., 249 N.E.2d 729, 737 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969)) (other citations omitted).

773

H.J. Baker & Bros., 554 A.2d at 205; see also Barry v. PMC Film Can., Inc.,
No. PC 07-3163, 2011 R.I. Super. LEXIS 110, at *1 (Aug. 4, 2011); Cone v.
AGCO Corp., No. PC 08-0575, 2011 R.I. Super. LEXIS, at *11 (Feb. 1, 2011).
774

775

Asea Brown, 2007 WL 1234523 at *57.

Blouin v. Surgical Sense, Inc., 2008 WL 2227781, 2008 R.I. Super. LEXIS
63, at *20–21 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 12, 2008).

776
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Rhode Island: The De Facto Merger Exception
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has not articulated a test for de
facto merger; however, superior courts have used the following factors
derived from Kleen Laundry and Dry Cleaning Servs., Inc. v. Total Waste
Management Corp. in determining whether or not a de facto merger had
occurred: 777
1. [t]hat there was a continuation of the
enterprise of the selling corporation vis a
visa [sic] a continuation of management,
personnel, physical location, assets, and
general business operation;
2.
[t]hat there is a continuity of
shareholders resulting from the purchase
of the assets with shares of stock, rather
than cash;
3. [t]hat the selling corporation ceases
operations, liquidate, or dissolves as soon
as possible; and
4. [t]hat the purchasing corporation
assumes the obligations of the selling
corporation necessary for uninterrupted
continuation of business. 778

817 F. Supp. 225, 230–31 (D.N.H. 1993) (quoting Acushnet River & New
Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 712 F. Supp. 1010, 1015 (D. Mass. 1989)).
777

Richmond Ready-Mix, No. Civ.A. 92-0960, 2004 WL 877595, at *9 (quoting
Kleen Laundry & Dry Cleaning Servs., Inc., 817 F. Supp. at 230–31) (alterations in
original); see also Blouin v. Surgical Sense, Inc., No. PC 07-6855, 2008 WL
2227781, 2008 R.I. Super. LEXIS 63, *17–20 (R.I. Super. Ct., May 12, 2008)
(stating “‘it is not necessary that all the factors be found for there to be a de
facto merger’”) (quoting 15 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7124.20 at 295 (rev.
perm. ed. 1983)); Asea Brown, 2007 WL 1234523 at *47 n.28.
778
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Rhode Island: The Fraud Exception
Although the Rhode Island Supreme Court has recognized the
fraud exception, it has not articulated a test or standard for determining
when it applies. 779 The superior court in Asea Brown indicated the fraud
exception was predicated on a fraudulent transfer and stated as dicta that,
“[c]riteria for finding a fraudulent transfer are set forth in the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act, G.L. 1956 §§ 6-16-1 to 6-16-12 (UFTA).” 780
The fraud exception was not at issue in that case, however. 781

South Carolina
In Brown v. American Railway Express Co., a 1924 decision, the
Supreme Court of South Carolina adopted the traditional exceptions to
the general rule of successor non-liability. 782 In Holloway v. John E. Smith’s
Sons Co., a 1977 case, the Federal District Court for the District of South
Carolina, although ostensibly applying South Carolina law, applied the
expanded exception to successor non-liability developed in Cyr v. Offen. 783
In 2005, though, the South Carolina Supreme Court confirmed that its
“opinion in Brown sets forth the proper test to determine, in a products
liability action, whether there is successor liability of a company which
purchases the assets of an unrelated company.” 784 In doing so, the court
H.J. Baker & Bro., Inc. v. Orgonics, Inc., 554 A.2d 196, 205 (R.I. 1989)
(remanding for a new trial on the issue of the fraud exception, noting the trial
court’s grant of a new trial on the count of actual fraud was inconsistent with
its denial of a new trial on the count of successor liability based on fraud).

779

780

Asea Brown, 2007 WL 1234523 at *47–48 n. 29.

781

Id. at *47.

Brown v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 123 S.E. 97, 98 (S.C. 1924); accord
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Eagle Windows & Doors, Inc., 714 S.E.2d 322
(S.C. 2011).

782

Holloway v. John E. Smith’s Sons Co., 432 F. Supp. 454, 455–456 (D.S.C.
1977) (citing Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., Inc., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974)).

783

Simmons v. Mark Lift Indus., Inc., 622 S.E.2d 213, 215 (S.C. 2005) (citing
Brown, 123 S.E. at 97); see also Walton v. Mazda of Rock Hill, 657 S.E.2d 67, 70
(S.C. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Simmons, 622 S.E.2d at 15 n.1); Pac. Capro Indus. v.
Global Advantage Distrib., Inc., No. 4:08–cv–4155–RBH, 2010 WL 890052, at
*4 (D.S.C. Mar. 8, 2010) (citing Brown, 123 S.E. at 97; Simmons, 622 S.E.2d 213;
Walton, 657 S.E.2d 67).
784
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stated that the Holloway court did not establish a new test of successor
liability, but rather it applied the mere continuation exception. 785 The
court noted:
[T]he majority of courts interpreting the
mere continuation exception have found
it applicable only when there is
commonality of ownership, i.e., the
predecessor
and
successor
corporations have substantially the
same
officers,
directors,
or
shareholders. We decline to extend the
exception to cases in which there is no
such commonality of officers, directors
and shareholders. 786
In determining whether there was an agreement to assume
liabilities, the appellate court in Walton v. Mazda of Rock Hill looked to the
asset purchase agreement, stating, ‘“When a contract is unambiguous a
court must construe its provisions according to the terms the parties
used, understood in their plain, ordinary, and popular sense.”’ 787
Regarding the fraud exception, the same court explained:
To meet the fraud exception to successor
liability, the general rule is that a
successor must knowingly participate in a
fraudulent asset transfer . . . . Proving
such knowledge is difficult, and a few
courts have advocated expanding the
fraud exception to include reviewing the
successor's actual or constructive
knowledge . . . . Under either
interpretation of the fraud exception to
successor liability, we find no genuine

785

Simmons, 622 S.E.2d at 215 n.1.

Id. (discussing Holloway, 432 F. Supp. 454); see also Capro Indus., 2010 WL
890052, at *4 (quoting Simmons, 622 S.E.2d at 215 n.1).

786

Walton, 657 S.E.2d at 69 (quoting S.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Oates,
588 S.E.2d 643, 645 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003)).

787
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issue of material fact. Walton provides
no theory supporting a claim of fraud.
For instance, there is no evidence of
inadequate
consideration
and
no
indication that McManus and Sigmon
were not bona fide purchasers for
value. 788

South Dakota
South Dakota recognizes the four traditional exceptions to the
general rule of nonliability for asset purchases, which the South Dakota
Supreme Court set forth as follows:
(1) when the purchasing corporation
expressly or impliedly agrees to assume
the selling corporation's liability;
(2) when the transaction amounts to a
consolidation or merger of the purchaser
and seller corporations;
(3) when the purchaser corporation is
merely a continuation of the seller
corporation; or
(4) when the transaction is entered into
fraudulently to escape liability for such
obligations. 789
Walton v. Mazda of Rock Hill, 657 S.E.2d at 70 (citations omitted)
(emphasis in original) (citing Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Redesigning Successor
Liability, 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 845, 875–76 (1999); see also Pac. Capro Industries,
2010 WL 890052 at *4 (quoting Walton, 657 S.E.2d at 70) (stating that the court
in Walton “confirmed that to ‘meet the fraud exception to successor liability, the
general rule is that a successor must knowingly participate in a fraudulent asset
transfer’”).
788

Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach., Inc., 387 N.W.2d 515, 518 (S.D. 1986)
(citing Jones v. Johnson Mach. & Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481, 483 (Neb. 1982);
see also Parker v. W. Dakota Insurors, 605 N.W.2d 181, 184–85 (S.D. 2000);
Groseth Intern., Inc. v. Tenneco, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 159, 169 (S.D. 1987);
Mitchell Mach., Inc. v. Ford New Holland, Inc., 918 F.2d 1366, 1370 (8th Cir.
1990) (quoting Hamaker, 387 N.W.2d at 518); Global Polymer Indus., Inc. v. C
& A Plus, Inc., No. 05-4081, 2006 WL 3743845, at *2 (D.S.D. Dec. 14, 2006)
(quoting Hamaker, 387 N.W.2d at 518); Parker v. W. Dakota Insurors, Inc., 605
789
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In Parker v. Western Dakota Insurors, the South Dakota Supreme
Court explained that these exceptions would apply more expansively in
the context of products liability:
All these exceptions, we caution to
explain, evolved under the traditional
rules applicable to corporate law. They
have,
however,
undergone
some
expansion under the law of products
liability.
Strict liability in tort for
defective products applies regardless of
negligence or privity.
Liability for
defective products rests on the need to
compensate eligible plaintiffs; thus, the
burden of economic loss is shifted not
just to the manufacturer of the defective
product, but also at times to the successor
manufacturer who by purchasing assets
from the predecessor is able to continue
making the same or similar products.
Yet, these strict liability concepts created
for the protection of injured persons do
not have the same expansive application
in a purely contractual dispute. 790
South Dakota: The Express or Implied Assumption Exception
In determining whether a successor expressly or impliedly
assumed liabilities, courts look to the language of the documents
surrounding the asset purchase or other pertinent transaction. 791
N.W.2d 181, 184–85 (S.D. 2000) (quoting Downtowner , Inc. v. Acrometal
Prod. Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118, 121 (N.D. 1984))).
790

Parker, 605 N.W.2d at 185.

See, e.g., Id. at 185–87 (finding no assumption of liabilities) (quoting purchase
agreement); Groseth Intern., Inc., 410 N.W.2d at 169 (finding express and implied
assumption) (citing purchase agreement); Hamaker, 387 N.W.2d at 518 (“There
is no language in the contract between these parties to suggest that KenwelJackson impliedly assumed responsibility for future products liability actions
against Kenwel. In fact, the purchase agreement expressly conditioned the sale
of assets upon Kenwel's promise to discharge, or to provide for, all of its
current or long-term liabilities incurred or unsatisfied as of the date of
closing.”) (referencing purchase agreement).
791
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Moreover, in Parker, the court stated: “‘[a] buyer of assets can avoid the
implied assumption of liabilities by enumerating liabilities assumed and
explicitly excluding the assumption of liabilities not enumerated.’” 792
South Dakota: The De Facto Merger Exception
The Supreme Court of South Dakota explained in Hamaker: “[A]
merger involves the actual absorption of one corporation into another,
with the former losing its existence as a separate corporate entity. When
the seller corporation retains its existence while parting with its assets, a
‘de facto merger’ may be found if the consideration given by the
purchaser corporation is shares of its own stock.” 793
South Dakota: The Mere Continuation Exception
In Hamaker, the Supreme Court of South Dakota analyzed the
reasoning of Turner, ultimately concluding that it would not follow this
expanded approach to continuity. 794 The Hamaker court stated: “The
Parker, 605 N.W.2d at 185 (quoting Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc.,
587 F. Supp. 144, 148 (E.D. Pa.1984), rev'd on other grounds, 762 F.2d 303 (3rd
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985)); see also Hamaker, 387 N.W.2d at 518
(referencing purchase agreement).
792

Hamaker, 387 N.W.2d at 518 (citing Leannais v. Cincinatti, Inc., 565 F.2d
437, 439 (7th Cir. 1977) (quoting Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250
(E.D. Wis. 1973)).
793

Hamaker, 387 N.W.2d at 519 (noting: “Many of the factors relied upon in
Turner exist here . . . . However, we are not persuaded to follow Turner in this
case where none of the owners, officers or stockholders were the same, where
Kenwel-Jackson expressly contracted not to assume any of Kenwel’s liabilities,
where Kenwel-Jackson’s business developed in a different direction relative to
product line and customers and especially where the notcher in question was
neither designed, manufactured nor sold by the successor corporation. We
find, therefore, that Kenwel-Jackson's cash purchase of Kenwel's assets does
not fall within the “merger” or “continuation” exceptions to the general rule)
(discussing Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 883–84 (Mich.
1976). But see Global Polymer Indus., Inc. v. C & A Plus, Inc., No. 05-4081,
2006 WL 3743845, at *2 (D.S.D. 2006) (seemingly misinterpreting Hamaker’s
rejection of Turner, stating: “The South Dakota Supreme Court has indicated
that cash consideration is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of
continuation of a successor corporation's responsibility for liability if: ‘(1) There
was basic continuity of the enterprise of the seller corporation, including,
apparently, a retention of key personnel, assets, general business operations,
794
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key element of a ‘continuation’ is a commonality of the officers,
directors, and stockholders in the predecessor and successor
corporations.” 795
South Dakota: The Product Line Exception
South Dakota has expressly rejected the product line exception,
following the Supreme Court of North Dakota’s reasoning that imposing
liability in such cases would amount to liability without duty and would
thus not comport with their understanding of strict liability in tort. 796

Tennessee
The Tennessee Supreme Court has not yet addressed or adopted
a test for successor liability. Tennessee appellate courts, however, have
approved the four traditional exceptions and a possible fifth, involving
inadequate consideration, as follows:
(1) The purchaser expressly or impliedly
agrees to assume such debts; (2) the
transaction amounts to a consolidation or
merger of the seller and purchaser; (3) the
purchasing corporation is merely a
continuation of the selling corporation; or
(4) the transaction is entered into
fraudulently in order to escape liability for
such debts . . . . A fifth exception,
sometimes incorporated . . . is the

and the corporate name[;] (2) The seller corporation ceased ordinary business
operations, liquidated, and dissolved soon after distribution of consideration
received from the buying corporation[;] (3) The purchasing corporation
assumed those liabilities and obligations of the seller ordinarily necessary for
the continuation of the normal business operations of the seller corporation; (4)
The purchasing corporation held itself out to the world as the effective
continuation of the seller corporation.’”) (citing Hamaker, 387 N.W.2d at 519).
Hamaker, 387 N.W.2d at 518 (citing Leannais, 565 F.2d at 440); see also
Mitchell Machinery, Inc. v. Ford New Holland, Inc., 918 F.2d 1366, 1371 (8th
Cir. 1990) (quoting Hamaker, 387 N.W.2d at 518).
795

796 Hamaker, 387 N.W.2d at 520–21 (citing Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal
Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118, 121 (N.D. 1984)).
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absence of adequate consideration for the
sale or transfer. 797
In Mapco Express, Inc. v. Interstate Entertainment, Inc. the court
stated the general rule of successor non-liability and discussed the
implied assumption, mere continuation, and de facto merger exceptions. 798
Addressing the implied assumption doctrine, the district court
stated: “A party seeking to recover under the theory of contract implied
in law must prove ‘[a] benefit conferred upon the defendant by the
plaintiff, appreciation by the defendant of such benefit, and acceptance
of such benefit under such circumstances that it would be inequitable for
him to retain the benefit without payment of the value thereof.’” 799
As for the de facto merger exception, the court noted, “In a de facto
merger, ‘there is a sale of substantially all of one corporation’s assets in
exchange for the stocks and bonds of the purchasing corporation[]’” 800
and that “[i]n a de facto merger, as opposed to a legal merger, the original
company maintains its legal entity, despite retaining no assets and going
out of business.” 801
797 Hopewell Baptist Church v. Se. Window Mfg. Co., No. E2000-02699-COAR3-CV, 2001 WL 708850, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2001) (citations
omitted) (quoting 1 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, Products Liability § 5.06(2), at
70.58(2)-(3) (1981) (quoting McKee v. Harris Seybold Co., 109 N.J.Super. 555,
264 A.2d 98 (1970)); Gas Plus of Anderson Cty., Inc. v. Arowood, No. 03A019311-CH-00406, 1994 WL 465797, at *3–4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 1994); see
also Flake v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., Nos. 3:07–0925, 3:07–926, 3:07–
927, 2011 WL 1106694, at *8 n.6 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 23, 2011) (quoting
Hopewell, 2001 WL 708850, at *4); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Potter, No. 4:04-cv112, 2006 WL 2854386, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 3, 2006) (citing Hopewell, 2001
WL 708850; Gas Plus of Anderson Cty., Inc., 1994 WL 465797); Woody v.
Combustion Engineering, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 817, 819 (M.D. Tenn. 1978).

No. 3:08-cv-1235, 2011 WL 12556959, at *14–17 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 11,
2011).
798

Mapco, 2011 WL 12556959 at *15 (quoting Hopewell, 2001 WL 708850, at *6)
(alteration in original).

799

Mapco, 2011 WL 12556959, at *15 (quoting Signature Combs, Inc. v. United
States, 331 F. Supp. 2d 630, 641 (W.D. Tenn. 2004)).
800

801 Mapco, 2011 WL 12556959, at *15 (alteration added) (citing IBC Mfg. Co. v.
Velsicol Chem. Corp., 187 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 1999); Signature Combs, Inc., 331 F.
Supp. 2d at 641).
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And, finally, regarding the mere continuation exception, the
court stated:
An acquiring corporation will be deemed
a mere continuation of the acquired
company if: “(1) a corporation transfers
its assets; (2) the acquiring corporation
pays less than adequate consideration for
the assets; (3) the acquiring corporation
continues the selling corporations
business, (4) both corporations share at
least one common officer who was
instrumental in the transfer, and (5) the
selling corporation is left incapable of
paying is creditors.” 802

Texas
Texas does not recognize the four traditional exemptions to nonliability for asset purchases. Successor liability in Texas is governed by
statute and is limited to the express assumption of liability. 803 The Texas
legislature first codified the rule for successor liability in asset purchases
in a legislative reversal of a court of appeals decision to impose the
doctrine. 804
In 1977, the Texas Court of Appeals applied the de facto merger
doctrine in Western Res. Life Ins. Co. v. Gerhardt. 805 In its first session
following the Gerhardt decision, the Texas legislature passed Texas
Business Corporation Act art. 5.10 § B, which stated:
A disposition of any, all, or substantially
all, of the property and assets of a
corporation, whether or not it requires

Mapco, 2011 WL 12556959, at *17 (citing IBC Mfg. Co., 187 F.3d at 637);
Cricket Comm’ns, Inc. v. Talk Til You Drop Wireless, Inc., No. 3:09–128, 2009
WL 2850687, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 1, 2009)).

802

803

TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 10.254.

804

See generally TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT art. 5.10(B) (expired Jan. 1, 2010).

805

See 553 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
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the special authorization of the
shareholders of the corporation affected
under Section A of this article:
(1) is not considered to be a merger or
conversion pursuant to this Act or
otherwise; and
(2) except as otherwise expressly provided
by another statute, does not make the
acquiring
corporation,
foreign
corporation, or other entity, responsible
or liable for any liability or obligation of
the selling corporation that the acquiring
corporation did not expressly assume. 806
The abovementioned statute expired on January 1, 2010, and was
replaced with one that is similar, limiting successor liability only to
express assumption:
(a) A disposition of all or part of the
property of a domestic entity, regardless
of whether the disposition requires the
approval of the entity's owners or
members, is not a merger or conversion
for any purpose.
(b) Except as otherwise expressly
provided by another statute, a person
acquiring property described by this
section may not be held responsible or
liable for a liability or obligation of the
transferring domestic entity that is not
expressly assumed by the person. 807

806

TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT art. 5.10(B) (expired Jan. 1, 2010).

TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 10.254; see Ford, Bacon & Davis, L.L.C. v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 635 F.3d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Where, as here, the
entity purchasing assets has expressly not assumed liability for the assets it
purchased, such liability will not extend under ‘operation of Texas law.’”)
(referencing purchase agreement).

807
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As noted in Mudgett v. Paxson Mach. Co., “the purpose of [the
statute was] to preclude the application of de facto merger in any sale, lease,
exchange or other disposition of all or substantially all the property and
assets of a corporation.” 809 The Mudgett court also rejected the mere
continuation exception, stating “[t]he ‘mere continuation’ doctrine is an
even more liberal means of imposing liability upon the acquiring
corporation in a purchase of assets transaction than is the de facto merger
doctrine . . . . Certainly if the de facto merger doctrine is contrary to the
public policy of our state, so must be the mere continuation doctrine.” 810
Later, in Shapolsky v. Brewton the court also rejected the fraud exception,
reaffirming that Texas only acknowledges the single exception to the
non-liability rule. 811 As noted by the 1st District Court of Appeals of
Texas in Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Gordon, “Texas strongly embraces the
non-liability rule. To impose liability for a predecessor’s torts, the
successor corporation must have expressly assumed liability.” 812 In
drawing a sharp comparison, the court noted, “Delaware and Maryland
recognize all four exceptions to the rule of non-liability by case law . . . . .
The Business Corporation Act controls in Texas.” 813
808

808

709 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. App. 1986) (emphasis in original) (alteration added).

Mudgett, 709 S.W.2d at 758 (quoting TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 5.10
cmt).
809

Id. (alteration added) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)
(citing Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974)).

810

811

Shapolsky v. Brewton, 56 S.W.3d 120, 137–39 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001).

812 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Gordon, 16 S.W.3d 127, 139 (Tex. App. 2000)
(citing TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT art. 5.10(B)(2)); see also Ford, Bacon & Davis,
L.L.C., 635 F.3d at 737 (quoting Keller Founds., Inc. v. Wausau
UnderwritersTravelers Ins. Co., 635 F.3d 871, 877 (5th Cir. 2010)).

Lockheed Martin Corp., 16 S.W.3d at 134 (citations omitted) (citing Elmer v.
Tenneco Resins, 698 F. Supp. 535, 540 (D. Del. 1988); Nissen Corp. v. Miller,
594 A.2d 564, 565–66 (Md. 1991); see also Lockheed Martin Corp., 16 S.W.3d a
139–40); C.M. Asfahl Agency v. Tensor, Inc., 135 S.W. 3d 768, 780–81 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2004) (citing TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT art 5.10(B)(2004); Sitaram v. Aetna
U.S. Healthcare of N. Tex., Inc., 152 S.W.3d 817, 826 (Tex. App. 2004) (citing
TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT art 5.10(B)(2); C.M. Asfahl Agency, 135 S.W.3d at 778));
Suarez v. Sherman Gin Co., 697 S.W.2d 17, 20–21 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
813
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Utah
Utah adheres to the traditional approach to successor liability. 814
The de facto merger exception “considers whether the business operations
and management continued and requires that the buyer paid for the asset
purchase with its own stock.” 815 The ‘“mere continuation[exception]’
considers not whether the ‘business operation[s]’ continued, but whether
the ‘corporate entity’ continued. . . . [a] continuation demands ‘a
common identity of stock, directors, and stockholders and the existence
of only one corporation at the completion of the transfer.’” 816
In response to certified questions from the 10th Circuit Court of
Appeals, 817 in 2007, the Utah Supreme Court held: (1) “Utah adheres to
the traditional rule of successor nonliability, subject to four widely
recognized exceptions[,]” and (2) “Utah law imposes on successor
corporations an independent post-sale duty to warn consumers of
defects in products manufactured and sold by the predecessor
corporation.” 818The court set out the four traditional exceptions as
follows:
A successor corporation or other business
entity that acquires assets of a predecessor
corporation or other business entity is
See, e.g., Tabor v. Metal Ware Corp., 182 F. App'x 774, 776 (10th Cir. 2006);
Decius v. Action Collection Serv., Inc., 105 P.3d 956, 958–59 (Utah Ct. App.
2004); Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 986 P.2d 748, 752 (Utah Ct.
App. 2004), aff’d, 16 P.3d 1214 (Utah 2000); Herrod v. Metal Powder Prods.,
413 F. App’x 7, 12 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Tabor v. Metal Ware Corp., 168 P.3d
814, 815 (Utah 2007)).
814

815 Decius, 105 P.3d at 959 (citing Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F.Supp.
797, 801 (W.D. Mich. 1974).

Decius, 105 P.3d at 959 (citations omitted) (quoting Travis v. Harris Corp.,
565 F.2d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d
75, 86 (3d Cir. 1986) (Mansmann, J., dissenting)); see also Icon Health & Fitness,
Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17340, at *6 (D. Utah 2011).
816

Tabor v. Metal Ware Corp., 182 F. App'x 774, 776–77 (10th Cir. 2006)
[hereinafter Tabor I], certified question answered, 168 P.3d 814.

817

Tabor v. Metal Ware Corp., 168 P.3d 814, 816–17 (Utah 2007) [hereinafter
Tabor II] (emphasis in the original).

818
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subject to liability for harm to persons or
property caused by a defective product
sold
or
otherwise
distributed
commercially by the predecessor if the
acquisition:
(a) is accompanied by an agreement for
successor to assume such liability; or
(b) results from a fraudulent conveyance
to escape liability for the debts or
liabilities of the predecessor; or
(c) constitutes a consolidation or merger
with the predecessor; or
(d) results in successor becoming a
continuation of the predecessor. 819
The Utah Supreme Court declined to further extend the rules of
successor liability stating, “[i]n our view, the general rule of successor
nonliability, together with the four exceptions provided . . . affords
adequate protection to consumers, and we accordingly decline to expand
the exceptions.” 820
The court did, however, adopt the position of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts, which imposes on successors a duty to warn in these
circumstances:
(a) A successor corporation or other
business entity that acquires assets of a
predecessor corporation or other business
entity, whether or not liable . . . is subject
to liability for harm to persons or
property caused by the successor's failure
to warn of a risk created by a product
sold or distributed by the predecessor if:
Tabor II, 168 P.3d at 816–17 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12 (AM. LAW INST. 1998)).
819

820 Tabor II, 168 P.3d. at 817; Herrod v. Metal Powder Prods., 413 F. App'x 7,
12 (10th Cir. 2010) (“The Utah Supreme Court has declined to adopt the
‘product line’ or ‘continuity of enterprise’ exceptions recognized by some other
states.”) (quoting Tabor v. Metal Ware Corp., 168 P.3d 814, 815)).
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(1) the successor undertakes or agrees to
provide services for maintenance or
repair of the product or enters into a
similar relationship with purchasers of the
predecessor's products giving rise to
actual or potential economic advantage to
the successor, and
(2) a reasonable person in the position of
the successor would provide a warning.
(b) A reasonable person in the position of
the successor would provide a warning if:
(1) the successor knows or reasonably
should know that the product poses a
substantial risk of harm to persons or
property; and
(2) those to whom a warning might be
provided can be identified and can
reasonably be assumed to be unaware of
the risk of harm; and
(3) a warning can be effectively
communicated to and acted on by those
to whom a warning might be provided;
and
(4) the risk of harm is sufficiently great to
justify the burden of providing a
warning. 821
Regarding the determination of whether a duty to warn has been
discharged, the Supreme Court of Utah stated:
If a successor corporation has a duty to
warn under section 13, one factor in
determining whether a successor
corporation has discharged its duty to
warn is whether it provided warning to
the end user, not just an intermediary like
Tabor II, 168 P.3d at 818 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 13 (AM. LAW INST. 1998)).
821

986

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 18

a distributor or retailer. In making this
determination, the successor has a duty to
only warn the end user if it has a
reasonable means of doing so. Another
factor to consider in this case might be
the effect of the closed [product] recall.
Other factors may be relevant, but the
factual development of this case is
insufficient for us to identify them. 822

Vermont
In 2005, the Vermont Supreme Court had the opportunity to
restate its position on successor liability in Gladstone v. Stuart Cinemas,
Inc. 823 The court began by reciting the traditional rule of non-liability in
asset sales, unless one of five traditionally accepted exceptions applied:
(1) express or implied assumption, (2) de facto merger or consolidation,
(3) mere continuation, (4) a fraudulent scheme to avoid liability, or (5)
inadequate consideration for the sale. 824 Interestingly, the court appears
to have split the traditional fraud analysis into two types: actual fraud and
constructive fraud. The latter of which appears to have only one
element, inadequate consideration, rather than the more common
alternative, the two-element approach set forth in the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act. 825
In Gladstone, the Supreme Court of Vermont noted that in
Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 826 it had declined to adopt either the
continuity of enterprise or product line exceptions because the successor
was not responsible for creating the risk of harm nor did it benefit from
the proceeds of the product’s sale; it also did not invite the product’s use
822

Tabor II, 168 P.3d at 818 (footnote omitted).

Gladstone v. Stuart Cinemas, Inc., 878 A.2d 214 (Vt. 2005); Post v.
Killington, Ltd., No. 5:07–CV–252, 2010 WL 3323659, at *8 (D.Vt. 2010).
823

824

Gladstone, 878 A.2d at 220.

See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 348 (2012) (UFTA enacted as part of the Bankruptcy
Code).

825

826

479 A.2d 126 (Vt. 1984).
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or make any safety representations, and it could not enhance the safety
of the product given that it had already been released into the market. 827
The Gladstone court then turned to Cab-Tek, Inc. v. E.B.M., Inc., 828 which
addressed the distinction between consolidation and de facto merger.
Consolidation occurs when the ‘“combining corporations are dissolved
and lose their identity in a new corporate entity.”’ 829 De facto merger
occurs where a corporation (1) takes control of all of the assets of
another corporation, (2) without consideration, and (3) the predecessor
corporation ceases to function. 830 Simply put, no asset purchase is
required for a de facto merger in Vermont.
The Gladstone court then announced the contours of the mere
continuation doctrine noting, “[a]s they have evolved, there is little
difference between the de facto merger exception and the mere
continuation exception . . . . We view the name of the exception as
unimportant.” 831 The mere continuation doctrine, said the court, focuses
on continuation of the corporate entity, not its business.832 Traditional
indicators or factors for a finding of continuation are a commonality of
officers, directors, and shareholders and the existence of only one
corporation after the sale is complete. 833 Although these are traditional

827

Gladstone, 878 A.2d at 220 (citing Ostrowski, 479 A.2d at 127).

828

571 A.2d 671 (Vt. 1990).

Cab-Tek, Inc., 571 A.2d at 672 (quoting Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d
437, 440 (7th Circ. 1977)) (citing Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452
F.2d 621, 625 (7th Cir. 1971)); Ladjevardian v. Laidlaw–Coggeshall, Inc., 431
F.Supp. 834, 838 (S.D.N.Y.1977).

829

830

Gladstone, 878 A.2d at 221 (citing Cab-Tek, Inc., 571 A.2d at 672).

Gladstone, 878 A.2d at 222 n.4 (citations and quotations omitted) (citing
Cargo Partner AG v. Albatrans, Inc., 352 F.3d 41, 45 n.3 (2d Cir. 2003); Nat’l
Gypsum Co. v. Cont’l Brands Corp., 895 F. Supp. 328, 336 (D. Mass. 1995);
Cab-Tek, Inc., 571 A.2d at 672); Morrison Enters., Inc. v. Perrotta, No. 292-8-04
Bncv, 2006 Vt. Super. LEXIS 34, at *5–6 (Vt. Super. Ct., Oct. 19, 2006).
831

832 Gladstone,

878 A.2d at 222.

833 Gladstone, 878 A.2d at 222; see also Post v. Killington, Ltd., 424 F. App’x 27
(2d Cir. 2011) (court discusses the factors that determine whether the mere
continuation exception applies: (1) whether there is continuity of ownership
and management between the purchasing and selling corporations, (2) only the
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834

indicators, they are not requirements in Vermont.
The court stated
that de facto merger, on the other hand, focuses on the absorption of one
corporation’s business by another, and its traditional indicators include
similarity of assets, locations, managements, personnel, shareholders, and
business practices. 835
Inadequacy of consideration may also be
present. 836
The Gladstone court then returned to the mere continuation
doctrine—considering, listing, and discussing its factors in declining
order of significance: (1) continuity of ownership and management,
“[t]he single most important factor[;]”(2) whether only the successor
corporation survived, although survival as a mere shell or for a short
period is not significant; (3) inadequate consideration; (4) similarity of the
business operated by the successor to that of the predecessor; and (5)
continuation of business practices, including how the company holds
itself out to the public. 837
The court also considered whether or not recognition of the
transfer as being free and clear of liabilities would work a fraud on
creditors by way of a breach of the fiduciary duty that corporations and
their directors owe to creditors of insolvent corporations on those
operating in the zone of insolvency. 838 The court concluded that a duty
to creditors did exist here because “[the successor corporation’s] actions
advanced [its] own interests while leaving [the predecessor corporation]
insolvent and unable to pay its debt to plaintiffs . . . .” 839

successor corporation has survived, (3) adequate consideration supported the
sale, and (4) the successor operates the same business as the seller).
834 Gladstone,
835

878 A.2d at 222.

Id.

836 Id.

Id. at 222–23; see also Post v. Killington, Ltd., 2010 WL 3323659, at *9–13
(D. Vt. 2010).

837

838

Gladstone, 878 A.2d at 224.

Gladstone, 878 A.2d at 225 (citing Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate
Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors’ Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1489
(1993)).
839
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Virginia
Virginia follows the traditional rule of successor liability and
recognizes only the four traditional exceptions. 840 In order to hold a
purchasing corporation liable for the obligations of the selling
corporation, “it must appear that (1) the purchasing corporation
expressly or impliedly agreed to assume such liabilities, (2) the
circumstances surrounding the transaction warrant a finding that there
was a consolidation or de facto merger of the two corporations, (3) the
purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the selling
corporation, or (4) the transaction is fraudulent in fact.” 841 Virginia has
declined to adopt either the product line exception or the “‘expanded
mere continuation’” exception, primarily because Virginia has not
adopted the doctrine of strict liability and these exceptions are based
upon that doctrine. 842
Virginia: The Express or Implied Assumption Exception
In Harris v. T.I., Inc., the Supreme Court of Virginia looked at
provisions of the asset purchase agreement and determined that there
was no expressed or implied assumption of tort liability by the
purchaser. 843 In States Roofing Corp. v. Bush Construction Corp., the appellate
court found an implied assumption of liabilities in the context of a
Harris v. T.I., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 605, 609 (Va. 1992) (citing Pepper v. Dixie
Splint Coal Co., 181 S.E. 406, 410 (Va. 1935); Peoples Nat’l Bank v. Morris,
148 S.E. 828, 829 (Va. 1929)); see also Fuisz v. Lynch, 147 F. App'x 319, 322
(4th Cir. 2005); Bizmark, Inc. v. Air Prods., Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d 680 (W.D. Va.
2006).

840

Harris, 413 S.E.2d at 609 (citing Pepper v. Dixie Splint Coal Co., 165 Va.
179, 191, 181 S.E. 406, 410 (Va. 1935); Peoples Nat. Bank v. Morris, 152 Va.
814, 819, 148 S.E. 828,829 (Va. 1929); see also Kaiser Found. Health Plan of
Mid-Atlantic States v. Clary & Moore, P.C., 123 F.3d 201, 204–05 (4th Cir.
1997); States Roofing Corp. v. Bush Constr. Corp., 426 S.E.2d 124, 126–27 (Va
Ct. App. 1993); 1993MDM Assocs. v. Johns Bros. Energy Techs., Inc., No.
L01-1190, 2002 WL 31989156, at *5 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2002).

841

842

Harris, 413 S.E.2d at 609–10 (citations omitted).

843

Id. at 608–09.
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worker’s compensation case where the conduct of the successor
evidenced the intention to assume the role of predecessor. 844
Virginia: The Mere Continuation Exception
“A common identity of the officers, directors, and stockholders
in the selling and purchasing corporations is the key element of a
‘continuation.’ . . . When, however, the purchase of all the assets of a
corporation is a bona fide, arm's-length transaction, the ‘mere
continuation’ exception does not apply.” 845
In Fuiz v. Lynch, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, applying Virginia law, further explained:
Several factors have been identified for
assessing whether a business entity
constitutes a mere continuation of a
predecessor entity. The key element for
such an assessment, according to the
Supreme Court of Virginia, is the
“common identity of the officers,
directors, and stockholders” in the
successor and predecessor corporations . .
. . Also relevant is whether a successor
entity “continues in the same business as
its predecessor,” although this factor is
less important than identity of ownership
. . . . Other factors identified as pertinent
to such an assessment include “whether
two corporations or only one remain”
and whether the successor continues to
States Roofing Corp. v. Bush Constr. Corp., 426 S.E.2d 124, 127 (Va. Ct.
App. 1993) (Where a successor-subcontractor purchased the “equipment, trade
accounts receivable, contract rights and inventory” of a predecessorsubcontractor but did not assume any of its liabilities or obligations; the
successor-subcontractor informed the contractor that it was going to continue
work on the predecessor-subcontractor’s jobs; and the successor-subcontractor
notified the sub-subcontractor to continue work, the successor-subcontractor
was the “statutory employer” of an employee of the sub-subcontractor as a
successor to the predecessor-subcontractor).
844

Harris, 413 S.E.2d at 609 (citations omitted); Bizmark, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d at
694; In re Meredith, 357 B.R. 374, 381 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006).

845
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operate at the same location with the
same telephone number as its predecessor
. . . . Additionally, when a predecessor
entity's assets are transferred for less than
adequate consideration, the successor is
“likely to be a mere continuation.” . . .
Finally, notwithstanding these factors,
Virginia law provides that the mere
continuation exception does not apply
when the “purchase of all the assets of a
corporation is a bona fide, arm's-length
transaction.” 846
In Fuiz v. Lynch, the court concluded that the mere continuation
exception applied where (1) there was complete continuity of ownership,
(2) the successor operated the same business in the same offices, using
the same phone number, (3) the predecessors ceased to exist, and (4)
even though adequate consideration was paid, the transaction was not
conducted as if the seller and buyer were “strangers” and thus, was not a
bona fide arm’s length transaction. 847
Virginia: De Facto Merger Exception
The Virginia state circuit court has used the four traditional
factors in deciding whether a de facto merger has occured, stating:
Generally, courts look for four factors to
determine whether a de facto merger has
occurred: (1) continuity of enterprise; (2)
continuity of shareholders; (3) cessation
of operations by seller; and (4)
assumption of the obligations necessary

Fuisz v. Lynch, 147 F. App’x 319, 321–22 (4th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted)
(quoting Harris, 413 S.E.2d at 609; Clary & Moore, 123 F.3d at 20); see also
Beck v. Va. Sash & Door, Inc., 58 Va. Cir. 65, 70 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2001).
846

Fuisz, 147 F. App’x at 322–23; see also Beck, 58 Va. Cir. at 70 (concluding that
the purchasers were liable under the mere continuation exception); Clary &
Moore, 123 F.3d at 208 (same).

847
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to uninterrupted continuation of normal
business operations by the seller. 848
The court in Augusta Lumber Co., Inc. v. Broad Run Holdings used
the term “factors” (and all four were present in the case’s fact pattern),
but the cases cited by Augusta had previously described these
considerations as “elements,” with continuity of ownership being the
most important. 849 Thus, it appears to remain an open question whether
the de facto merger exception in Virginia is made up of factors (indicators)
or elements (requirements).

Washington
Washington recognizes the traditional four exceptions to the
general rule of non-liability in asset purchases as well as the product line
exception. 850 The Washington Supreme Court noted that the adoption
of the product line exception was preferable to expanding the mere
continuation exception- a rule “designed for other purposes.” 851
Augusta Lumber Co. v. Broad Run Holdings, LLC, 71 Va. Cir. 326, 327 (Va.
Cir. 2006) (footnote omitted); see also Blizzard v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.,
831 F. Supp. 544, 547 (E.D. Va. 1993); Crawford Harbor Assocs. v. Blake
Const. Co., 661 F. Supp. 880, 884 (E.D. Va. 1987).

848

Augusta Lumber, Co., 71 Va. Cir. at 328 (citing Blizzard, 831 F. Supp. at 547;
Bud Antle, Inc. v. E. Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d 1451, 1458 (11th Cir. 1985));
Crawford Harbor Assocs., 661 F. Supp. at 884.

849

See Hall v. Armstrong Cork, Inc., 692 P.2d 787, 789–90 (Wash. 1984) (“The
general rule in Washington is that a corporation purchasing the assets of
another corporation does not, by reason of the purchase of assets, become
liable for the debts and liabilities of the selling corporation, except where: (1)
the purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to assume liability; (2) the purchase
is a de facto merger or consolidation; (3) the purchaser is a mere continuation
of the seller; or (4) the transfer of assets is for the fraudulent purpose of
escaping liability.” (citations omitted)); see also In re Bellingham Ins. Agency,
Inc., 702 F.3d 553, 572 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2880 (U.S. 2013);
U.S. ex rel. Klein v. Omeros Corp., 897 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1065–66 (W.D. Wash.
2012); Cambridge Townhomes, LLC v. Pac. Star Roofing, 209 P.3d 863, 868
(Wash. 2009); Creech v. AGCO Corp., 138 P.3d 623, 624 (Wash Ct. App.
2006).
850

851 Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 386, 386 (Wash. 1984) (citing Ray v. Alad
Corp., 19 Cal.3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1997); see also Hall v.
Armstrong Cork, Inc., 692 P.2d 787, 790 (Wash. 1984) (“Rather than
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In 2009, the Washington Court of Appeals held, applying Wash.
Rev. Code 51.16.200, which makes successors liable for the unpaid taxes
of the business they succeed, that “selling or conveying a significant or
substantial portion of the closing business’s property to another business
triggers successor liability.” 852 In Orca Logistics, the court determined that
a significant portion of a closing business is “a major part of the
materials, supplies, merchandise, inventory, fixtures, or equipment[,]”
including intangible property that “has no physical existence, but may
have value[,]” such as goodwill and customer lists. 853 The court found
that the successor corporation was a liable successor to the predecessor
corporation due to the ‘“sale or transfer of four trucks, four trailers, [and
other materials],’ which constituted a “significant… portion of the
closing business” and thus, the successor was liable for the predecessor’s
unpaid premiums of workers' compensation coverage. 854
Washington: The Express or Implied Assumption Exception
In 1954, the Supreme Court of Washington addressed this
exception, citing to a treatise for the following proposition:
“[U]nless the corporation has expressly
assumed the debts and obligations of its
predecessor, its liability, if it exists at all,
must arise by implication or presumption,
out of the facts and circumstances
attending the incorporation, and the
acquisition by the corporation of the
assets and property of the firm or
association, and it is quite obvious that
these must be peculiar to each case and
are very seldom exactly the same in any
expanding the mere continuation exception founded on corporate law
principles, we adopted the ‘product line rule’ of liability as developed by the
California Supreme Court . . . .”).
Orca Logistics, Inc. v. State, No. 62264-1-I, 2009 WL 1589366 at *2 (Wash.
Ct. App. Jun. 8, 2009) (footnote omitted).
852

853

Orca Logistics, Inc., 2009 WL 1589366 at *2.

854 Orca Logistics, Inc., 2009 WL 1589366 at *2. (footnotes omitted) (quoting
assessment of the Board).
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two cases. The corporation, of course, would
not be liable on the partnership obligations where
no showing is made that it either expressly or
impliedly assumed them.” 855
An express assumption of liability by the successor corporation is
determined from the fair meaning of the language in the contract. 856
Washington: The Fraud Exception
In Eagle Pacific Insurance Co., the appellate court noted, “The
different common law tests for applying for [the fraud] exception
include: (1) a showing of fraud or actions otherwise lacking good faith,
(2) insufficient consideration for the assets, and (3) predecessor left
unable to respond to creditor's claims.” 857 In applying the fraud
exception, the court concluded the test was met where the successor was
created for the “sole purpose” of hindering the predecessor’s creditors. 858

Mill & Logging Supply Co. v. W. Tenino Lumber Co., 265 P.2d 807, 812
(Wash. 1954) (quoting 8 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS 393, § 4012 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 1999))
(emphasis added by the court).
855

856Creech

v. AGCO Corp., 138 P.3d 623, 624–25 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006);
Optimer Int’l., Inc. v. Bellevue, L.L.C., No. 55967-2-I, 2006 WL 2246197, at *4
(Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2006).

Eagle Pac. Ins. Co. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 934 P.2d 715, 721
(Wash. Ct. App. 1997) aff’d, 959 P.2d 1052, 1056–60 (Wash. 1998) (quoting
Robert C. Manlowe, Note, SUCCESSOR LIABILITY IN WASHINGTON:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY- Meisel v. M & N Modern Hydraulic Press Company, 6
U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 323, 331 n.37 (1983)) (affirming the Appellate Court
on the issue of Fraudulent Transfer); see also Hamer Elec., Inc. v. TMB-NW
Liquidation, LLC, No. 3:12-CV-5332 RBL, 2012 WL 3239190, at *4 (W.D.
Wash. 2012); Gremp v. Ramsey, No. C08-558RS, 2009 WL 112674, at *6
(W.D. Wash. 2009).
857

Eagle Pac. Ins Co. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 959 P.2d 1052 at
1059–60; (Wash. 1998); Long v. Home Health Servs. of Puget Sound, Inc., 719
P.2d 178, 181 (Wash. Ct. App 1986).

858

2017] A TAXONOMY AND EVALUATION OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY (REVISITED) 995

Washington: The De Facto Merger Exception
Washington courts have not set out a definitive test for de facto
merger. One Washington appellate court did list one key element of a de
facto merger:
In addition to other requirements . . . such a union can only be
found when the consideration given to the selling corporation for its
assets is shares of the purchasing corporation's stock, rather than cash.
The rationale behind this requirement is that liability should be imposed
on the purchaser only in cases where the seller's stockholders [] retain an
ownership interest in the business operations. 859
Washington: The Mere Continuation Exception
In 2009 the Supreme Court of Washington determined that a
successor corporation to a sole proprietorship was a mere continuation
of the sole proprietorship. 860 The court explained:
Washington courts rely on several factors
to determine whether a successor
business is a mere continuation of a seller
. . . . These include a common identity
between the officers, directors, and
stockholders of the selling and purchasing
companies, and the sufficiency of the
consideration running to the seller
corporation in light of the assets being
sold . . . . In considering these factors,
the objective of the court is to discern

Cashar v. Redford, 624 P.2d 194, 196 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981); see also Payne v.
Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., 190 P.3d 102, 108 n. 11 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (“de
facto merger ‘can only be found when the consideration given to the selling
corporation for its assets is shares of the purchasing corporation's stock, rather
than cash . . . .’”) (quoting Cashar, 624 P.2d at 196).
842

Cambridge Townhomes, LLC v. Pac. Star Roofing, 209 P.3d 863, 868–69
(Wash. 2009).

860
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whether the “purchaser represents
‘merely a “new hat” for the seller.’” 861
The court rejected the successor’s argument that a corporation,
as a matter of law, could not be a mere continuation of a sole
proprietorship, holding that the continuity of officers, directors, and
shareholders was not a “rigid requirement,” stating: 862
The successor liability doctrine is a
common law rule, and the principle it
embraces is not linked to statutes or laws
governing corporate entities. Though
there is no continuation of officers,
directors, or shareholders where a sole
proprietorship is involved, we can
consider the continuity of individuals in
control of the business as satisfying this
factor, which at any rate is not a rigid
requirement for finding successor
liability. 863
Previously, several appellate courts had treated the mere
continuation test as more stringent. Some required that the plaintiff
establish three requirements in order to prove that a successor is a mere
continuation of a predecessor; the requirements were set forth as
follows:
(1) a common identity of the officers,
directors, and stockholders between the
companies; (2) that the new company
gave inadequate consideration for the
assets transferred; and (3) a transfer of all
or substantially all of the old company’s
assets. 864
Cambridge Townhomes, LLC, 209 P.3d at 868 (citations omitted) (quoting and
citing Cashar, 624 P.2d at 196); McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 264 A.2d 98, 106
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970).
861

862

Cambridge Townhomes, LLC, 209 P.3d at 868.

863

Id.

Rendoni v. Pac. Fleet & Lease Sales, Inc., No. 43049-1-I, 1999 WL 674584,
at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. June 1, 1999) (footnotes omitted); Gall Landau Young
864
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Others required proof of the first two requirements but not the third. 865
In either case, the mere consideration test was treated as having more
rigid requirements than in Cambridge Townhomes, LLC v. Pac. Star
Roofing. 866
Washington: The Product Line Exception
In Washington, a court applying the product line exception is
required to determine:
“(1) whether the transferee has acquired
substantially all the transferor’s assets,
leaving no more than a mere corporate
shell; (2) whether the transferee is holding
itself out to the general public as a
continuation of the transferor by
producing the same product line under a
similar name; and (3) whether the
transferee is benefiting from the goodwill
of the transferor.” 867
Much like California, Washington requires that the successor, in
some manner, cause the destruction of a plaintiff’s remedies in order to
satisfy the first element of the product line test. 868 The successor must
Constr. Co., v. Hedreen, 816 P.2d 762, 765–67 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991), rev.
denied, 118 Wash. 2d 1022, 827 P.2d 1392 (Wash. 1992).
Eagle Pac. Ins. Co. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 934 P.2d 715, 721 n.1
(Wash. Ct. App. 1997) aff’d, 959 P.2d 1052, 1056–60 (Wash. 1998); see Long v.
Home Health Servs. of Puget Sound, Inc., 719 P.2d 178, 181 (Wash. App
1986).
865

866

Cambridge Townhomes, 209 P.3d at 868.

Hall, 692 P.2d at 790 (quoting Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 387
(Wash. 1984)); see also George v. Parke-Davis, 733 P.2d 507, 510 (Wash. 1987)
(for the exception to apply, the successor must continue to manufacture the
specific type of product).
867

Hall, 692 P.2d at 792 (“A key premise of the product line exception is that
successor liability is only appropriate when the successor corporation by its
acquisition actually played some role in curtailing or destroying the claimants’
remedies.”); Fox v. Sunmaster Prods., Inc., 821 P.2d 502, 508 (Wash. Ct. App.
1991); see also Stewart v. Telex Comm., Inc., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 669, 675 (Cal. Ct.

868
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also continue to produce the same specific type of product at issue in the
lawsuit. 869 Although Washington courts have not expressly addressed
the application of the second element, the court in Hall v. Armstrong Cork,
Inc., addressed the application of the third, stating, “[t]he goodwill
transfer contemplated by the product line rule is that associated with the
predecessor business entity, not that associated with individual
products.” 870

West Virginia
In In re State Pub. Bldg. Asbestos Litigation, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia set out the traditional exceptions to the general
rule of successor nonliability but then applied the implied assumption
and mere continuation exceptions quite broadly. 871 The court described
the traditional exceptions as follows:
“A successor corporation can be liable for
the debts and obligations of a predecessor
corporation if there was an express or
implied assumption of liability, if the
transaction was fraudulent, or if some
element of the transaction was not made
in good faith. Successor liability will also
attach in a consolidation or merger under
W.Va. Code, 31-1-37(a)(5) (1974).
Finally, such liability will also result where
the successor corporation is a mere
continuation or reincarnation of its
predecessor.” 872
App. 1991) (“[S]ome causal connection between the succession and the
destruction of the plaintiff's remedy must be shown”).
George v. Parke-Davis, 733 P.2d 507, 510 (Wash. 1987) (holding that the
product line exception did not apply where the predecessor produced DES, and
the successor produced various pharmaceuticals but not DES).

869

Hall, 692 P.2d at 792 (citing Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d at 388–89); Ray v. Alad
Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977).
870

In re State Pub. Bldg. Asbestos Litigation, 454 S.E.2d 413, 424–25 (W. Va.
1994).

871

872 Id.

(quoting Davis v. Celotex Corp., 420 S.E.2d 557 (W. Va. 1992)).
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The court then affirmed the trial court’s finding of successor liability,
stating: “Grace [(the successor)] acquired all of Zonolite's assets and
continued to manufacture the same products as Zonolite. Therefore,
the trial judge could conclude that Grace impliedly assumed
responsibility or that it is a mere continuation or reincarnation of its
predecessor.” 873
A year later, though, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia indicated that ‘“[t]he mere continuation exception to the rule of
nonliability envisions a common identity of directors and stockholders
and the existence of only one corporation at the completion of the
transfer.”’ 874 The court then held that the mere continuation exception
did not apply because there was no commonality of ownership and only
one common director shared between the predecessor and the
successor. 875

Wisconsin
Wisconsin follows the traditional approach to successor liability
as well as the four traditional exceptions to the general rule of nonliability of asset purchasers:
“(1) when the purchasing corporation
expressly or impliedly agreed to assume
the selling corporation's liability; (2) when
the
transaction
amounts
to
a
consolidation or merger of the purchaser
and seller corporations; (3) when the
purchaser corporation is merely a
continuation of the seller corporation; or
(4) when the transaction is entered into

In re State, Pub. Bldg. Asbestos Litig., 454 S.E.2d at 425 (footnote omitted);
Carter Enters., Inc. v. Ashland Specialty Co., Inc., 257 B.R. 797, 803 (S.D. W.
Va. 2001).
873

Jordan v. Ravenswood Aluminum Corp., 455 S.E.2d 561, 564 (W. Va. 1995)
(quoting AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2711 (1986)).

874

875

Jordan, 455 S.E.2d at 564.
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fraudulently to escape liability for such
obligations.” 876
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin expressly declined to adopt the
product line exception or the “expanded continuation” exception
(continuity of enterprise) set out in Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co. 877
Wisconsin: The Express or Implied Assumption Exception
Wisconsin recognizes express or implied assumption of liabilities
as one way that a successor may be liable for the liabilities of its
predecessor. 878 “The first exception under Fish [v. Amsted Industries, Inc.]
requires an express or implied assumption of liabilities, not an express
exclusion of liabilities.” 879 The Columbia Propane, L.P. v. Wisconsin Gas Co.
court noted the importance of not blurring “the well-established and
fundamental distinction between an asset purchase and a stock
purchase.” 880
In Briggs & Stratton Power Products Group, LLC v. Generac Power
Systems, Inc., the court noted, “[T]he express mention of one matter
excludes other similar matters [that are] not mentioned.” 881 Thus, the
876 Fish v. Amsted Indus., 376 N.W.2d 820, 823 (Wis. 1985) (quoting Leannais
v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977)); Columbia Propane, L.P. v.
Wis. Gas Co., 661 N.W.2d 776, 784 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003).

Fish, 376 N.W.2d at 829 (stating, inter alia, in regard to the product line
exception, “[i]f the liability of successor corporations is to be expanded, we
conclude that such changes should be promulgated by the legislature,” and in
regard to the Turner, 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976), exception, “we decline to
adopt the ‘expanded continuation’ exception to nonliability for the same
reasons that we declined to adopt the product line exception.”); Red Arrow
Prods. Co. v. Emp’r Ins. of Wausau, 607 N.W.2d 294, 299–300 (Wis. Ct. App.
2000).

877

878 See

Fish, 376 N.W.2d at 823.

Columbia Propane, L.P. v. Wis. Gas Co., 661 N.W.2d 776, 785 (Wis. 2003)
(citing Fish v. Amsted., Indus., Inc., 126 Wis. 2d 293, 376 N.W.2d 820 (Wis.
1985)).
879

880

Id. at 785.

Briggs & Stratton Power Products Grp., LLC v. Generac Power Sys., Inc.,
796 N.W.2d 234, 238 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011) (citation omitted) (quoting FAS,
LLC v. Town of Bass Lake, 733 N.W.2d 287, 297 (Wis. 2007)).

881
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court reasoned: “The liabilities Briggs expressly assumed in the
Agreement were numerous; however, products liability was not expressly
included. Because products liability was not included in other Assumed
Liabilities under the Agreement, we conclude that Briggs did not assume
Generac's products liability under the Agreement.” 882
Wisconsin: The De Facto Merger Exception
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals has identified four factors used
to determine whether an asset purchase constitutes a de facto merger:
“(1) the assets of the seller corporation
are acquired with shares of the stock in
the buyer corporation, resulting in a
continuity of shareholders; (2) the seller
ceases operations and dissolves soon after
the sale; (3) the buyer continues the
enterprise of the seller corporation so that
there is a continuity of management,
employees, business location, assets and
general business operations; and (4) the
buyer assumes those liabilities of the seller
necessary
for
the
uninterrupted
continuation
of
normal
business
883
operations.”
Although not every factor need be present, “[t]he key element in
determining whether a merger or defacto [sic] merger has occurred is
that the transfer of ownership was for stock in the successor corporation
rather than cash.” 884

Briggs & Stratton, Power Products Grp., LLC, 796 N.W.2d at 238 (citing Town of
Bass Lake, 733 N.W.2d at 287).

882

Sedbrook v. Zimmerman Design Group, Ltd., 526 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Parson v. Roper Whitney, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1447,
1449 (W.D. Wis. 1984)); see Smith v. Meadows Mills, 60 F. Supp. 2d 911, 917
(E.D. Wis. 1999).
883

Fish, 376 N.W.2d at 824 (citing Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437,
439 (7th Cir. 1977)); Sedbrook, 526 N.W.2d at 761; Smith v. Meadows Mills,
Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 911, 917–18 (E.D. Wis. 1999).
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Wisconsin: The Mere Continuation Exception
“In determining if the successor is the ‘continuation’ of the
seller corporation, the key element ‘is a common identity of the officers,
directors and stockholders in the selling and purchasing
corporations.’” 885

Wyoming
As of February 2017, Wyoming courts do not appear to have
addressed successor liability.

The U.S. Virgin Islands
In 1985, the Federal District Court for the Virgin Islands
adopted the four traditional exceptions to the general rule of successor
nonliability as well as the continuity of enterprise exception, citing,
among other cases, Korzetz v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 886 and Turner v.
Bituminous Casualty Co., 887 for the respective guidelines. 888 The court
expressly rejected the product line theory, concluding that it was a
minority rule and not the “modern trend.” 889 The Third Circuit agreed
with the district court’s decision to reject the product line exception but
rejected its adoption of the continuity of enterprise exception stating
“[t]o the extent that the continuity of enterprise approach reaches
beyond the traditional exceptions, it violates the established principle of
corporate liability grounded on the continued existence of that entity.” 890
The Third Circuit set forth the traditional exceptions as follows:

Fish, 376 N.W.2d at 824 (quoting Leannais, 565 F.2d at 440); see also Smith v.
Meadows Mills, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 911, 917–18 (E.D. Wis. 1999).
885

886 72
887

F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Mich. 1979).

244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976).

Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 608 F. Supp. 1541, 1545 (D.V.I. 1985), rev’d, 802
F.2d 75 (3d. Cir. 1986).
888

889 Id.

at 1545.

890 Polius,

802 F.2d at 83.
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(1) [the purchaser] assumes liability; (2)
the
transaction
amounts
to
a
consolidation or merger; (3) the
transaction is fraudulent and intended to
provide an escape from liability; or (4) the
purchasing corporation is a mere
continuation of the selling company. 891
Regarding the de facto merger exception, the district court in
Martin v. Powermati, Inc. stated:
A transaction deemed an “asset purchase
agreement” may be a de facto merger
where:
“(1) There is a continuation of the
enterprise of the seller corporation, so
that there is a continuity of management,
personnel, physical location, assets, and
general business operations.
(2) There is a continuity of shareholders
which results from the purchasing
corporation paying for the acquired assets
with shares of its own stock, this stock
ultimately coming to be held by the
shareholders of the seller corporation so
that they become a constituent part of the
purchasing corporation.
(3) The seller corporation ceases its
ordinary business operations, liquidates,
and dissolves as soon as legally and
practically possible.
(4) The purchasing corporation assumes
those liabilities and obligations of the
seller ordinarily necessary for the
uninterrupted continuation of normal

891 Polius, 802 F.2d at 78; (citations omitted); Martin v. Powermatic, Inc., No.
01–0137, 2008 WL 2329642, at *3 (D.V.I. Jun. 4, 2008).
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business of operations of the seller
corporation.” 892
Regarding the mere continuation exception, the Third Circuit
stated: “[W]hen the form of the transfer does not accurately portray
substance, the courts will not refrain from deciding that the new
organization is simply the older one in another guise. In that instance,
the continuation approach [is] applicable.” 893

Guam
Courts in Guam do not appear to have addressed the issue of
successor liability in a published decision.

The Northern Mariana Islands
Courts in the Northern Mariana Islands do not appear to have
addressed the issue of successor liability in a reported opinion.

Puerto Rico
Puerto Rico has, on several occasions, addressed the issue of
successor liability and has adopted the traditional exceptions. Successor
corporations are not liable for the debts or acts of a predecessor
corporation except: (1) when the purchasing corporation expressly or
impliedly agreed to assume the selling corporation's liability; (2) when the
transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of the purchaser and
seller corporations; (3) when the purchaser corporation is merely a
continuation of the seller corporation; or (4) when the transaction is
entered into fraudulently to escape liability for such obligations. 894

Martin, 2008 WL 2329642 at *4 (quoting Berg Chilling Sys. v. Hull Corp.,
435 F.3d 455, 468–69 (3d. Cir. 2006)).

892

Polius, 802 F.2d at 78; Martin, 2008 WL 2329642 at *4; see Postdissolution
Product Claims and the Emerging Role of Successor Liability, 64 VA. L. REV. 861, 866
(1978).
893

Maldonado v. Valsyn S.A., 434 F. Supp. 2d 90, 92 (D.P.R. 2006); CarballoRodriguez v. Clark Equip. Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 63, 65 (D.P.R 2001) (citing
Carreiro v. Rhodes Gill & Co., Ltd., 68 F.3d 1443, 1447 (1st Cir. 1995));
Ricardo Cruz Distribs., Inc. v. Pace Setter, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 106, 110 (D.P.R.
1996); Explosives Corp. of Am. v. Garlam Enterps. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 364,
367 (D.P.R. 1985).
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